Are there counter-examples to this conditional? undermine my freedom, but in which the counterfactual is true that if i had chosen otherwise, I would have acted t to Problem cases: coercion, kleptomania, i.e., cases in which my choices were in fact constrained to a degree sufficie otherwise Ayer suggests we suppose that another person has obtained an habitual ascendancy over me. I have acquired so strong a habit of obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not do what the other person wants. my own deliberations have ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior (484 This is the picture of a puppet, not a free agent But notice that it may still be true that if the puppet had chosen to behave differently, he would have; it's just that he,'s not going to choose differently (or really himself choose at all) because he being controlled i Sometimes my actions are not the result of my choice at all, so aren t free; but it is still true that if i had made a genuine choice. i would have acted otherwise i Sometimes my actions are the result of my choice, but my choice was compelled or made under duress, so the action wasn,'t free; but it is still possible that if I had chosen to act differently, I would have acted differently So it appears that two things have to be added for freedom: first, the action needs to be the result of a choice, and second the choice must not be forced or compelled. Consider some further examples given by Stace in his essay Free nbs &nb Unfit Fasting because you Fasting because you are lost want to free india &n bsp; in the desert without food Stealing because you Stealing because someone are hungry nbsp &nb sp; forces you Confessing because you Confessing to avoid further want to tell the truth b eating To find the correct definition of free action we must discover what characteristic is common to the acts on the left but lacking in the acts on the right. Is it that the right-hand acts were caused, and the left-hand not caused? This is what the incompatibilist might say, but itis clearly absurd. All of the acts were caused. Note, however, that both Ayer and Stace suggest that what's important is whether the source of the action is internal to me. Stace proposes that we should consider the kind of cause Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states of the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent ( 490)Are there counter-examples to this conditional? Problem cases: coercion, kleptomania, i.e., cases in which my choices were in fact constrained to a degree sufficient to undermine my freedom, but in which the counterfactual is true that if I had chosen otherwise, I would have acted otherwise. Ayer suggests we suppose that: ...another person has obtained an habitual ascendancy over me...I have acquired so strong a habit of obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not do what the other person wants...my own deliberations have ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior (484). This is the picture of a puppet, not a free agent. But notice that it may still be true that if the puppet had chosen to behave differently, he would have; it's just that he's not going to choose differently (or really himself choose at all) because he is being controlled. ï Sometimes my actions are not the result of my choice at all, so aren't free; but it is still true that if I had made a genuine choice, I would have acted otherwise. ï Sometimes my actions are the result of my choice, but my choice was compelled or made under duress, so the action wasn't free; but it is still possible that if I had chosen to act differently, I would have acted differently. So it appears that two things have to be added for freedom: first, the action needs to be the result of a choice, and second, the choice must not be forced or compelled. Consider some further examples given by Stace in his essay: Free ; & nbsp; &nb sp; Unfree Fasting because you Fasting because you are lost want to free India. &n bsp; in the desert without food. Stealing because you Stealing because someone are hungry. & nbsp; &nb sp; forces you. Confessing because you Confessing to avoid further want to tell the truth. b eating. To find the correct definition of free action we must discover what characteristic is common to the acts on the left but lacking in the acts on the right. Is it that the right-hand acts were caused, and the left-hand not caused? This is what the incompatibilist might say, but itís clearly absurd. All of the acts were caused. Note, however, that both Ayer and Stace suggest that what's important is whether the source of the action is internal to me. Stace proposes that we should consider the kind of cause: Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states of the agent. Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent. (490)