Origins of the EU 55 any deal include a sheltered agricultural regime.This further alienated the British (with their Commonwealth agricultural preferences).The EEC was the result:The Germans and Benelux agreed to liberalization largely on French terms.Thus,claims Moravcsik,we can trace French choices to clear majorities based on objective societal interests.27 For institutionalist pioneer Ernst Haas,structural pressures led the French to the ECSC,but institutional feedback led on to the EEC.He suggested that French interest groups and parties did not spontaneously perceive interests in extending the ECSC to the EDC or EEC.Only the ECSC's supranational agents led domestic groups to perceive such interests.Chief among them was Jean Monnet,the French bureaucrat who presided over the ECSC's"High Authority"from 1952 to 1955,and thereafter led a lobby called the "Action Committee for the United States of Europe."Without the initial creation of supranational agents in the ECSC,implied this "neofunctionalist"account,leaders in France (and elsewhere)were unlikely to pursue the EEC.French choices can be traced to a majority of sectoral associations and their party representatives,but only supranational(not national)leadership built that majority.28 I accept elements of both approaches but strongly revise their causal claims.The institutionalist story requires more blatant revision.Between the initial,narrow ECSC deal and the much more extensive EEC,literally no major French actors shifted their policy preferences in response to supranational lobbying.Nonetheless, once the broader EEC bargain was struck,we need an institutionalist logic of path-dependence to understand why it was consolidated into Europe's fundamental architecture in the 1960s.My qualification of the structuralist case is less direct but no less profound.Any explanation of European institution building must begin with the economic and geopolitical context.Yet structuralists overlook the immense political battle that took place over different interpretations of that context.As of 1950,otherwise-similar French elites debated three ideational "models"of their interests in Europe.The divide between“community,”“confederal,”and“tradi-- tional"views did not quite display the impasse of a Condorcet paradox,but the availability of many issue linkages made all three options domestically viable.2 Corresponding deals were viable in international bargaining."Pro-community" leaders who obtained power on other,disconnected issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind their personal ideas and to strike particular 27.Moravcsik 1998.86. 28.For similar arguments about the EEC's later development,see Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996;and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. 29.Labeling“community"views S,for“supranational,.”“confederal'"views C,and“traditional" views T.French elites divided into preference orderings SCT.CTS.and TCS.In single-issue voting.this would produce a confederal majority.Only issue linkages made"community"policies a viable outcome.any deal include a sheltered agricultural regime. This further alienated the British (with their Commonwealth agricultural preferences). The EEC was the result: The Germans and Benelux agreed to liberalization largely on French terms. Thus, claims Moravcsik, we can trace French choices to clear majorities based on objective societal interests.27 For institutionalist pioneer Ernst Haas, structural pressures led the French to the ECSC, but institutional feedback led on to the EEC. He suggested that French interest groups and parties did not spontaneously perceive interests in extending the ECSC to the EDC or EEC. Only the ECSC’s supranational agents led domestic groups to perceive such interests. Chief among them was Jean Monnet, the French bureaucrat who presided over the ECSC’s “High Authority” from 1952 to 1955, and thereafter led a lobby called the “Action Committee for the United States of Europe.” Without the initial creation of supranational agents in the ECSC, implied this “neofunctionalist” account, leaders in France (and elsewhere) were unlikely to pursue the EEC. French choices can be traced to a majority of sectoral associations and their party representatives, but only supranational (not national) leadership built that majority.28 I accept elements of both approaches but strongly revise their causal claims. The institutionalist story requires more blatant revision. Between the initial, narrow ECSC deal and the much more extensive EEC, literally no major French actors shifted their policy preferences in response to supranational lobbying. Nonetheless, once the broader EEC bargain was struck, we need an institutionalist logic of path-dependence to understand why it was consolidated into Europe’s fundamental architecture in the 1960s. My qualification of the structuralist case is less direct but no less profound. Any explanation of European institution building must begin with the economic and geopolitical context. Yet structuralists overlook the immense political battle that took place over different interpretations of that context. As of 1950, otherwise-similar French elites debated three ideational “models” of their interests in Europe. The divide between “community,” “confederal,” and “tradi￾tional” views did not quite display the impasse of a Condorcet paradox, but the availability of many issue linkages made all three options domestically viable.29 Corresponding deals were viable in international bargaining. “Pro-community” leaders who obtained power on other, disconnected issues used their agenda-setting authority to assemble majorities behind their personal ideas and to strike particular 27. Moravcsik 1998, 86. 28. For similar arguments about the EEC’s later development, see Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; and Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. 29. Labeling “community” views S, for “supranational,” “confederal” views C, and “traditional” views T, French elites divided into preference orderings SCT, CTS, and TCS. In single-issue voting, this would produce a confederal majority. Only issue linkages made “community” policies a viable outcome. Origins of the EU 55