debate on what it was the next logical step for. Clearly also a staging post is different than a scientific facility and has different design drivers. Nevertheless because there was no clear objective for Station it quickly ran into trouble and NASa made it worse by repeatedly changing the rationale for the Station. Thus is was the next logical step, for a while it was an orbiting lab facility to do all kinds of science work, sort of a Oak Ridge National Lab, in the sky. This ran afoul of a number of the scientific societies who pointed out that most science does not require it to be done in space(and of course they were concerned that it would take money from science). It was also touted as an international effort to show how the US got along with the Europeans and Japanese. Both of these space agencies were strong armed into participating in it. For a while it was also a place where commercialization of space would be undertaken. These were claims of vast amounts of commercial discoveries that would flow from Station. When asked to be specific the advocates of this would suggest that it was serendipity and one could not say exactly. finally low point, the Station was pitched itched by one nasa administrator as a means to revitalize the objective why not spend the money directly on education? uestion that if this was the primary education of youth in America. Of course this raised the NASA also suggested the station cost as $8 billion. This estimate came not from any technical cost analysis(actually the internal cost estimates at NASa were twice this) but from the political erception that $8 billion was the most they could ask for and get the project approved. This was he camels nose strategy in full force. In order to come up with even the $16 billion figure, NASA omitted all transportation and operations costs for the station. In contrast the estimated cost of Station is $19-22 billion to construct and $9 billion for all costs over its full projected lifetime This lack of consensus over objectives led to the predictable result that the station had a major redesign or rescoping in 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992. By the time the decade was up(in 1994 NASA had spent $9 billion and had not produced a single piece of hardware. NASA also decided to go without a prime contractor for the Station and allowed it to become a jobs program in many states as possible. The NASa centers saw the station as the way to build up their own institutional power and each brought as much of it to their centers as possible. To give a sense of the forces by the early nineties to run the centers took $9 billion/yr. without doing anything productive. Thus the Station became just a means to justify the continued existence of NASA and spent most of the eighties being redesigned to meet changing objectives. It came up repeatedly in Congress for approval and was nearly killed on several occasions Only its use as a job program saved it. What a far cry from the vitality of the apollo program For Military space, the eighties were a period of considerable opportunities and maturing Within the doD, the Air Force formed a Space Command in 1982 and 1985 a Unified spac Command was formed. This was an attempt to"operationalize"space and make it a mission ather than a place In the meantime the systems like DMSP, dSP, Milstar and GPs continued to come online and provide space support that would come to fruition in the Gulf War. The big military innovation in space was the SDI. Once it was announced large resources flowed into it. Many old and new ideas were discussed to meet the objective of an impenetrable shield. These included nuclear explosion driven X-ray lasers to shoot down missiles, large space based lasers, particle beam weapons and by the end of this period Brilliant Eyes"and"Brilliant Pebbles"as technical schemes to hit all 10,000 warheads. During this decade there was two attempts to undertake space commercialization that collapsed under their own logical contradictions. One was the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 which directed the dot to facilitate, license anddebate on what it was the next logical step for. Clearly also a staging post is different than a scientific facility and has different design drivers. Nevertheless because there was no clear objective for Station it quickly ran into trouble and NASA made it worse by repeatedly changing the rationale for the Station. Thus is was the next logical step, for a while it was an orbiting lab facility to do all kinds of science work, sort of a Oak Ridge National Lab, in the sky. This ran afoul of a number of the scientific societies who pointed out that most science does not require it to be done in space (and of course they were concerned that it would take money from science). It was also touted as an international effort to show how the US got along with the Europeans and Japanese. Both of these space agencies were strong armed into participating in it. For a while it was also a place where commercialization of space would be undertaken. These were claims of vast amounts of commercial discoveries that would flow from Station. When asked to be specific the advocates of this would suggest that it was serendipity and one could not say exactly. Finally in a low point, the Station was pitched by one NASA administrator as a means to revitalize the education of youth in America. Of course this raised the question that if this was the primary objective why not spend the money directly on education? NASA also suggested the station cost as $8 billion. This estimate came not from any technical cost analysis (actually the internal cost estimates at NASA were twice this) but from the political perception that $8 billion was the most they could ask for and get the project approved. This was the camels nose strategy in full force. In order to come up with even the $16 billion figure, NASA omitted all transportation and operations costs for the station. In contrast the estimated cost of Station is $19-22 billion to construct and $96 billion for all costs over its full projected lifetime. This lack of consensus over objectives led to the predictable result that the station had a major redesign or rescoping in 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1992. By the time the decade was up (in 1994) NASA had spent $9 billion and had not produced a single piece of hardware. NASA also decided to go without a prime contractor for the Station and allowed it to become a jobs program in as many states as possible. The NASA centers saw the station as the way to build up their own institutional power and each brought as much of it to their centers as possible. To give a sense of the forces by the early nineties to run the centers took $9 billion/yr. without doing anything productive. Thus the Station became just a means to justify the continued existence of NASA and spent most of the eighties being redesigned to meet changing objectives. It came up repeatedly in Congress for approval and was nearly killed on several occasions. Only its use as a job program saved it. What a far cry from the vitality of the Apollo program. For Military space, the eighties were a period of considerable opportunities and maturing. Within the DoD, the Air Force formed a Space Command in 1982 and 1985 a Unified Space Command was formed. This was an attempt to “operationalize” space and make it a mission rather than a place. In the meantime the systems like DMSP, DSP, Milstar and GPS continued to come online and provide space support that would come to fruition in the Gulf War. The big military innovation in space was the SDI. Once it was announced, large resources flowed into it. Many old and new ideas were discussed to meet the objective of an impenetrable shield. These included nuclear explosion driven X-ray lasers to shoot down missiles, large space based lasers, particle beam weapons and by the end of this period ‘Brilliant Eyes” and “Brilliant Pebbles” as technical schemes to hit all 10,000 warheads. During this decade there was two attempts to undertake space commercialization that collapsed under their own logical contradictions. One was the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 which directed the DoT to facilitate, license and 6