syllogisms;or,on the other hand,from premises which have not been thus proved,and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof.Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length,for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers:those of the latter kind will fail to win assent,because they are based on premises that are not generally admitted or believed Para.8:The enthymeme and the example must,then,deal with what is in the main contingent,the example being an induction,and the enthymeme a syllogism,about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions,fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism.For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact,there is no need even to mention it;the hearer adds it himself.Thus,to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown,it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games", without adding"And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown",a fact which everybody knows. There are few facts of the necessary type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms.Most of the things about which we make decisions,and into which therefore we inquire,present us with alternative possibilities.For it is about our actions what we deliberate and inquire,and all our actions have a contingent character;hardly any of them are determined by necessity.Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premises that do the same,just as necessary conclusions must be drawn from necessary premises;this too is clear to us from the Analytics.It is evident,therefore,that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be necessary,will most of them be only usually true.Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs,which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true.A Probability is a thing that usually happens;not,however,as some definitions would suggest,anything whatever that usually happens,but only if it belongs to the class of the contingent or variable.It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular.Of signs,one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal,the other the same as the universal bears to the particular.The infallible kind is a complete proof;the fallible kind has no specific name.By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based:and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called complete proof:when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted,they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof",meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed;for the word“perhas'”has the same meaning(of“end'or“boundary"")as the word“tekmarh”in the ancient tongue.Now the one kind of Sign(that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal)may be illustrated thus.Suppose it were said,"The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just".Here we certainly have a Sign;but even though the proposition be true,the argument is refutable,since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose,on the other hand,it were said,"The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill",or, "The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child".Here we have the infallible kind of Sign,the only kind that constitutes a complete proof,since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true,is irrefutable.The other kind of sign,that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular,might be illustrated by saying,"The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever".This argument also is refutable,even if the statement about the fast breathing be true,since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premises which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premises that are not generally admitted or believed. Para. 8: The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say “For he has been victor in the Olympic games”, without adding “And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown”, a fact which everybody knows. There are few facts of the necessary type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions what we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premises that do the same, just as necessary conclusions must be drawn from necessary premises; this too is clear to us from the Analytics. It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be necessary, will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the contingent or variable. It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular. Of signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a complete proof; the fallible kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called complete proof: when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a “complete proof”, meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed; for the word “perhas” has the same meaning (of “end” or “boundary”) as the word “tekmarh” in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, “The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just”. Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, “The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill”, or, “The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child”. Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, “The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever”. This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever