224 HODGES.MEAGHER.NORTON.McBAIN.AND SROUBEK Whsitioncd others.Howevercable Sl efectoccd one epB Predictions First,in addition to hypotheses t sted earlier (i.e.an SFl effect Experiment 2 was designed to begin to address these issues. sat Position 6(Not see)than Position 5(See).If this Experiment 2 h nd,there evidence of the attr rious alternative hypoth two important not in placed not only in s.social solidarity.and pragmatics in ways that indicated n a p tion of knowled hich hee con for Participant A.B. or C (real p with C ment than motivations to act on me were not informed i of self- ort mea s that as o the dem ands of speakin and cally thar ing wi AeFree On the othe hand, we did o that ther oul 、D agreers do not care about other part allowed us to test sever al altemative hypot cial so tly.we mig H se they are speaking truthfullyfro d persp n eople want to distinguish th nd a pr d tha s of pe he fact that hird possibility is that those people who lisagree with corre thers.Fifth. 1981).A fourth pe sibility is that the in these term Furthermore,we expected that Agreer ackno hen that an ons (OmeWhit 2000)A fift ndicating anger about their position would not be correlated with d be nc ant s who then act in ith th pants are ry at the Method and byn Participant ght be was omitted from analyses due to a procedural led he and I anc stud &H e of th were addre ed b yincluding tw ware of the nc however.were addressed by comparing the number of disagrecing that they were not aware of how many people were expected atpositioned others. However, a sizeable SFI effect occurred, one which cannot be explained by a lack of trust in others or a misperception of one’s own (lack of) knowledge. Participants knowingly disagreed with correct answers. Although Experiments 1a and 1b indicated that an SFI effect can occur and that it is likely not due to mistrust or inattention, they did not provide positive evidence in favor of a values-pragmatics account, nor did they consider possible alternative explanations. Experiment 2 was designed to begin to address these issues. Experiment 2 The focus of Experiment 2 was to evaluate evidence that could provide clearer support for a values-pragmatics account of the SFI effect and that could begin to rule out various alternative hypoth￾eses that might explain why some people some of the time choose to disagree with correct answers rather than conforming. The design of Experiment 2 included two important features not in￾cluded in the earlier experiments. One was the addition of a new control condition: Participants were placed not only in a position of ignorance but also in a position of knowledge in which they could see, as well as hear, the correct answer. We set up six positions for Participant A, B, or C (real participant), with C alternating between Position 5, in which the participant could see clearly, and Position 6, in which he or she could not (see Figure 1). Participants were not informed in advance that they would be placed in both positions. A second feature was the addition of a series of self-report measures that assessed various possible moti￾vations for how participants answered or other perceptions or feelings that might contribute to participants disagreeing with their peers. These two features allowed us to test several alternative hypoth￾eses for why an SFI effect occurs. One possibility is that people do not want to look like copycats, merely repeating what others have said. That is, perhaps disagreeing answers are refusals to imitate others (Wheeler & Arrowood, 1966). Another possibility is that people want to distinguish themselves from others, and answering correctly does not do that in this context (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen, Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006). A third possibility is that those people who disagree with correct answers are simply more independent than those who always agree (Perrin & Spencer, 1981). A fourth possibility is that the experi￾mental situation somehow invites or demands that people give differing answers when they have been placed in an odd position and asked to answer questions (Orne & Whitehouse, 2000). A fifth possibility is that experimenters expect people to disagree and somehow subtly and nonconsciously signal this expectation to participants who then act in accordance with those signals (Hazel￾rigg, Cooper, & Strathman, 1991). A sixth possibility is that participants are angry at the experimenter for asking them impos￾sible questions and they respond aggressively by giving incorrect answers (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). A seventh possibility, which might be framed in attribution terms, is that participants think the experimenter knows they cannot see and is testing them to see if they will acknowledge it (Ross, Bierbrauer, & Hoffman, 1976). Some of these alternatives were addressed by including relevant measures in the postidentification task (e.g., how angry did par￾ticipants say they felt while in the position of ignorance?). Others, however, were addressed by comparing the number of disagreeing answers given in the position of ignorance with those given in the position of knowledge (e.g., are participants refusing to imitate?). Predictions First, in addition to hypotheses tested earlier (i.e., an SFI effect, despite trusting others’ answers, and experiencing the situation as a dilemma), we predicted that there would be significantly more disagreements at Position 6 (Not see) than Position 5 (See). If this occurs it would undercut alternative hypotheses mentioned earlier, such as refusing to imitate, experimenter expectancy, wanting to appear distinctive, and demand characteristics. Second, there should be some evidence of the attraction of truthfulness, social solidarity, and pragmatics on most if not all participants in a position of ignorance, not just those who choose to give disagreeing answers one or more times. Thus, we predicted that all participants, both those who always chose to agree with A and B (Agreers) and those who sometimes chose to disagree (Disagreers), would answer items directed at concerns for truth￾fulness, social solidarity, and pragmatics in ways that indicated their actions were constrained by values-realizing dynamics. In￾dexes of truthfulness, social solidarity, and pragmatics were ex￾pected to receive stronger endorsement than motivations to act agreeably or answer independently. Third, we expected that Disagreers would score higher on mea￾sures of truthfulness and pragmatics than Agreers. Disagreers, we believed, would likely show greater sensitivity in an SFI situation to the demands of speaking truthfully and pragmatically than Agreers. On the other hand, we did not expect that there would be a difference in expressions of social solidarity between Agreers and Disagreers. If Disagreers do not care about other participants and are simply acting independently, we might expect expressions of social solidarity to be less than for Agreers. However, if they disagree primarily because they are speaking truthfully from their assigned perspective, then there is no reason to expect that they would express significantly less social solidarity than Agreers. Fourth, we predicted that measures of agreement and indepen￾dence would be relatively weaker than other motivations, despite the fact that participants would probably often choose to agree with others. Fifth, we expected that concerns to answer correctly would be expressed by virtually all participants since the task was defined in these terms. Furthermore, we expected that Agreers would be more likely than Disagreers to acknowledge correctness as a motivation for their actions. Finally, we predicted that an item indicating anger about their position would not be correlated with disagreeing answers at Position 6 and that there would be no difference between Disagreers and Agreers in this regard. Method Participants. Forty-seven undergraduate participants at a pri￾vate liberal arts college completed the experiment for extra credit. One participant was omitted from analyses due to a procedural error, leaving 36 women and 10 men in the study. Procedure. In order to test for possible experimenter expec￾tancy effects, two experimenters unaware of the previous studies, including their rationale and results, were used, while two others were aware. Participants were recruited by e-mail solicitations so that they were not aware of how many people were expected at This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. 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