INDUSTRIES FOR FREE TRADE 353 Since the U.S.economy performed more poorly in the 197os,one might expect that,if economic difficulty were a precursor to protectionism,this period should have experienced protectionism with a vengeance. A second similarity between the 19zos and 197os that has been linked to protectionism is the declining power of the world's hegemonic state. This change in the international distribution of power has been cited as a major factor leading to the closure of the world's markets.Robert Gilpin has stated that Today,...the dominant economy is itself in relative decline and is being challenged by rising centers of economic power.With the decline of the dominant economic power,the world economy may be following the pat- tern of the late nineteenth century and of the 1g3os:it may be fragmenting into regional trading blocs,exclusive economic alliances,and economic na- tionalism. In the 1920s,Great Britain,the hegemon of the Igth century,was los- ing its status.From a peak of 24 percent in 1870,Great Britain's share of world trade had fallen to 14 percent before World War I.Furthermore, its share of the world's manufacturing output tumbled from a dominant 32 percent in 1870 to a third-rate level of 14 percent in 1913."Germany and the United States overtook it in industrial competitiveness in certain critical,advanced sectors."+In addition,Britain's control over the inter- national monetary system was declining.Its problems in returning to and maintaining the gold standard in the 1gzos and its final abandonment of that system in 193I signaled this loss of influence.3 By the Iozos,then, Britain's hegemony had seriously eroded. The situation was fairly similar in the 197os.By the early part of the decade,the global dominance that the United States had exercised in the 195os and 196os had been reduced as other nations mounted a challenge. (New York:Basic Books,1979),482,502-3.The worst economic difficulties of the Great Depression followed(rather than preceded)the tariff increases,occurring in the early 1930s: unemployment averaged 3%in 1930,the year Smoot-Hawley was passed,but rose to 25%by 1933,the year before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Gilpin (fn.5),258-59.Also see Kindleberger (fn.5),esp.307-8;Krasner (fn.5),317-47; Keohane(fn.5),131-62;David Lake,"Structure and Strategy:The International Sources of American Trade Policy,1887-1939"(Ph.D.diss.,Cornell University,1983);Charles Kindle- berger,"Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy,"International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981),242-54;Robert Gilpin,War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1981). Lake (fn.I),Table I,p.525. "Ratner,Soltow,and Sylla (fn.8),385. Lake (fn.1);Alexander Gerschenkron,Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1962),chaps.I and 2;Samuel Hays,The Response to Industrialism,1885-1914 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1957),chaps.1,7,8. Robert O.Keohanc and Joseph S.Nye,Ir.,Power and Interdependence:World Polities in Transirion (Boston:Little,Brown,1977),70;Kindleberger (fn.)63-68,146-70.INDUSTRIES FOR FREE TRADE 353 Since the U.S. economy performed more poorly in the 1970s, one might expect that, if economic difficulty were a precursor to protectionism, this period should have experienced protectionism with a vengeance. A second similarity between the 1920s and 1970s that has been linked to protectionism is the declining power of the world's hegemonic state. This change in the international distribution of power has been cited as a major factor leading to the closure of the world's markets. Robert Gilpin has stated that Today, ... the dominant economy is itself in relative decline and is being challenged by rising centers of economic power. With the decline of the dominant economic power, the world economy may be following the pat￾tern of the late nineteenth century and of the 1930s: it may be fragmenting into regional trading blocs, exclusive economic alliances, and economic na￾tionalism.9 In the 192os, Great Britain, the hegemon of the 19th century, was los￾ing its status. From a peak of 24 percent in 1870, Great Britain's share of world trade had fallen to 14 percent before World War I.lo Furthermore, its share of the world's manufacturing output tumbled from a dominant 32 percent in 1870 to a third-rate level of 14 percent in 1913." Germany and the United States overtook it in industrial competitiveness in certain critical, advanced sectors.I2 In addition, Britain's control over the inter￾national monetary system was declining. Its problems in returning to and maintaining the gold standard in the 1920s and its final abandonment of that system in 1931 signaled this loss of influence.13 By the 192os, then, Britain's hegemony had seriously eroded. The situation was fairly similar in the 1970s. By the early part of the decade, the global dominance that the United States had exercised in the 1950s and 1960s had been reduced as other nations mounted a challenge. (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 482, 502-3. The worst economic difficulties of the Great Depression followed (rather than preceded) the tariff increases, occurring in the early 1930s: unemployment averaged 3% in 1930, the year Smoot-Hawley was passed, but rose to 25% by 1933, the year before the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. vGilpin (fn. 5), 258-59. Also see Kindleberger (fn. 5), esp. 307-8; Krasner (fn. 5), 317-47; Keohane (fn. 5), 131-62; David Lake, "Structure and Strategy: The International Sources of American Trade Policy, 1887-1939" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1983); Charles Kindle￾berger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy," Intevzational Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981),242-54;Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 'O Lake (fn. I), Table I, p. 525. " Ratner, Soltow, and Sylla (fn. 8), 385. "Lake (fn. I); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Bac&uardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), chaps. I and 2; Samuel Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957)~chaps. I, 7, 8. '3 Robert 0.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977)~70; Kindleberger (fn. 5),63-68, 146-70