International Security 13:3 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises.Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations,they deserve further explication. In June 1950,Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow.America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War,this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950and1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects.First,despite flaws in enemy delivery capa- bilities,the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly,Washington acknowledged real limita- tions in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets.Although 4.David Alan Rosenberg,"U.S.Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.38,No.5(May1982),p.26. 5.Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC,August 25,1950, intelligence file,president's secretary's file (PSF),Box 250,Harry S Truman papers,Truman Library,Independence,Missouri (hereafter"Truman papers,HSTL"). 6.Executive Secretary,National Security Council(NSC),to Chairman,AEC,December 6,1950, NSC atomic weapons file,PSF,Box 202,Truman papers,HSTL;Briefing:Air Estimate of the Situation,1951-1954,U.S.Air Force Commanders'Conference,October 30,1951,item 168.7026- 9,Charles Cabell papers,Simpson Historical Research Center,Maxwell Air Force Base,Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers").The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951.New York Times,October 2,1951;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command (SAC),Development of Strategic Air Command,1946-1976 (Omaha:U.S.Air Force SAC,1976),Pp.20,27,33,35,38;Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary,NSC,June 8,1953,Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA) NSC subject file,atomic energy series,Box 1,Dwight D.Eisenhower papers,Dwight D.Eisen- hower Library,Abilene,Kansas;Office of the Historian,Strategic Air Command,Status of Strategic Air Command,January-June 1953,Volume 1,frame 0481,reel K4263,Office of Air Force History,Bolling Air Force Base,Maryland. 7.President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951;Public Papers of the President,1951(Washington,D.C.:U.S.Government Printing Office [U.S.GPO],1965),pp.225-226.This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers,with dates and pages.By early 1953,President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent,not the possibility,of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes.See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter"FRUS"),1952-1954,Volume 2,National Security Affairs (Washington,D.C.:U.S.GPO, 1984),pp.203,213-214,232-233. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 13:3 j 52 of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 had worked and could prove effective in future crises. Because these three ideas profoundly influenced the decisions of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, they deserve further explication. In June 1950, Washington had a clear but qualified nuclear advantage over Moscow. America had nearly three hundred atomic bombs in its stockpile, and more than two hundred sixty aircraft capable of putting them on Soviet targets.4 The Soviet Union had exploded its first nuclear device only ten months earlier and could strike the United States only by one-way bomber missions or by smuggling nuclear weapons into American harbors aboard merchant vessels.5 While both powers dramatically increased their nuclear stockpiles and improved their delivery systems during the Korean War, this balance favoring the United States did not change fundamentally between 1950 and 1953.6 But American decision-makers recognized that their nuclear superiority was qualified in two respects. First, despite flaws in enemy delivery capa￾bilities, the grim truth was that Moscow's ability to strike the American heartland was growing.7 Secondly, Washington acknowledged real limita￾tions in America's ability to put nuclear weapons on enemy targets. Although 4. David Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile 1945 to 1950," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1982), p. 26. 5. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence memorandum 323-SRC, August 25, 1950, intelligence file, president's secretary's file (PSF), Box 250, Harry S Truman papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter "Truman papers, HSTL"). 6. Executive Secretary, National Security Council (NSC), to Chairman, AEC, December 6, 1950, NSC atomic weapons file, PSF, Box 202, Truman papers, HSTL; Briefing: Air Estimate of the Situation, 1951-1954, U.S. Air Force Commanders' Conference, October 30, 1951, item 168.7026- 9, Charles Cabell papers, Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (hereafter "Cabell papers"). The briefing document puts Soviet nuclear strength at less than half the estimated American stockpile as of January 1951. New York Times, October 2, 1951; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1976 (Omaha: U.S. Air Force SAC, 1976), pp. 20, 27, 33, 35, 38; Secretary of Defense to Executive Secretary, NSC, June 8, 1953, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), NSC subject file, atomic energy series, Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, Dwight D. Eisen￾hower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command, Status of Strategic Air Command, January-June 1953, Volume 1, frame 0481, reel K4263, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland. 7. President Truman publicly acknowledged American vulnerability to Soviet attack in April 1951; Public Papers of the President, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1965), pp. 225-226. This series will hereafter be cited as Truman Public Papers, with dates and pages. By early 1953, President Eisenhower's advisers were debating the extent, not the possibility, of damage from Soviet nuclear strikes. See Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter "FRUS"), 1952-1954, Volume 2, National Security Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1984), pp. 203, 213-214, 232-233. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions