354 WORLD POLITICS America's share of world trade dropped from 18.4 percent in 1950 to 13.4 percent in 1977.'4 More tellingly,its share of the world's manufactured exports plummeted from nearly 30 percent in 1953 to about 13 percent in the late 197os.5 Its share of the world's manufacturing output also lost ground,dropping from 62 percent in 1950 to 44 percent in 1977.6 Many U.S.industries had lost their economic advantage and faced bitter com- petition both at home and abroad.In addition,the United States was no longer as dominant in the international monetary system.By 1973,it had scuttled the monetary system it had created and found itself unable to fashion a new,stable one.American hegemony in monetary relations in the 197os,however,was not as reduced as Britain's had been in the 192os and early 1930s.7But it had declined substantially,especially in trade and production,leaving the international distribution of power in the 197os more closely resembling that of the interwar period than that of the im- mediate post-World War II period.This eclipse of hegemony might have been expected to produce widespread protectionism,as it had in the I920s. Although both periods experienced the decline of a hegemon,this may be less important to American policy than the relative position of the United States.The striking fact is how similar the relative international position of the U.S.appears to be in the late 192os and the late 197os,and how different it was in the Ig5os and Ig6os.America's share of the world's manufacturing output reached 42 percent in 1929 and had leveled off at 44 percent in 1977.In contrast,the U.S.had dominated in the 195os and 196os,with 62 percent in 195o and 51 percent in 1960.In the trade area,the United States was more dominant in the Igzos than in the 197os, but nowhere near as dominant as in the 195os.In the Igzos,it was the world's largest exporter and biggest foreign investor,and ranked second only to Britain in its imports.s By the late 197os,it had become the world's second-largest exporter of manufactures-West Germany led with almost 16 percent compared to America's 13 percent-and was being challenged for that spot by Japan(II percent).In 1953,by contrast, the U.S.had reigned supreme in trade,controlling nearly 30 percent of all manufactured exports.'9 "Lake (fn.1),Table 3,p.541;Keohane and Nye (fn.13),141. s Feldstein (fn.7),193,196. 16 Ibid.,I9I. 7U.S.hegemony in money was diminished less than in trade.Its ending of the Bretton Woods system was more an act of power than of weakness,according to many analysts.See Keohane and Nye (fn.13),141,165-86;John Odell,U.S.International Monetary Policy:Mar- kets,Power,and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1982),chap. 4,esp.p.219. 'Ratner,Soltow,and Sylla (fn.8),464;Feldstein (fn.7),191. Feldstein (fn.7),196.354 WORLD POLITICS America's share of world trade dropped from 18.4 percent in I950 to 13.4 percent in I977.'4 More tellingly, its share of the world's manufactured exports plummeted from nearly 30 percent in 1953 to about 13 percent in the late I~~OS.'~ Its share of the world's manufacturing output also lost ground, dropping from 62 percent in 1950 to 44 percent in 1977.1~ Many U.S. industries had lost their economic advantage and faced bitter com￾petition both at home and abroad. In addition, the United States was no longer as dominant in the international monetary system. By 1973, it had scuttled the monetary system it had created and found itself unable to fashion a new, stable one. American hegemony in monetary relations in the I~~OS, however, was not as reduced as Britain's had been in the 1920s and early 1930s.17 But it had declined substantially, especially in trade and production, leaving the international distribution of power in the 1970s more closely resembling that of the interwar period than that of the im￾mediate post-World War I1 period. This eclipse of hegemony might have been expected to produce widespread protectionism, as it had in the 1920s. Although both periods experienced the decline of a hegemon, this may be less important to American policy than the relative position of the United States. The striking fact is how similar the relative international position of the U.S. appears to be in the late 1920s and the late I~~OS, and how different it was in the 1950s and 1960s. America's share of the world's manufacturing output reached 42 percent in 1929 and had leveled off at 44 percent in 1977. In contrast, the U.S. had dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, with 62 percent in 1950 and 51 percent in 1960. In the trade area, the United States was more dominant in the 1920s than in the I~~OS, but nowhere near as dominant as in the 1950s. In the 192os, it was the world's largest exporter and biggest foreign investor, and ranked second only to Britain in its imports.18 By the late I~~OS, it had become the world's second-largest exporter of manufactures-West Germany led with almost 16 percent compared to America's 13 percent-and was being challenged for that spot by Japan (I I percent). In 1953, by contrast, the U.S. had reigned supreme in trade, controlling nearly 30 percent of all manufactured exports.19 '4 Lake (fn. I), Table 3, p. 541; Keohane and Nye (fn. 131, 141. '5 Feldstein (fn. 7), 193, 196. lh Ibid., 191. '7 U.S. hegemony in money was diminished less than in trade. Its ending of the Bretton Woods system was more an act of power than of weakness, according to many analysts. See Keohane and Nye (fn. 13), 141, 165-86; John Odell, U.S. International Monetaty Policy: Mar￾kets, Powel; and Ideas as Sources of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982),chap. 4, esp. p. 219. 'Watner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 464; Feldstein (fn. 71, 191. 'q Feldstein (fn. 7), 196