The Power of the Multitude to disenfranchise the (already disempowered)groups ance from victory into defeat,politicians carefully man- to which they disproportionately belong. age their reputations,aiming to satisfy a range of in- Brennan glibly dismisses this"demographic objec- terest groups without upsetting others too profoundly tion."He announces repeatedly,for instance,that by (Oppenheimer and Edwards 2012,206-18).Even if his“objective,.”“morally relevant'”standards,black the franchise does not meaningfully empower indi- women are the least "competent"voters in the US. viduals,therefore,it does give non-negligible leverage and that his proposals would therefore disenfranchise to groups. them in large numbers (2016,33,132-3,148,227-8). That said,we may grant that enfranchisement of- Rather than taking this opportunity to reexamine his ten brings surprisingly few benefits.For instance, epistemological premises,however.he assures readers nineteenth-century socialists and reactionaries both as- of his excellent implicit bias scores,and asserts that sumed working class suffrage would yield far more ex- disadvantaged citizens cannot vote in ways that pro- tensive redistribution than it did.We may also grant mote their interests "unless they have tremendous so- that most voters are sociotropic,meaning that their cial scientific knowledge"(227).14 Remedying their dis- votes are directed at a common good,rather than their advantages thus requires disenfranchising them-and own self-interest.Yet even Brennan acknowledges that thereby entrusting their interests to better-informed there is clearly some connection between enfranchise- voters.I5 ment and group interests,observing for instance that Such claims are,quite frankly,preposterous,and "if we deprive all black people of the right to vote one may be tempted simply to ignore them.In my [...this will help facilitate people of other races in view,however,it is worth showing why they are not exploiting,dominating,and oppressing blacks"(2016, supported by the empirical evidence Brennan cites, 97-8).Nothing could be more obvious,of course,but since this research does challenge many common as- given Brennan's assumptions,it cries out for explana- sumptions about democracy,and it should not be dis- tion:Why might this be?Alas,it seems,not everyone missed along with Brennan's conclusions.It is well votes sociotropically-and even when we do,our views 4r元 established,for instance,that most voters know too of the “common good”are inevitably biased(Bagg little about policy to make meaningful choices be- 2018b) tween parties on that basis-meaning that there is In sum,empirical research in public opinion and no "bedrock"of public opinion to which representa- political psychology does not dispute that groups- tives might faithfully respond (Disch 2011).Accord- even those with below-average political knowledge- ing to Achen and Bartels(2016),moreover,the min- can use the electoral system to advance their inter- imalistic model favored by many political scientists- ests. What the research does throw into question is retrospective accountability-is also typically oversold the rational grounding such processes are often sup- (146-76).At best,it seems,voters hold representatives posed to have.If"most citizens support a party not be- accountable for a fairly narrow set of outcomes(Healy cause they have carefully calculated that its policy posi- and Malhotra 2013):at worst,for nothing at all-or for tions are closest to their own.but rather because 'their outcomes representatives cannot control.This research kind'of person belongs to that party"-as Achen and thus warrants serious attention,if not a thorough re- Bartels(2016,307)summarize-members of disadvan- thinking of democratic theory (e.g.,Green 2009).Yet taged groups may not always vote in ways that promote even the most resolutely skeptical accounts do not re- their interests.This is concerning,if unsurprising.Yet motely imply that low-knowledge voters would be bet- it hardly implies that their voting behavior is entirely ter off disenfranchised. insensitive to their interests-much less that their in- For one,democratic realists like Achen and Bar- terests will be more reliably protected by others.Vot- tels readily admit some correspondence between pub- ers driven by identity rather than policy will effectively lic opinion and policy outcomes.So long as they must promote their interests as long as the identities they fear electoral defeat,incumbents will adhere to"vague find salient lead them to support parties and candidates limits of permissiveness"set by public opinion,and whose policies promote their interests. though electoral punishment of specific misdeeds is To be sure,this is not always the case.But neither is rare,it does occur in extreme cases (Achen and Bar- it particularly implausible-voters do not choose their tels 2016,318-9).Uncertain about what will tip the bal- identities at random-and it seems especially likely when groups suffer collective disadvantages that ren- 14 One might suggest that a more relevant measure of epistemic der that identity affiliation salient.In such cases,ordi- 四 merit is one's likelihood of voting for a know-nothing authoritarian nary group members will often follow the recommen- populist-implying that black women were the most competent de- dations of respected leaders,many of whom would pass mographic group in the 2016 US Presidential election-but I will not pursue that argument here. any epistemic qualification Brennan could propose. Because this compliance is largely driven by identity On most of Brennan's proposals,this would entail entrusting the interests of the poor,women.and African Americans in the United rather than informed and independent consideration States to rich white men.To preempt the obvious objections,he pro of the issues,of course,leaders have latitude to extract poses that worries about fairness could be resolved by giving extra rents and engage in various deceptions.Voter igno- weight to the votes of those demographic minorities who do qualify rance does have real costs.Barring exceptional circum- to vote.Even if we grant (implausibly)that this solves the problem stances,however-such as a sinister conspiracy among /:sany however,it does so only by exacerbating another:clearly,entrusting electoral outcomes to complex algorithms only widens the opportu- group leaders-it need not render their votes counter- nity (and incentive)for manipulation. productive,as Brennan suggests.Perhaps working-class 899The Power of the Multitude to disenfranchise the (already disempowered) groups to which they disproportionately belong. Brennan glibly dismisses this “demographic objec￾tion.” He announces repeatedly, for instance, that by his “objective,” “morally relevant” standards, black women are the least “competent” voters in the US, and that his proposals would therefore disenfranchise them in large numbers (2016, 33, 132–3, 148, 227–8). Rather than taking this opportunity to reexamine his epistemological premises, however, he assures readers of his excellent implicit bias scores, and asserts that disadvantaged citizens cannot vote in ways that pro￾mote their interests “unless they have tremendous so￾cial scientific knowledge” (227).14 Remedying their dis￾advantages thus requires disenfranchising them—and thereby entrusting their interests to better-informed voters.15 Such claims are, quite frankly, preposterous, and one may be tempted simply to ignore them. In my view, however, it is worth showing why they are not supported by the empirical evidence Brennan cites, since this research does challenge many common as￾sumptions about democracy, and it should not be dis￾missed along with Brennan’s conclusions. It is well established, for instance, that most voters know too little about policy to make meaningful choices be￾tween parties on that basis—meaning that there is no “bedrock” of public opinion to which representa￾tives might faithfully respond (Disch 2011). Accord￾ing to Achen and Bartels (2016), moreover, the min￾imalistic model favored by many political scientists— retrospective accountability—is also typically oversold (146–76). At best, it seems, voters hold representatives accountable for a fairly narrow set of outcomes (Healy and Malhotra 2013); at worst, for nothing at all—or for outcomes representatives cannot control.This research thus warrants serious attention, if not a thorough re￾thinking of democratic theory (e.g., Green 2009). Yet even the most resolutely skeptical accounts do not re￾motely imply that low-knowledge voters would be bet￾ter off disenfranchised. For one, democratic realists like Achen and Bar￾tels readily admit some correspondence between pub￾lic opinion and policy outcomes. So long as they must fear electoral defeat, incumbents will adhere to “vague limits of permissiveness” set by public opinion, and though electoral punishment of specific misdeeds is rare, it does occur in extreme cases (Achen and Bar￾tels 2016, 318–9). Uncertain about what will tip the bal- 14 One might suggest that a more relevant measure of epistemic merit is one’s likelihood of voting for a know-nothing authoritarian populist—implying that black women were the most competent de￾mographic group in the 2016 US Presidential election—but I will not pursue that argument here. 15 On most of Brennan’s proposals, this would entail entrusting the interests of the poor, women, and African Americans in the United States to rich white men. To preempt the obvious objections, he pro￾poses that worries about fairness could be resolved by giving extra weight to the votes of those demographic minorities who do qualify to vote. Even if we grant (implausibly) that this solves the problem, however, it does so only by exacerbating another: clearly, entrusting electoral outcomes to complex algorithms only widens the opportu￾nity (and incentive) for manipulation. ance from victory into defeat, politicians carefully man￾age their reputations, aiming to satisfy a range of in￾terest groups without upsetting others too profoundly (Oppenheimer and Edwards 2012, 206–18). Even if the franchise does not meaningfully empower indi￾viduals, therefore, it does give non-negligible leverage to groups. That said, we may grant that enfranchisement of￾ten brings surprisingly few benefits. For instance, nineteenth-century socialists and reactionaries both as￾sumed working class suffrage would yield far more ex￾tensive redistribution than it did. We may also grant that most voters are sociotropic, meaning that their votes are directed at a common good, rather than their own self-interest. Yet even Brennan acknowledges that there is clearly some connection between enfranchise￾ment and group interests, observing for instance that “if we deprive all black people of the right to vote […] this will help facilitate people of other races in exploiting, dominating, and oppressing blacks” (2016, 97–8). Nothing could be more obvious, of course, but given Brennan’s assumptions, it cries out for explana￾tion: Why might this be? Alas, it seems, not everyone votes sociotropically—and even when we do, our views of the “common good” are inevitably biased (Bagg 2018b). In sum, empirical research in public opinion and political psychology does not dispute that groups— even those with below-average political knowledge— can use the electoral system to advance their inter￾ests. What the research does throw into question is the rational grounding such processes are often sup￾posed to have. If “most citizens support a party not be￾cause they have carefully calculated that its policy posi￾tions are closest to their own, but rather because ‘their kind’ of person belongs to that party”—as Achen and Bartels (2016, 307) summarize—members of disadvan￾taged groups may not always vote in ways that promote their interests. This is concerning, if unsurprising. Yet it hardly implies that their voting behavior is entirely insensitive to their interests—much less that their in￾terests will be more reliably protected by others. Vot￾ers driven by identity rather than policy will effectively promote their interests as long as the identities they find salient lead them to support parties and candidates whose policies promote their interests. To be sure, this is not always the case. But neither is it particularly implausible—voters do not choose their identities at random—and it seems especially likely when groups suffer collective disadvantages that ren￾der that identity affiliation salient. In such cases, ordi￾nary group members will often follow the recommen￾dations of respected leaders,many of whom would pass any epistemic qualification Brennan could propose. Because this compliance is largely driven by identity rather than informed and independent consideration of the issues, of course, leaders have latitude to extract rents and engage in various deceptions. Voter igno￾rance does have real costs. Barring exceptional circum￾stances, however—such as a sinister conspiracy among group leaders—it need not render their votes counter￾productive, as Brennan suggests. Perhaps working-class 899 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527