started it was said one needed to work on materials and engines when it collapsed $9 billion later it needed work on materials and engines. For SEl, there are basic research questions of human survival under high radiation, microgravity environments for long times that we do not understand In contrast the Apollo program had no fundamental research questions we did not know. To see the contrast it is helpful to consider two other programs which have not yielded to big overnment pushes but instead have required steady pushes over long times to see progress These are the war on cancer(born of the Apollo effort.. if we can go to the Moon we can solve cancer)and the effort to harness magnetic fusion energy. Both of these big pushes have failed dramatically. Another key part of the Apollo program was that it attracted and motivated a generation of the best students. By contrast, the SDI initiative was so controversial that many of the best scientists would not i.e. refused to work on it. This led to the statement from the sdi chief scientist that if he could not get a few first rate scientists to work on something, he would make it up with twice as many second rate scientists. This of course is a linear view of progress in basic research that is not supported by the historical data on how progress is made in science The second reason for failure is in primary versus secondary policy. Primary policy breaks with past decisions and perspectives to meet the nations top priorities. It has long term goals and has organized efforts to achieve them, so for Reagan primary policy was budget cuts, tax cuts and a huge defense buildup. For Bush primary policy was on the budget deficits. Primary policy is innovation. By contrast ancillary policy does not solve identified national problems. It has lo grade status and receives limited attention and funding. Ancillary policy is the policy of continuation. By all these measures, in the 60s space policy was primary policy. It met the national angst after Sputnik and was bold and innovative. The Congress clearly bought in and money flowed freely. There was broad public support and consensus on the goal, which was to show we could beat the Soviets. In contrast all the space policy behind all the initiatives was secondary or ancillary policy. The interest in the space enterprise had declined in the public mind and there was no consensus between the White House and the Congress on where to go. There shos no Johnson to build the consensus with the Congress In primary policy the question is"What should we do? In ancillary policy, the question becomes"What can we afford? and"How can we sell it? The Space Station decision was marked by all of these large differences with the Apollo decision. The biggest and clearest way to see the difference between the two is to look at the difference in funding as a function of the Federal budget. This is a measure of the importance the administration and Congress really puts on something. In FY60, the NASa budget was 0.8% of the Federal budget. In FY66 it was 4.4% of the Federal budget, in FY80 it was back to 0.8% of the budget, in FY84( Space Station)it was 0.8% of the budget and actually dropped the next year to 0. 7% of the budget. FY90(SEI)it was 0.99% of the budget and has since dropped significantly The Space Station was announced in January 1984 by the President in the context of a speech where he talked of living and working in space for peaceful economic and scientific gain However, just to contrast it with the Soviet Mir(peace) it was to be called Freedom. What was the objective of the station? In the original NASA plan, the Space Station was a staging place for a mission to Mars serviced and supported by a truck, the Sts. Thus NASa touted Station as the next logical step but since there was no national commitment to Mars, there was not any realstarted it was said one needed to work on materials and engines when it collapsed $9 billion later, it needed work on materials and engines. For SEI, there are basic research questions of human survival under high radiation, microgravity environments for long times that we do not understand. In contrast the Apollo program had no fundamental research questions we did not know. To see the contrast it is helpful to consider two other programs which have not yielded to big government pushes but instead have required steady pushes over long times to see progress. These are the war on cancer (born of the Apollo effort…if we can go to the Moon we can solve cancer) and the effort to harness magnetic fusion energy. Both of these big pushes have failed dramatically. Another key part of the Apollo program was that it attracted and motivated a generation of the best students. By contrast, the SDI initiative was so controversial that many of the best scientists would not i.e. refused to work on it. This led to the statement from the SDI chief scientist that if he could not get a few first rate scientists to work on something, he would make it up with twice as many second rate scientists. This of course is a linear view of progress in basic research that is not supported by the historical data on how progress is made in science. The second reason for failure is in primary versus secondary policy. Primary policy breaks with past decisions and perspectives to meet the nation’s top priorities. It has long term goals and has organized efforts to achieve them, so for Reagan primary policy was budget cuts, tax cuts and a huge defense buildup. For Bush primary policy was on the budget deficits. Primary policy is innovation. By contrast ancillary policy does not solve identified national problems. It has low grade status and receives limited attention and funding. Ancillary policy is the policy of continuation. By all these measures, in the 60’s space policy was primary policy. It met the national angst after Sputnik and was bold and innovative. The Congress clearly bought in and money flowed freely. There was broad public support and consensus on the goal, which was to show we could beat the Soviets. In contrast all the space policy behind all the initiatives was secondary or ancillary policy. The interest in the space enterprise had declined in the public mind and there was no consensus between the White House and the Congress on where to go. There was no Johnson to build the consensus with the Congress. In primary policy the question is “What should we do?” In ancillary policy, the question becomes “What can we afford?” and “How can we sell it?” The Space Station decision was marked by all of these large differences with the Apollo decision. The biggest and clearest way to see the difference between the two is to look at the difference in funding as a function of the Federal budget. This is a measure of the importance the administration and Congress really puts on something. In FY60, the NASA budget was 0.8% of the Federal budget. In FY66 it was 4.4% of the Federal budget, in FY80 it was back to 0.8% of the budget, in FY84 (Space Station) it was 0.8% of the budget and actually dropped the next year to 0.7% of the budget. FY90 (SEI) it was 0.99% of the budget and has since dropped significantly. The Space Station was announced in January 1984 by the President in the context of a speech where he talked of living and working in space for peaceful economic and scientific gain. However, just to contrast it with the Soviet Mir (peace) it was to be called Freedom. What was the objective of the station? In the original NASA plan, the Space Station was a staging place for a mission to Mars serviced and supported by a truck, the STS. Thus NASA touted Station as the next logical step but since there was no national commitment to Mars, there was not any real 5