How Clients Select Brokers Larreguy,Marshall,and Querubin 2016).In sharp In neglecting this reality of client choice in select- contrast,there have been no efforts to systemati- ing brokers,party-centric studies have overlooked the cally theorize and examine client preferences for bro- client preferences empowered by such choice.At most, kers.Auyero's(2000,153)assertion,made nearly two these studies anticipate clients will prefer a broker decades ago,that studies of clientelism rarely take the with connections to party organizations.Such connec- agency of clients seriously still rings true today. tions unlock the top-down flow of party handouts dur This neglect of client preferences stems from in- ing elections that are seen to motivate resident sup- sufficient recognition of competition among brokers port.Client approval of a broker should therefore for clients,which enables a degree of choice in who hinge upon a party's prior approval,especially from clients can turn to for help(Scott 1977).Many influen- the resource-rich incumbent at the center of most top- tial studies of clientelism model interactions between down models. voters and a single dominant machine (Stokes 2005; By contrast,in competitive brokerage environments, Nichter 2008:Stokes et al.2013:Gans-Morse.Maz- client approval does not simply flow axiomatically from zuca,and Nichter 2014).In such settings,client choice prior party approval.Slum leaders,for example,must can only occur via intra-party competition among bro- attract a following through entrepreneurial sweat,by kers,which is rarely examined.Other frameworks advancing everyday resident demands through local specify a single broker (Gingerich and Medina 2013: lobbying and competing with others in the settlement Rueda 2015)or multiple brokers who each hold spa- who seek to engage in netagiri,or politicking.Indeed. tially distinct monopolies over clients (Gans-Morse, party leaders frequently consider a slum leader's local Mazzuca,and Nichter 2014;Camp 2015).Across all of popularity with clients in their own organizational deci- these models,clients are bereft of options,rendering sions.Party leaders in our study cities noted they could their preferences-and efforts to investigate them- not manufacture client support for any individual sim- redundant. ply by granting them a position within their local or- However,assumptions of single-party or single ganization.Instead they noted the need for brokers to 4号元 broker dominance do not align with the political re- be from the slum itself,and the importance of resident alities of many countries and communities.An ex- approval in shaping their own evaluations: pert survey (Kitschelt 2011)documents competitive "bilateral or multilateral"clientelistic party systems Party Elite 1:See,there would always be some leadership as more common than "unilateral clientelism.4 Fur- in the bastis;some people who were active and working ther,even within "unilateral machines,"ethnographic for people.Our party needed someone like this in the set- studies find evidence of microlevel competition among tlement.It was through such people that we strengthened brokers (Auyero 2000;Zarazaga 2014).In our study our position in the bastis...These are the people we would setting,we found slum dwellers reside in highly com- select for a party position. petitive brokerage environments.Our survey respon- 是 dents provided nearly 1,000 slum leader names,or Party Elite 2:Someone from the community emerges as a roughly 9 per settlement,and most slums had leaders strong leader,has a public following,and has strong influ- with formal affiliations to each of the city's major po- ence.In that case,we must approach him and offer him a litical parties. position. Competition grants clients a degree of choice in Author:You mean when there is someone the local peo- choosing whom they seek assistance from.In inter- ple already support,you then approach him and bring him views,Indian slum residents repeatedly noted they ac- into the party? tively selected their leaders: Party Elite 2:Yes,somehow we have to make him part of the party. Resident 1:Slum leaders help us because the residents of the basti [slum have chosen them as their leader. Party Elite 3:We [the party]can't make someone a neta [leader]just by giving him neta clothes and making him stand on the road.In that case he would just be a statue. Resident 2:We chose them so that they can help us when They must first have the support of residents to be a there is a problem. leader.10 Evidence from our survey of 629 slum leaders(de- Resident 3:Leaders help poor people who have no one in the government to go to...We have chosen them for a tailed below)provides further corroboration of the im- reason. portance of client support in solidifying a broker's ap- peal to political parties.We asked slum leaders what the biggest reason was for securing a position (pad) within a party.56.8%said popularity within the slum 4"Clientelistic effort proceeds within a bilateral or multilateral competitive framework"in contexts across Europe (Italy,Austria. the next most frequent item accounted for 10.11%of L Bulgaria,Ukraine),Asia (Indonesia,India,and Taiwan),Africa (Ghana and Nigeria),and even Latin America (Brazil and Colom- bia)(Kitschelt 2011,9) Interview with Congress ex-MLA,Bhopal,January 25,2017 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 7 August 2017 Interview with BJP municipal councilor,Jaipur,February 13,2017 6 Interview with Naya Colony Resident 3,August 2017 10 Interview with Congress municipal councilor,Bhopal,January 23. Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 9,August 2017 2017 777How Clients Select Brokers Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016). In sharp contrast, there have been no efforts to systemati￾cally theorize and examine client preferences for bro￾kers. Auyero’s (2000, 153) assertion, made nearly two decades ago, that studies of clientelism rarely take the agency of clients seriously still rings true today. This neglect of client preferences stems from in￾sufficient recognition of competition among brokers for clients, which enables a degree of choice in who clients can turn to for help (Scott 1977). Many influen￾tial studies of clientelism model interactions between voters and a single dominant machine (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Stokes et al. 2013; Gans-Morse, Maz￾zuca, and Nichter 2014). In such settings, client choice can only occur via intra-party competition among bro￾kers, which is rarely examined. Other frameworks specify a single broker (Gingerich and Medina 2013; Rueda 2015) or multiple brokers who each hold spa￾tially distinct monopolies over clients (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Camp 2015). Across all of these models, clients are bereft of options, rendering their preferences—and efforts to investigate them— redundant. However, assumptions of single-party or single￾broker dominance do not align with the political re￾alities of many countries and communities. An ex￾pert survey (Kitschelt 2011) documents competitive “bilateral or multilateral” clientelistic party systems as more common than “unilateral clientelism.”4 Fur￾ther, even within “unilateral machines,” ethnographic studies find evidence of microlevel competition among brokers (Auyero 2000; Zarazaga 2014). In our study setting, we found slum dwellers reside in highly com￾petitive brokerage environments. Our survey respon￾dents provided nearly 1,000 slum leader names, or roughly 9 per settlement, and most slums had leaders with formal affiliations to each of the city’s major po￾litical parties. Competition grants clients a degree of choice in choosing whom they seek assistance from. In inter￾views, Indian slum residents repeatedly noted they ac￾tively selected their leaders: Resident 1: Slum leaders help us because the residents of the basti [slum] have chosen them as their leader.5 * Resident 2: We chose them so that they can help us when there is a problem.6 * Resident 3: Leaders help poor people who have no one in the government to go to…We have chosen them for a reason.7 4 “Clientelistic effort proceeds within a bilateral or multilateral competitive framework” in contexts across Europe (Italy, Austria, Bulgaria, Ukraine), Asia (Indonesia, India, and Taiwan), Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), and even Latin America (Brazil and Colom￾bia) (Kitschelt 2011, 9). 5 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 7, August 2017. 6 Interview with Naya Colony Resident 3, August 2017. 7 Interview with Kamal Nagar Resident 9, August 2017. In neglecting this reality of client choice in select￾ing brokers, party-centric studies have overlooked the client preferences empowered by such choice. At most, these studies anticipate clients will prefer a broker with connections to party organizations. Such connec￾tions unlock the top-down flow of party handouts dur￾ing elections that are seen to motivate resident sup￾port. Client approval of a broker should therefore hinge upon a party’s prior approval, especially from the resource-rich incumbent at the center of most top￾down models. By contrast, in competitive brokerage environments, client approval does not simply flow axiomatically from prior party approval. Slum leaders, for example, must attract a following through entrepreneurial sweat, by advancing everyday resident demands through local lobbying and competing with others in the settlement who seek to engage in netagiri, or politicking. Indeed, party leaders frequently consider a slum leader’s local popularity with clients in their own organizational deci￾sions. Party leaders in our study cities noted they could not manufacture client support for any individual sim￾ply by granting them a position within their local or￾ganization. Instead they noted the need for brokers to be from the slum itself, and the importance of resident approval in shaping their own evaluations: Party Elite 1: See, there would always be some leadership in the bastis; some people who were active and working for people. Our party needed someone like this in the set￾tlement. It was through such people that we strengthened our position in the bastis...These are the people we would select for a party position.8 * Party Elite 2: Someone from the community emerges as a strong leader, has a public following, and has strong influ￾ence. In that case, we must approach him and offer him a position. Author: You mean when there is someone the local peo￾ple already support, you then approach him and bring him into the party? Party Elite 2: Yes, somehow we have to make him part of the party.9 * Party Elite 3: We [the party] can’t make someone a neta [leader] just by giving him neta clothes and making him stand on the road. In that case he would just be a statue. They must first have the support of residents to be a leader.10 Evidence from our survey of 629 slum leaders (de￾tailed below) provides further corroboration of the im￾portance of client support in solidifying a broker’s ap￾peal to political parties. We asked slum leaders what the biggest reason was for securing a position (pad) within a party. 56.8% said popularity within the slum (the next most frequent item accounted for 10.11% of 8 Interview with Congress ex-MLA, Bhopal, January 25, 2017. 9 Interview with BJP municipal councilor, Jaipur, February 13, 2017. 10 Interview with Congress municipal councilor, Bhopal, January 23, 2017. 777 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800028X