BOUNDED RATIONALITY 305 rather than a deliberate search for solutions(Cohen et al 1972,March Olsen 1989,Kingdon 1996,Baumgartner Jones 1993). Because attention processes are time dependent and policy contexts change temporally,connections between problems and solutions have time depend- ency built into them.As an important consequence,policy systems dominated by boundedly rational decision makers will at best reach local rather than global optima.Because of the time dependence of attentional processes,all policy processes will display considerable path dependence (March 1994) asn OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPECTED-UTILITY MODEL: BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY 豆 ou'seuofe wo popeojumo The expected-utility model incorporates risk and uncertainty into models of 9008960210 rational choice.Instead of maximizing utility,decision makers maximize expected utility in choice situations in which the consequences of choice are risky(may be characterized by known probabilities)or uncertain (are charac- terized by unspecified probabilities). Numerous empirical studies of human decision making,from experiments in the laboratory to large-scale social surveys to observational studies in the field,have demonstrated that humans often do not conform to the strictures of choice theory (Slovak 1990).This study of how people actually behave in choice situations is known as behavioral decision theory.Even defenders of choice theory have retreated in the face of the onslaught of empirical findings. Expected-utility theory is no longer seriously entertained as an accurate de- 世 scriptive theory (Halpern Stern 1998b). Again,this does not imply that people are irrational,nor that people inter- 666 acting in large-scale institutions make large-scale mistakes.Intendedly ra- tional actors in large-scale institutions may respond collectively to the tasks they face adaptively.Wittman(1995:16)notes that"even if some individuals make incorrect choices,the law of large numbers is likely to yield the correct majority choice.” 台 Many of these objections are quite fundamental-so much so that it seems impossible to develop a serious empirical theory of choice without taking them into consideration.They address both(a)the limitations of humans to com- prehend and act on inputs from the environment and (b)the fundamental complexity of the environment,which is vastly underestimated in standard B rational choice theories. The Nature of the Decision Maker Empirical objections to rational choice are so voluminous that they are,in ef- fect,a laundry list of problems.The first set has to do with the nature of the de- cision maker.rather than a deliberate search for solutions (Cohen et al 1972, March & Olsen 1989, Kingdon 1996, Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Because attention processes are time dependent and policy contexts change temporally, connections between problems and solutions have time depend￾ency built into them. As an important consequence, policy systems dominated by boundedly rational decision makers will at best reach local rather than global optima. Because of the time dependence of attentional processes, all policy processes will display considerable path dependence (March 1994). OBJECTIONS TO THE EXPECTED-UTILITY MODEL: BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY The expected-utility model incorporates risk and uncertainty into models of rational choice. Instead of maximizing utility, decision makers maximize expected utility in choice situations in which the consequences of choice are risky (may be characterized by known probabilities) or uncertain (are charac￾terized by unspecified probabilities). Numerous empirical studies of human decision making, from experiments in the laboratory to large-scale social surveys to observational studies in the field, have demonstrated that humans often do not conform to the strictures of choice theory (Slovak 1990). This study of how people actually behave in choice situations is known as behavioral decision theory. Even defenders of choice theory have retreated in the face of the onslaught of empirical findings. Expected-utility theory is no longer seriously entertained as an accurate de￾scriptive theory (Halpern & Stern 1998b). Again, this does not imply that people are irrational, nor that people inter￾acting in large-scale institutions make large-scale mistakes. Intendedly ra￾tional actors in large-scale institutions may respond collectively to the tasks they face adaptively. Wittman (1995:16) notes that “even if some individuals make incorrect choices, the law of large numbers is likely to yield the correct majority choice.” Many of these objections are quite fundamental—so much so that it seems impossible to develop a serious empirical theory of choice without taking them into consideration. They address both (a) the limitations of humans to com￾prehend and act on inputs from the environment and (b) the fundamental complexity of the environment, which is vastly underestimated in standard rational choice theories. The Nature of the Decision Maker Empirical objections to rational choice are so voluminous that they are, in ef￾fect, a laundry list of problems. The first set has to do with the nature of the de￾cision maker. BOUNDED RATIONALITY 305 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 1999.2:297-321. 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