12 For the next several years,the routine at Fenghuang shan proceeded much as it had under Gordon and Jebb:Commands were given in Chinese rather than English; Chinese officials supervised the basic administration of the camp;Anhui Army officers occupied the military posts of tongling and yingguan(battalion commander);and customs revenue sustained the camp.But by 1873,after nearly a decade of operation and the expenditure of nearly a million and a half taels,the training program had degenerated beyond any hope of redemption.As early as 1869,the North-China Herald described it as a collection of "quondam rebels,opium smokers and idlers."Ding Richang,now governor of Jiangsu,expressed a similar view,writing that the troops at the camp were inadequately trained,riddled with corruption,extravagant,unclean,and poorly led.Most of the middle grade officers smoked opium,and he described the two Chinese battalion commanders at Fenghuang shan as listless and"slippery."Ding considered the whole program to have "form without substance."[40] Winstanley,too,complained vehemently about the situation,but bound by the 1864 agreeement,he and his foreign associates were "powerless to correct domestic abuses.British officials in Shanghai,and Winstanley himself,tried to expand the foreign role at Fenghuang shan,but to no avail.The Chinese felt that foreign meddling in camp affairs was already too pronounced.In mid-1873 the Fenghuang shan program was abruptly terminated,to the intense displeasure of local British officials and the extreme satisfaction of the Qing authorities.Too much attention on the part of Westerners had not compensated for neglect on the part of the Chinese.Indeed,the two tendencies had a complementary effect in hastening the decline of the program. The failure of Fenghuang shan reflected the failure of foreign-training programs generally in the Tongzhi period(1862-1874).Lacking central government direction and support,these programs lasted only as long as the enthusiasm or tenure of their local sponsors.Most programs withered and died well before Fenghuang shan.[41]Yet in the absence of a regular institutional means of producing a modern,Western-trained Chinese officer corps,Qing officials,including Li Hongzhang,continued to use foreigners to train their troops.[42]However,Li now approached the matter of using Western talent from two different directions.One was naturally the familiar strategy of employing Westerners in China on an ad hoc basis,according to immediate needs.The other,more complex in conception and execution,was to send Chinese abroad for exposure to Western military Influences. After Li became governor-general of Chihli in 1870,he found that he could now draw on an ever-widening circle of foreign contacts in the pursuit of both approaches.In part,this development can be explained by his own rapidly expanding domestic network of progressively-minded protegees,such as Ding Richang,who not only acquired increasing power and prestige within the Qing bureaucracy,but who also enjoyed good standing among foreigners in China.His greater access to foreign talent can also be attributed to the maturation of his long-standing friendship with Robert Hart,who allowed Western employees from the maritime customs administration,like H.E Hobson,to serve Li (and other Chinese officials)in various modernizing enterprises.Yet another explanation for his success is that in Tientsin--as both the governor general of the metropolitan province and commissioner for the three northern ports--Li became,in effect,a central government official,in a position to attempt the coordination of China's diplomacy,military defense,and self-strengthening projects.Few foreign representatives12 For the next several years, the routine at Fenghuang shan proceeded much as it had under Gordon and Jebb: Commands were given in Chinese rather than English; Chinese officials supervised the basic administration of the camp; Anhui Army officers occupied the military posts of tongling and yingguan (battalion commander); and customs revenue sustained the camp. But by 1873, after nearly a decade of operation and the expenditure of nearly a million and a half taels, the training program had degenerated beyond any hope of redemption. As early as 1869, the North-China Herald described it as a collection of "quondam rebels, opium smokers and idlers." Ding Richang, now governor of Jiangsu, expressed a similar view, writing that the troops at the camp were inadequately trained, riddled with corruption, extravagant, unclean, and poorly led. Most of the middle grade officers smoked opium, and he described the two Chinese battalion commanders at Fenghuang shan as listless and "slippery." Ding considered the whole program to have "form without substance." [40] Winstanley, too, complained vehemently about the situation, but bound by the 1864 agreeement, he and his foreign associates were "powerless to correct domestic abuses." British officials in Shanghai, and Winstanley himself, tried to expand the foreign role at Fenghuang shan, but to no avail. The Chinese felt that foreign meddling in camp affairs was already too pronounced. In mid-1873 the Fenghuang shan program was abruptly terminated, to the intense displeasure of local British officials and the extreme satisfaction of the Qing authorities. Too much attention on the part of Westerners had not compensated for neglect on the part of the Chinese. Indeed, the two tendencies had a complementary effect in hastening the decline of the program. The failure of Fenghuang shan reflected the failure of foreign-training programs generally in the Tongzhi period (1862-1874). Lacking central government direction and support, these programs lasted only as long as the enthusiasm or tenure of their local sponsors.Most programs withered and died well before Fenghuang shan. [41] Yet in the absence of a regular institutional means of producing a modern, Western-trained Chinese officer corps, Qing officials, including Li Hongzhang, continued to use foreigners to train their troops. [42] However, Li now approached the matter of using Western talent from two different directions. One was naturally the familiar strategy of employing Westerners in China on an ad hoc basis, according to immediate needs. The other, more complex in conception and execution, was to send Chinese abroad for exposure to Western military influences. After Li became governor-general of Chihli in 1870, he found that he could now draw on an ever-widening circle of foreign contacts in the pursuit of both approaches. In part, this development can be explained by his own rapidly expanding domestic network of progressively-minded protegees, such as Ding Richang, who not only acquired increasing power and prestige within the Qing bureaucracy, but who also enjoyed good standing among foreigners in China. His greater access to foreign talent can also be attributed to the maturation of his long-standing friendship with Robert Hart, who allowed Western employees from the maritime customs administration, like H. E. Hobson, to serve Li (and other Chinese officials) in various modernizing enterprises. Yet another explanation for his success is that in Tientsin--as both the governor general of the metropolitan province and commissioner for the three northern ports--Li became, in effect, a central government official, in a position to attempt the coordination of China's diplomacy, military defense, and self-strengthening projects. Few foreign representatives