Define freedom like this, and thereis no conflict whatsoever with determinism because one's free actions not only can be caused by prior events, but must be, i. e. they must be caused by my desires and choices. So perhaps we should try another evision No Coercion"+No-Duress"("third try )Compatibilism(Ayer and stace) Ayer and Stace provide examples to suggest that my action is free only if it is under the control of how I choose, and I an being compelled by anyone(by external force or threat)to act as I do. However, external duress is not the only issue, for internal duress is a threat to freedom as well. Consider an addict: when offered the drug, their desire is so strong they are unable to choose anything but the drug. So Stace's idea that the cause must be"internal"is not enough. However, perhaps it is enough to require that the cause be a certain sort of internal event Basic idea: My free action is voluntary, i.e., it is caused by my own desire or choice, and the choice in turn has the rights sorts of causes(no threats, phobias, addictions, etc. I act freely iff (i the way I act is the result of my choice (ii) the immediate causes of my choice are"internal "to me, (iii) my choice is not the result of coercion or duress, and (iv)I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to Compatibility: my acts and choices are caused, but the causal sequence might have been different, and the actual causes are"of the right sort". So they are free even if caused Problems: The whole point of our attempt at analyzing freedom is to determine more clearly whether freedom is compatible with determinism. Simply saying that I am free if I am not coerced or under duress is unhelpful because we have no clear way to distinguish coercion and duress from more ordinary cases of being caused to choose and act as one does. What makes addiction a threat to freedom, whereas a passion for learning is not? What makes kleptomania a threat to freedom whereas a deep commitment to be honest in one's dealings with others is not? Note that it would not help the compatibilist to revise the third condition to read: (iii*)nothing compels me to act as I do? The compatibilist's goal is to find an account of freedom that is compatible with determinism, and a determinist will claim surely, that prior circumstances do compel me to act as I do. In short, a compatibilist position cannot place the condition on freedom that our choices must be completely unconstrained. So we need a new strategy The compatibilism we've considered so far offer explications of freedom that seem to undermine (3)in the Hard Determinist Argument, i. e, the idea that determinism prevents one from acting other than the way one does. But suppose e challenge(2), viz., the idea that freedom requires avoidability, more fully. Suppose you are in a room with everything you've always wanted (your favorite entertainment, friends, food, etc. ) if anyone tried to remove you, you'd fight to stay Suppose then someone locks the doors and windows. You can, t leave, but you also don ' t want to. Are you unfree? Whether you could have left the room if you wanted seems irrelevant to the issue of whether you stay of your own free will. This suggests that the real issue is not whether one is constrained but whether one' s actions are based on choices that are in some important sense "ones own", Can we make sense of the idea that our free choices are choices we have chosen? Deep-Self ("final try")Compatibilism (Harry Frankfurt) I act freely iff my actions are in the control of choices endorsed by my"deeper self-endorsed that is by higher- order choices I have made, or by my values, or reflection, etcDefine freedom like this, and thereís no conflict whatsoever with determinism because one's free actions not only can be caused by prior events, but must be, i.e., they must be caused by my desires and choices. So perhaps we should try another revision: "No Coercion" + "No-Duress" ("third try") Compatibilism (Ayer and Stace) Ayer and Stace provide examples to suggest that my action is free only if it is under the control of how I choose, and I am being compelled by anyone (by external force or threat) to act as I do. However, external duress is not the only issue, for internal duress is a threat to freedom as well. Consider an addict: when offered the drug, their desire is so strong they are unable to choose anything but the drug. So Stace's idea that the cause must be "internal" is not enough. However, perhaps it is enough to require that the cause be a certain sort of internal event. Basic idea: My free action is voluntary, i.e., it is caused by my own desire or choice, and the choice in turn has the rights sorts of causes (no threats, phobias, addictions, etc.). I act freely iff (i) the way I act is the result of my choice, (ii) the immediate causes of my choice are "internal" to me, (iii) my choice is not the result of coercion or duress, and (iv) I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to. Compatibility: my acts and choices are caused, but the causal sequence might have been different, and the actual causes are "of the right sort". So they are free even if caused. Problems: The whole point of our attempt at analyzing freedom is to determine more clearly whether freedom is compatible with determinism. Simply saying that I am free if I am not coerced or under duress is unhelpful because we have no clear way to distinguish coercion and duress from more ordinary cases of being caused to choose and act as one does. What makes addiction a threat to freedom, whereas a passion for learning is not? What makes kleptomania a threat to freedom whereas a deep commitment to be honest in one's dealings with others is not? Note that it would not help the compatibilist to revise the third condition to read: (iii*) nothing compels me to act as I do? The compatibilist's goal is to find an account of freedom that is compatible with determinism, and a determinist will claim, surely, that prior circumstances do compel me to act as I do. In short, a compatibilist position cannot place the condition on freedom that our choices must be completely unconstrained. So we need a new strategy. The compatibilisms we've considered so far offer explications of freedom that seem to undermine (3) in the Hard Determinist Argument, i.e., the idea that determinism prevents one from acting other than the way one does. But suppose we challenge (2), viz., the idea that freedom requires avoidability, more fully. Suppose you are in a room with everything you've always wanted (your favorite entertainment, friends, food, etc.); if anyone tried to remove you, you'd fight to stay. Suppose then someone locks the doors and windows. You can't leave, but you also don't want to. Are you unfree? Whether you could have left the room if you wanted seems irrelevant to the issue of whether you stay of your own free will. This suggests that the real issue is not whether one is constrained, but whether one's actions are based on choices that are in some important sense "one's own". Can we make sense of the idea that our free choices are choices we have chosen? Deep-Self ("final try") Compatibilism (Harry Frankfurt) I act freely iff my actions are in the control of choices endorsed by my "deeper self" -- endorsed that is by higher￾order choices I have made, or by my values, or reflection, etc