The“Other”Geneva Conference 65 posed political conference.Jackson and his colleagues did not expect their task to be easy,for the South Koreans seemed to be suffering from a case of collective manic de- pression."Korea has had a frustrating recent history,"stated one psychological-warfare report."Perhaps as a result of this,Korean aspirations,both personal and national,are gran- diose and often impossible of attainment.The resulting frus- trations induced by failure to achieve aspirations lead to mo- rose passivity,panic,or belligerence." As the Geneva conference approached,its importance to the United States increased daily,not for Korea's sake,but for the role it would play in the larger context of the Cold War. In the weeks before Geneva,the Eisenhower administration was attempting to line up support for military action in Indo- china,but with little success.The British,whose cooperation the administration presupposed vital to intervention,consid- ered Indochina a losing venture.Moreover,many people in Britain,remembering loose talk about the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese during the heavy fighting in Korea,considered the Americans trigger-happy.Whether British leaders agreed with this sentiment or not,it was some- thing they could not ignore.Neither,then,could the Eisen- hower administration.If there was to be any hope for united action in Indochina,the administration had to demonstrate that its fundamental goal in Asia was peace,and not the de- struction of Communist China,as many in Britain believed. Such a demonstration required a good showing at the Korea conference. And a good showing on Korea required the cooperation 8.Jackson to Robert Cutler,March 4,1953,box 2,Jackson Records,Eisenhower Library,Abilene,Kansas.United States Information Service(USIS)Country Plan: Korea,July 24,1953,box 4,ibid.Jackson landed his White House post largely on the basis of a World War II stint as Eisenhower's assistant for psychological warfare. Some detailed background on Jackson can be found in a lengthy obituary article of Sept.25,1964,in FYI,the house organ of Time,Inc.,where Jackson worked for many years.A copy of this article accompanies the Jackson Papers at the Eisenhower Library.See also Blanche Wiesen Cook,The Declassified Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.,1981),passim. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThe "Other" Geneva Conference 65 posed political conference. Jackson and his colleagues did not expect their task to be easy, for the South Koreans seemed to be suffering from a case of collective manic de￾pression. "Korea has had a frustrating recent history," stated one psychological-warfare report. "Perhaps as a result of this, Korean aspirations, both personal and national, are gran￾diose and often impossible of attainment. The resulting frus￾trations induced by failure to achieve aspirations lead to mo￾rose passivity, panic, or belligerence."8 As the Geneva conference approached, its importance to the United States increased daily, not for Korea's sake, but for the role it would play in the larger context of the Cold War. In the weeks before Geneva, the Eisenhower administration was attempting to line up support for military action in Indo￾china, but with little success. The British, whose cooperation the administration presupposed vital to intervention, consid￾ered Indochina a losing venture. Moreover, many people in Britain, remembering loose talk about the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese during the heavy fighting in Korea, considered the Americans trigger-happy. Whether British leaders agreed with this sentiment or not, it was some￾thing they could not ignore. Neither, then, could the Eisen￾hower administration. If there was to be any hope for united action in Indochina, the administration had to demonstrate that its fundamental goal in Asia was peace, and not the de￾struction of Communist China, as many in Britain believed. Such a demonstration required a good showing at the Korea conference. And a good showing on Korea required the cooperation 8. Jackson to Robert Cutler, March 4, 1953, box 2,Jackson Records, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. United States Information Service (USIS) Country Plan: Korea, July 24, 1953, box 4, ibid. Jackson landed his White House post largely on the basis of a World War II stint as Eisenhower's assistant for psychological warfare. Some detailed background on Jackson can be found in a lengthy obituary article of Sept. 25, 1964, in FYI, the house organ of Time, Inc., where Jackson worked for many years. A copy of this article accompanies the Jackson Papers at the Eisenhower Library. See also Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y., 1981), passim. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions