Consciousness, left to what Engels once called"the nibbling of the mice, "can Preface be explained by their transitional position in the intellectual biographies of their authors. Both were trained as philosophers and steeped in romantic It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Marx and Lukacs volutionism. Their early works were written at similar turning points in failed to appreciate the significance of their own early works. Marx's Manu- their authors spiritual trajectories, at times when they felt the need to move scripts were written in 1844 but had to wait nearly 100 years to see the light beyond these intellectual origins and believed they could do so without violent of day. Since its publication this unfinished early work has come to rival rupture through a dialectical transcendence. Later, they judged this transcen- Capital as the text of reference for Marxists and others interested in Marxism. dence inadequate, still internal to positions they uncompromisingly rejected in During the first half century after the publication of History and Class Con- elaborating their mature outlook. There is little doubt that after the break sciousness, Lukacs book became an underground classic, rejected by its author their judgment on their early work was too harsh, that it contains more of nd known only to a few European scholars, among them the philosophers of value and had more impact on the later work than the authors were willing to the frankfurt School admit Marx and Lukacs' self-interpretation is only partially warranted. It is true The romantic influence is undoubtedly present in these early writings By that their early works reflect a"messianic moment"to which they responded romanticism is usually meant that trend in modern culture which exalts with an implausible revolutionary eschatology. But the authority of their self- subjectivity against objectivity, life against rationality, concreteness against nterpretation has misled commentators into projecting far too much unity abstraction, traditional values against capitalist mercantilism. Certainly these d consistency on the early works philosophers antagonism toward the oppressive formalism of capitalist social The theoretical resources deployed by these philosophers are not entire life, analyzed and condemned in parallel critiques of"alienation"and"reifica- congruent with their political program. Philosophy resembles art in that the tion, "is to some degree tributary of that trend. And yet it would grossly tools and materials have their own logic. The interpreter must uncover the distort the theories of alienation and reification to reduce them to a romantic tensions between the creator's ends and means, not simply assume the ends to reason as is frequently suggested by contemporal be realized in the work. This is especially true of Lukacs, whose text is full of While Marx and Lukacs were influenced by the romantic critique of c contradictions between his Hegelian framework and his politics. In Marxs talism, they were still more profoundly influenced by the Hegelian critique of case the consequences appear later in his suppression of his own most interest- that critique. For Hegel, as for a number of other major figures in modern ng philosophical writings, the Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, thought, romanticism has the value of a transcended moment. It plays ong after his death. Thus arose a whole tradition of interpretation according propaedeutic role in the development of a rational outlook on the world that to which the later Marx abandoned philosophy as a youthful error is not merely philistine and complacent but critical and rich in inwardness. It The seminal importance of the early works was not widely recognized un- was Hegel who first systematically elaborated this"post-romantic"reconcilia til the 1960s and 1970s. At that time the influence of thinkers associated with tion with rational necessity and human finitude. Frankfurt School contributed significantly to the receptiveness of a youth Marx and Lukacs aimed to preserve the moment of revolt in romanticism ful audience to what might be called"early Marxism. "Marcuse, in particular, ithout recapitulating the subjectivist errors so effectively criticized by Hegel. lived through a second messianic moment in old age in response to the New I will show that they are only partially successful in this task, but also that th Left. In his case too there is a tensions between his theoretical resources and task itself was well chosen and indeed still relevant to critical theory and his politics. Nevertheless, his writings from Eros and Civilization on excited practice. They approached this task with a similar method, which I will call precedented interest in philosophy of praxis. cultural"because of its orientation toward the most general patterns The long eclipse of Marx's Manuscripts and Lukacs' History and ClassPreface It is one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Marx and Lukács failed to appreciate the significance of their own early works. Marx's Manu￾scripts were written in 1844 but had to wait nearly 100 years to see the light of day. Since its publication this unfinished early work has come to rival Capital as the text of reference for Marxists and others interested in Marxism. During the first half century after the publication of History and Class Con￾sciousness, Lukács’ book became an underground classic, rejected by its author and known only to a few European scholars, among them the philosophers of the Frankfurt School. Marx and Lukács’ self-interpretation is only partially warranted. It is true that their early works reflect a “messianic moment” to which they responded with an implausible revolutionary eschatology. But the authority of their self￾interpretation has misled commentators into projecting far too much unity and consistency on the early works. The theoretical resources deployed by these philosophers are not entirely congruent with their political program. Philosophy resembles art in that the tools and materials have their own logic. The interpreter must uncover the tensions between the creator’s ends and means, not simply assume the ends to be realized in the work. This is especially true of Lukács, whose text is full of contradictions between his Hegelian framework and his politics. In Marx’s case the consequences appear later in his suppression of his own most interest￾ing philosophical writings, the Manuscripts and the Grundrisse, published long after his death. Thus arose a whole tradition of interpretation according to which the later Marx abandoned philosophy as a youthful error. The seminal importance of the early works was not widely recognized un￾til the 1960s and 1970s. At that time the influence of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School contributed significantly to the receptiveness of a youth￾ful audience to what might be called “early Marxism.” Marcuse, in particular, lived through a second messianic moment in old age in response to the New Left. In his case too there is a tensions between his theoretical resources and his politics. Nevertheless, his writings from Eros and Civilization on excited unprecedented interest in philosophy of praxis. The long eclipse of Marx's Manuscripts and Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, left to what Engels once called "the nibbling of the mice," can be explained by their transitional position in the intellectual biographies of their authors. Both were trained as philosophers and steeped in romantic revolutionism. Their early works were written at similar turning points in their authors' spiritual trajectories, at times when they felt the need to move beyond these intellectual origins and believed they could do so without violent rupture through a dialectical transcendence. Later, they judged this transcen￾dence inadequate, still internal to positions they uncompromisingly rejected in elaborating their mature outlook. There is little doubt that after the break their judgment on their early work was too harsh, that it contains more of value and had more impact on the later work than the authors were willing to admit. The romantic influence is undoubtedly present in these early writings. By romanticism is usually meant that trend in modern culture which exalts subjectivity against objectivity, life against rationality, concreteness against abstraction, traditional values against capitalist mercantilism. Certainly these philosophers’ antagonism toward the oppressive formalism of capitalist social life, analyzed and condemned in parallel critiques of "alienation" and "reifica￾tion," is to some degree tributary of that trend. And yet it would grossly distort the theories of alienation and reification to reduce them to a romantic protest against reason as is frequently suggested by contemporary critics. While Marx and Lukács were influenced by the romantic critique of capi￾talism, they were still more profoundly influenced by the Hegelian critique of that critique. For Hegel, as for a number of other major figures in modern thought, romanticism has the value of a transcended moment. It plays a propaedeutic role in the development of a rational outlook on the world that is not merely philistine and complacent but critical and rich in inwardness. It was Hegel who first systematically elaborated this "post-romantic" reconcilia￾tion with rational necessity and human finitude. Marx and Lukács aimed to preserve the moment of revolt in romanticism without recapitulating the subjectivist errors so effectively criticized by Hegel. I will show that they are only partially successful in this task, but also that the task itself was well chosen and indeed still relevant to critical theory and practice.2 They approached this task with a similar method, which I will call "cultural" because of its orientation toward the most general patterns of meaning and practice, institutions and artifacts, of entire societies. Just such a