fact,it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it,as we said at the outset.Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject:both are faculties for providing arguments.This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other. Para.5:With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof:just as in dialectic there is induction(归纳法)on the one hand and syllogism(三段论)or apparent syllogism on the other,so it is in rhetoric.The example is an induction,the enthymeme is a syllogism,and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism.I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism,and the example a rhetorical induction.Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples:there is no other way.And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics),it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions.The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed.When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases,this is induction in dialectic,example in rhetoric;when it is shown that, certain propositions being true,a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence,whether invariably or usually,this is called syllogism in dialectic,enthymeme in rhetoric.It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages.Types of oratory,I say:for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here;in some oratorical styles examples prevail,in others enthymemes;and in like manner,some orators are better at the former and some at the latter.Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind,but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause.The sources of examples and enthymemes,and their proper uses,we will discuss later.Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly. Para.6:A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so.In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades.But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine,for instance,does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias,but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients:this also is business:individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible.In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias,but with what seems probable to men of a given type;and this is true of dialectic also.Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials,such as the fancies of crazy people,but out of materials that call for discussion;and rhetoric,too,draws upon the regular subjects of debate.The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us,in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument,or follow a long chain of reasoning.The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities:about things that could not have been and cannot now or in the future be,other than they are,nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation Para.7:It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previousfact, it is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.Para.5: With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction （归纳法） on the one hand and syllogism （三段论） or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly. Para. 6: A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this also is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation. Para. 7: It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous