24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 5. 2001 Freewill II: Compatibilism STANDARD HARD DETERMINIST ARGUMENT 1. Whatever happens is determined by prior events. Determinism) 2. I act freely iff I am able to act othenwise (Avoidability Analysis of Freedom) 3. If my action is determined, I am unable to act otherwise 4. So, I never act freely I Consider(1): Determinism: i To say that an event e is determined, is not to day that e is predictable i To say that an event e is determined, is not to say that it is fated e is determined iff due to prior events, e is bound to occur e is fated iff regardless of prior events, e is bound to occur Consider again the example of my raising my arm. The determinist will say, of course, that my arm was caused to, and so bound to go up due to preceding events. But note that its rising was the effect of, among other things, my decision to raise my arm. So itis not true that my arm was going to go up no matter what: if my decision had been different, my action would have been different. This means that the determinist, unlike the fatalist, can say: what I do depends on what I choose to do. Suppose I hadnit wanted to raise my arm just then; well, then I wouldnit have raised it. But then even if in fact I was caused to raise my arm, since my decision was the cause, it would seem that I could have avoided raising my arm(e.g, by deciding not to raise it ). So where is the conflict between determinism and freedom? IL. Consider(3): Does the Avoidability analysis of Freedom conflict with Determinism? It seems plausible that freedom is a matter of having been able to act differently than one in fact acts. this is the core idea of premise(2).) But what does it mean to say that one was"able to act otherwise"? Last time we considered the"choice analysis of ability". I could have acted otherwise iff had I chosen to act othenwise, I would have. If we pursue this notion of "acting otherwise" can we avoid the conflict with Determinism? Hypothetical Choice(or first try")Compatibilism I act freely iff I am able to act otherwise iff I would have acted otherwise had i chosen to Compatibility: my acts and my choices are caused, and yet a different causal sequence might have caused different choices and acts. So I'm free even if caused to act as i act However, note that the definition implies IF [had I chosen to act otherwise, I would have acted otherwise ], then [I act freelyI IF had I chosen to perform action A instead of A, I would have performed A*, THEN I performed A freely24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 5, 2001 Freewill II: Compatibilism STANDARD HARD DETERMINIST ARGUMENT 1. Whatever happens is determined by prior events. (Determinism) 2. I act freely iff I am able to act otherwise. (Avoidability Analysis of Freedom) 3. If my action is determined, I am unable to act otherwise. 4. So, I never act freely. I. Consider (1): Determinism: ï To say that an event e is determined, is not to day that e is predictable. ï To say that an event e is determined, is not to say that it is fated. e is determined iff due to prior events, e is bound to occur. e is fated iff regardless of prior events, e is bound to occur. Consider again the example of my raising my arm. The determinist will say, of course, that my arm was caused to, and so bound to go up due to preceding events. But note that its rising was the effect of, among other things, my decision to raise my arm. So itís not true that my arm was going to go up no matter what: if my decision had been different, my action would have been different. This means that the determinist, unlike the fatalist, can say: what I do depends on what I choose to do. Suppose I hadnít wanted to raise my arm just then; well, then I wouldnít have raised it. But then even if in fact I was caused to raise my arm, since my decision was the cause, it would seem that I could have avoided raising my arm (e.g., by deciding not to raise it). So where is the conflict between determinism and freedom? II. Consider (3): Does the Avoidability Analysis of Freedom conflict with Determinism? It seems plausible that freedom is a matter of having been able to act differently than one in fact acts. (This is the core idea of premise (2).) But what does it mean to say that one was "able to act otherwise"? Last time we considered the "choice analysis of ability": I could have acted otherwise iff had I chosen to act otherwise, I would have. If we pursue this notion of "acting otherwise" can we avoid the conflict with Determinism? Hypothetical Choice (or "first try") Compatibilism I act freely iff I am able to act otherwise iff I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to. Compatibility: my acts and my choices are caused, and yet a different causal sequence might have caused different choices and acts. So I'm free even if caused to act as I act. However, note that the definition implies: IF [had I chosen to act otherwise, I would have acted otherwise], THEN [I act freely]. or IF had I chosen to perform action A* instead of A, I would have performed A*, THEN I performed A freely