The Magic Bullet?The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization Michael J.Hiscox Introduction The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences.It is typically por- trayed as a clever maneuver that,by shifting authority over trade policy from Con- gress to the president,fundamentally altered the nature of the policymaking process and drastically changed the future course of U.S.trade relations.Wedded to high levels of tariff protection for most of its history,the United States began a steady process of tariff reduction after 1934 that helped to transform the international economy. The connection between the RTAA and the shift in policy seems obvious.How else can we explain the sudden swing toward liberalization after 1934 than by refer- ence to the institutional change of 1934?Why else would there be a sudden move- ment away from a seemingly robust protectionist equilibrium?In the political- economy literature,the standard explanation for inefficient protectionism is that the benefits of tariffs are concentrated among producers in import-competing industries, whereas the costs are dispersed among producers in other industries and consumers; so the former find it easier to organize collectively to influence policy to their advan- tage.An escape from this political trap is likely only if some change in the institu- tions that govern policymaking can provide greater political weight to members of the large free-trade bloc. The conventional wisdom on the RTAA relies on two versions of this same claim. The first version focuses on how delegating authority to the president eliminated protectionist logrolling and made more salient the costs of tariffs to consumers that would otherwise have been neglected because they were dispersed across electoral An earlier version of this article was presented at the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,Washington,D.C.,1997.I thank David Lake,Peter Gourevitch,and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. International Organization 53,4,Autumn 1999,pp.669-698 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyThe Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization Michael J. Hiscox Introduction The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences. It is typically por￾trayed as a clever maneuver that, by shifting authority over trade policy from Con￾gress to the president, fundamentally altered the nature of the policymaking process and drastically changed the future course of U.S. trade relations. Wedded to high levels of tariff protection for most of its history, the United States began a steady process of tariff reduction after 1934 that helped to transform the international economy. The connection between the RTAA and the shift in policy seems obvious. How else can we explain the sudden swing toward liberalization after 1934 than by refer￾ence to the institutional change of 1934? Why else would there be a sudden move￾ment away from a seemingly robust protectionist equilibrium? In the political￾economy literature, the standard explanation for inefficient protectionism is that the benefits of tariffs are concentrated among producers in import-competing industries, whereas the costs are dispersed among producers in other industries and consumers; so the former find it easier to organize collectively to influence policy to their advan￾tage. An escape from this political trap is likely only if some change in the institu￾tions that govern policymaking can provide greater political weight to members of the large free-trade bloc. The conventional wisdom on the RTAA relies on two versions of this same claim. The first version focuses on how delegating authority to the president eliminated protectionist logrolling and made more salient the costs of tariffs to consumers that would otherwise have been neglected because they were dispersed across electoral An earlier version of this article was presented at the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997. I thank David Lake, Peter Gourevitch, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Interrzcrtionnl Orgnnizntion 53, 4,Autumn 1999, pp. 669-698 o 1999 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology