304 JONES tions tended to adopt task performance rules,which routinized even the most important decisions of the organization (March Simon 1958).Firms routi- nized price and output decisions(Cyert March 1963).Learning in organiza- tions seemed to be a slow,evolutionary,conflictual process (Sabatier Jenkins-Smith 1993,Lounamaa March 1985,Ostrom 1990)rather than the instantaneous adjustment process that rational organization theory would im- ply.Participants identified with the rules of the organization,adhering to them asn even in the face of evidence of problems (Jones 1980,1985).This could cause disjoint"lurches"as organizations were finally forced to adjust to changes in their environments (Dodd 1994). JO'SMOl Routines in service organizations invariably generated unintended conse- 2 quences,many of which went unrecognized or unaddressed.For example, distributional consequences of supposedly neutral rules were often ignored 9086000 (Levy 1974,Mladenka 1978). In other cases,an organization might have contradictory demands on it. Such contradictory demands are handled in economics via indifference curves, which specify a decision maker's preferences under all combinations of the de- mands.Instead of a rational process for handling tradeoffs,public service or- ganizations tended to develop task performance rules for each demand.The re- sponse of the organization depended on which set of rules was activated.A study of Chicago's Building Department revealed that two sets of task per- formance rules were in effect.One set directed resources in accordance with the severity of the problem.These rules embodied the classic administrative norm of neutral competence.A second set of rules,less explicit but just as im- 世w沿 portant,directed resources based on responsiveness to political forces.The distribution of organizational outputs to neighborhoods depended on an atten- 666 tion rule,activated by middle management,that governed which set of rules was to be put in force.Neutral competence was the default;response to politi- cal forces required an override of standard operating procedures,but the atten- 美 tion rule override happened so often that it could easily be detected in organ- izational outputs (Jones 1985). Policy Agendas If individuals have limited attention spans,so must organizations.The notion of policy agendas recognizes the "bottleneck"that exists in the agenda that any policy-making body addresses (Cobb Elder 1972).These attention pro- B cesses are not simply related to task environments-problems can go for long periods of time without attracting the attention of policy makers(Rochefort Cobb 1994).A whole style of politics emerges as actors must strive to cope with the limits in the attentiveness ofpolicy makers-basically trying to attract allies to their favored problems and solutions.This style of politics depends on connections driven by time-dependent and often emotional attention processestions tended to adopt task performance rules, which routinized even the most important decisions of the organization (March & Simon 1958). Firms routi￾nized price and output decisions (Cyert & March 1963). Learning in organiza￾tions seemed to be a slow, evolutionary, conflictual process (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, Lounamaa & March 1985, Ostrom 1990) rather than the instantaneous adjustment process that rational organization theory would im￾ply. Participants identified with the rules of the organization, adhering to them even in the face of evidence of problems (Jones 1980, 1985). This could cause disjoint “lurches” as organizations were finally forced to adjust to changes in their environments (Dodd 1994). Routines in service organizations invariably generated unintended conse￾quences, many of which went unrecognized or unaddressed. For example, distributional consequences of supposedly neutral rules were often ignored (Levy 1974, Mladenka 1978). In other cases, an organization might have contradictory demands on it. Such contradictory demands are handled in economics via indifference curves, which specify a decision maker’s preferences under all combinations of the de￾mands. Instead of a rational process for handling tradeoffs, public service or￾ganizations tended to develop task performance rules for each demand. The re￾sponse of the organization depended on which set of rules was activated. A study of Chicago’s Building Department revealed that two sets of task per￾formance rules were in effect. One set directed resources in accordance with the severity of the problem. These rules embodied the classic administrative norm of neutral competence. A second set of rules, less explicit but just as im￾portant, directed resources based on responsiveness to political forces. The distribution of organizational outputs to neighborhoods depended on an atten￾tion rule, activated by middle management, that governed which set of rules was to be put in force. Neutral competence was the default; response to politi￾cal forces required an override of standard operating procedures, but the atten￾tion rule override happened so often that it could easily be detected in organ￾izational outputs (Jones 1985). Policy Agendas If individuals have limited attention spans, so must organizations. The notion of policy agendas recognizes the “bottleneck” that exists in the agenda that any policy-making body addresses (Cobb & Elder 1972). These attention pro￾cesses are not simply related to task environments—problems can go for long periods of time without attracting the attention of policy makers (Rochefort & Cobb 1994). A whole style of politics emerges as actors must strive to cope with the limits in the attentiveness of policy makers—basically trying to attract allies to their favored problems and solutions. This style of politics depends on connections driven by time-dependent and often emotional attention processes 304 JONES Annu. Rev. Polit. 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