SPEAKING FROM IGNORANCE 23 and provided sef-repors that indicated their trust in the answ of others.and for the od disa ments need to occur,but it is the pattem osing to giv information tha is for the the istemic position.not thei nsight about co sing help us understand the ch who ging wth them than attem of truthfulness taking priority over co rance reader s may have witnessed.for examp who kne e about physics talking tome h the experi ental instructions explicitly i oked corre of the es in this racy)ast relevant task go be guided ting one's interest and c er for t topi he SF or the or I dem actan to th could h ction as ans staying engas and o depeef oder at fire odd w ts of having been i think it occurs w 106 but this d he 2000 rustful off ntly of others (Nail.MacDonald.Levy. ver time,the teacher can use as the basis for ce ting an xeet of then olid arity might all be b nthe long run by ave little p did the possibility that people he ignorance of one's position at certain points in the relationship the valu ctive found ting This sult ind Having ocaed the anguageand s can we glear cing futu than by plausibl alterr io e that has e?i by placing the n nu nty.not by constraint s in which the immediate situa ion is embedded.W The View From Language:Beyond Agreement agre and Disagreement ate th inte ust as Asch's situation wa 5. ertheless,the larger practica 10).the valu -pragmatics account tries to capture importan think about the p does not assun that ind with each other the sam would be true if they only disagreed with Hodees Gever 2006)By focu he on the values that guide and ain the c cosystem rather tha opic,and a the conversation might re work the de rth o heorizing at the of situations (Reis 2001 and provided self-reports that were consonant with a concern to speak truthfully and with pragmatic warrant. Virtually all partici￾pants indicated their trust in the answers of others, and for those participants choosing to give disagreeing answers some or much of the time, they appeared to trust their peers to understand that the basis for their disagreement was their epistemic position, not their animosity or lack of concern for them. Experiment 2 suggested that values-realizing constraints and pragmatic concerns weighed on the choices of most, if not all, of the participants, even those who always chose to agree with better positioned others. However, the pattern of truthfulness taking priority over correctness, pragmatics over independence, and social solidarity over agreement was par￾ticularly clear for those who offered disagreeing answers. Even though the experimental instructions explicitly invoked correct￾ness (i.e., accuracy) as the relevant task goal and the only way to achieve that was by agreement, participants refused to let their choices be guided by accuracy and agreement alone. Experiment 2 showed that the SFI effect is robust and cannot likely be explained by experimenter or participant expectancy effects, demand characteristics, or anger or reactance due to the frustration of being in a position of ignorance. The effect also was not dependent on a within- or between-subjects design, gender composition of groups, or the effects of having been in a different position earlier. More substantive theoretical explanations, such as not wanting to imitate others (Wheeler & Arrowood, 1966), want￾ing to distinguish oneself from others in order to appear unique (e.g., Imhoff & Erb, 2009; Morrison & Wheeler, 2010), or wanting to act independently of others (Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000), also found no real support. An attribution explanation that assumes participants do what they think others expect of them also ap￾peared to have little plausibility, as did the possibility that people disagreed in order to dissent from the group. In contrast, the values-pragmatics perspective found positive support in Experiment 3: Manipulating participants’ sensitivity to truthfulness produced a marked increase in the frequency of non￾agreeing answers. This result indicates that the SFI effect is clearly linked to the honest communication of one’s own ignorance. The SFI effect appears to be real and to be explained better by a values-pragmatics account than by plausible alternatives, at least so far. What, though, is the larger meaning, practically and theo￾retically, of such a phenomenon? To address this question, we begin by placing the phenomenon in a larger context of language and learning. The View From Language: Beyond Agreement and Disagreement As we noted earlier, our reason for running these studies was purely theoretical. The experimental situation was intentionally odd, just as Asch’s situation was. Nevertheless, the larger practical and theoretical significance of the SFI effect becomes clearer if we think about the purpose of conversing with others. Although it is often assumed that the purpose of language is to reach agreement, conversations would never need to occur if people always agreed with each other; the same would be true if they only disagreed with each other (Hodges, 2004). The purpose of conversing with others is to learn—about each other, about one’s circumstances and one’s topic, and about how all the parties in the conversation might coordinate their efforts to accomplish their common tasks and, more generally, to realize values (e.g., develop new, better ways to do their tasks; develop their friendships). In order to do this, agreements and disagreements need to occur, but it is the pattern of agreements and disagreements that provides information that orients and redirects the efforts of those involved. How does this insight about conversing help us understand the SFI effect? What is the sense of disagreeing with someone’s answer when in all likelihood it is correct? Trusting others and engaging in useful conversation with them involve more than always agreeing with them (or keeping quiet), even when one is in a position of ignorance. Readers may have witnessed, for example, a person who knew little about physics talking to some accom￾plished physicist as if the person knew what he or she was talking about. Why do people make fools of themselves in this way? Perhaps it is not so foolish. Inevitably, one’s ignorance will be revealed, but one’s willingness to expose one’s ignorance becomes an act of trust, indicating one’s interest and care either for the topic or for the person, or for both. Viewed with a longer lens, the willingness to disagree with an expert or to ask uninformed ques￾tions could function as a means of staying engaged and of trusting that one will become better informed over time. It is because of this that, although the SFI situation appears at first to be odd, we think it occurs whenever people find themselves in the role of teacher (position of knowledge) and learner (position of igno￾rance). Students are ignorant, but this does not mean that they should never act from their ignorance. The expressions of igno￾rance or awkwardness on the part of students are trustful offerings that, over time, the teacher can use as the basis for correcting and guiding their efforts. It is in this way that truth, trust, and social solidarity might all be better realized in the long run by expressing the ignorance of one’s position at certain points in the relationship. Rethinking Social Influence: Beyond Conformity and Independence Having located the SFI effect in terms of language and learning, what lessons can we glean for understanding and advancing future social influence research? First, values-pragmatics theory ques￾tions the focus on conformity and independence that has framed much of the research on social interaction. Instead, it points to the pragmatics of cooperation and the ways in which people work together to realize values such as truth and social solidarity, not by individually planning to but by working within the complex array of constraints in which the immediate situation is embedded. We agree with Mason, Conrey, and Smith (2007) that considering simple, individual cognitive processes may not be the most pro￾ductive way to appreciate the complex, dynamic interactions that occur among people interacting across time. Rather than focusing on particular cognitive mediators (cf. Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010), the values-pragmatics account tries to capture important dimensions of ecosystem relations as a whole and to predict patterns of actions that are likely given the larger dynamics. The theory does not assume that individuals are conscious of these demands, strategies, or patterns, although they sometimes may be (Hodges & Geyer, 2006). By focusing on the values that guide and constrain the dynamics of a social ecosystem rather than isolated cognitive variables, values-pragmatics theory may be of aid in future work seeking to address the dearth of social psychological theorizing at the level of situations (Reis, 2008). 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