The NASa scientific satellites were shelved to await the sts return to flights Thus both Hubble and Galileo were put in storage to await later launch. In addition, the cryogenic Centaur upper stage for use from the Shuttle bay was cancelled. It was now seen as just too dangerous for a rare, high value asset like Shuttle. The direct consequence of this was that the galileo mission when it flew would take two more years since there was now no upper stage to push it directly to Jupiter. In order to get these it would have to do a flyby past venue and the earth twice to get enough delta-v. Since it is an RTG powered vehicle, this meant that 30 kg of plutonium came flying by the Earth twice to get to Jupiter. This has had the consequence of inflaming the anti nuclear movement and eventually sealed the fate of nuclear power in space. The delays for Galileo and the Hubble turned out to have interesting consequences. For Hubble, it was fortunate since problems were discovered with the hst paint that would have been much harder to fix in orbit and may have limited its utility. For Galileo, it was bad. Galileo was shipped across the country three times(twice to the Cape and once back ) This cross country trip and long storage led to the loss of lubricant in the high gain antenna which subsequently led to loss of that system on the way to Jupiter. Finally, NASa abandoned the policy of flying civilians (i.e. not regular astronauts)in the shuttle. In 1991, the Presidents advisory commission on space found the sts was still in the developmental phase. So much for operational status For space enthusiasts, the Reagan and Bush administration seemed like a return to the Kennedy mindset. Both Presidents believed in big government initiatives which they announced This was a return to the technocratic approach. However, there was a big difference relative to the Kennedy years. In all cases they chose targets that were too hard to do in a small number of years and they did not get or achieve the support of Congress in their decisions. Perhaps this is because they were not willing to make these primary policy issues versus ancilliary policy issues. Thus in 1983, President Reagan committed the country to a Strategic Defense Initiative to provide impenetrable shield against Soviet missile attack. In 1984 he pledged support for the NAsa goal of a permanently manned space station in a decade and also an"Orient Express" hypersonic aircraft to reach the far East in hours. In 1989, President Bush pledged the country to establish a lunar base and organize a human expedition to Mars within 30 years. All of these bold initiatives have failed. The reason for this are many but essentially come to issues of technical capability and primary policy versus secondary policy. Let us deal with technical capability first. The SDI NASP and sei as conceived either were technically almost impossible or involved basic research issues that had not been resolved. Basic research issues tend not to be solved by money but rely much more on getting the best and brightest minds to work on them. In the language of technology planners these things are idea limited rather than funding limited. For SDI, the conception of a perfect defense against a 10000 warhead attack when even one warhead can kill city involves levels of reliability unheard of in modern engineering. This is especially true since there would be no opportunity for a real test under real conditions of the integration of all the hardware and software to get a perfect kill ratio. No weapons planner plays on a kill probability of I but that is what the requirement for the system was. From the record, it seems like President Reagan was persuaded by a few influential hawks and it fit nicely with his vision of America Even his own science advisor was not told about his decision for SDI. This was a far cry from the Kennedy days. For the Orient Express(aka NASP) there were fundamental flaws in the requirements. It was meant to get to the Orient quickly but also to deliver things to orbit. These equirements meant that it had to fly fast in the dense atmosphere. This led to demands on materials and our breathing engines that(still) require basic research to resolve. When NASPThe NASA scientific satellites were shelved to await the STS return to flights. Thus both Hubble and Galileo were put in storage to await later launch. In addition, the cryogenic Centaur upper stage for use from the Shuttle bay was cancelled. It was now seen as just too dangerous for a rare, high value asset like Shuttle. The direct consequence of this was that the Galileo mission when it flew would take two more years since there was now no upper stage to push it directly to Jupiter. In order to get these it would have to do a flyby past Venue and the Earth twice to get enough delta-v. Since it is an RTG powered vehicle, this meant that 30 kg of plutonium came flying by the Earth twice to get to Jupiter. This has had the consequence of inflaming the anti￾nuclear movement and eventually sealed the fate of nuclear power in space. The delays for Galileo and the Hubble turned out to have interesting consequences. For Hubble, it was fortunate since problems were discovered with the HST paint that would have been much harder to fix in orbit and may have limited its utility. For Galileo, it was bad. Galileo was shipped across the country three times (twice to the Cape and once back). This cross country trip and long storage led to the loss of lubricant in the high gain antenna which subsequently led to loss of that system on the way to Jupiter. Finally, NASA abandoned the policy of flying civilians (i.e. not regular astronauts) in the shuttle. In 1991, the President’s advisory commission on space found the STS was still in the developmental phase. So much for operational status! For space enthusiasts, the Reagan and Bush administration seemed like a return to the Kennedy mindset. Both President’s believed in big government initiatives which they announced. This was a return to the technocratic approach. However, there was a big difference relative to the Kennedy years. In all cases they chose targets that were too hard to do in a small number of years and they did not get or achieve the support of Congress in their decisions. Perhaps this is because they were not willing to make these primary policy issues versus ancilliary policy issues. Thus in 1983, President Reagan committed the country to a Strategic Defense Initiative to provide an impenetrable shield against Soviet missile attack. In 1984 he pledged support for the NASA goal of a permanently manned space station in a decade and also an “Orient Express” hypersonic aircraft to reach the far East in hours. In 1989, President Bush pledged the country to establish a lunar base and organize a human expedition to Mars within 30 years. All of these bold initiatives have failed. The reason for this are many but essentially come to issues of technical capability and primary policy versus secondary policy. Let us deal with technical capability first. The SDI, NASP and SEI as conceived either were technically almost impossible or involved basic research issues that had not been resolved. Basic research issues tend not to be solved by money but rely much more on getting the best and brightest minds to work on them. In the language of technology planners these things are idea limited rather than funding limited. For SDI, the conception of a perfect defense against a 10000 warhead attack when even one warhead can kill a city involves levels of reliability unheard of in modern engineering. This is especially true since there would be no opportunity for a real test under real conditions of the integration of all the hardware and software to get a perfect kill ratio. No weapons planner plays on a kill probability of 1 but that is what the requirement for the system was. From the record, it seems like President Reagan was persuaded by a few influential hawks and it fit nicely with his vision of America. Even his own science advisor was not told about his decision for SDI. This was a far cry from the Kennedy days. For the Orient Express (aka NASP) there were fundamental flaws in the requirements. It was meant to get to the Orient quickly but also to deliver things to orbit. These requirements meant that it had to fly fast in the dense atmosphere. This led to demands on materials and our breathing engines that (still) require basic research to resolve. When NASP 4