56 International Organization international bargains.The traditional and confederal alternatives display the his- torical range across which these ideas demonstrably mattered.30 Three points merit immediate clarification.First,I do not claim that ideas "mattered more"than other causes.Causality cannot be allocated meaningfully in percentage terms.Instead,my answer to the "how much"question specifies the range of historical outcomes dictated by each cause.Objective geopolitical and economic conditions ruled out autarchy or war in postwar Europe,causing some sort of international cooperation.3 They also made certain issues salient over time:coal and steel during early reconstruction,defense with the outbreak of the Korean War, and trade and atomic energy in the later 1950s.But objective trends never set the shape or extent of cooperation.Ideas,as a distinct cause,selected among three European formats with different institutional and material features.Second,French choices were necessary but not sufficient causes of European outcomes.If all accounts see French choices as pivotal,Benelux leadership (from Beyen and Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak)and German assent (from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer)were also crucial to the EEC.Third,my evidence is largely qualitative.Where possible I offer numbers to substantiate cross-cutting patterns, but my interview,archival,and secondary sources often sustain only estimates.Few precise figures are available.In France,leaders deliberately avoided divisive parliamentary votes that contrasted European alternatives.Most votes were called after policy choices,when leaders engaged coalitional pressures and side-payments to assemble support.Similarly,public opinion polls never contrasted policy options. They show mainly that many voters liked "Europe,"but knew little of European alternatives.Nonetheless,I submit,the evidence strongly supports my analysis. The section first presents how a new French debate emerged in the late 1940s. Then it narrates the French choices leading to the ECSC,EDC,and EEC.Finally, it considers why,if only"community"ideas led France to the EEC,these institu- tions survived when Charles de Gaulle brought"traditional"ideas to power in 1958. Three Models of French Interests Immediately after World War II,French elites largely agreed on their basic European strategy.Their primary goal was to keep Germany weak while rebuilding French strength.Their means were direct controls on occupied Germany,bolstered by alliances and economic cooperation with other European powers.32 The advent of the Cold War in 1946-47,however,partly blocked this strategy.The United 30.The only academic precedents to this argument are vague histories without specific causal claims: Lipgens 1977;and Brugmans 1965.McNamara's argument about ideas in the EU concerns ideas about economic policies,not Europe itself.McNamara 1998. 31.Here I allow competitors to pack many other institutionalized ideas (about the state,sovereignty. capitalism,democracy)into "objective conditions." 32.French disagreements before 1947 mainly concerned who the major European ally was against Germany:the Soviets,the British,or the Benelux and Italy.See Knipping 1990:Gerbet 1991:Young 1990:and Willis 1962.international bargains. The traditional and confederal alternatives display the his￾torical range across which these ideas demonstrably mattered.30 Three points merit immediate clarification. First, I do not claim that ideas “mattered more” than other causes. Causality cannot be allocated meaningfully in percentage terms. Instead, my answer to the “how much” question specifies the range of historical outcomes dictated by each cause. Objective geopolitical and economic conditions ruled out autarchy or war in postwar Europe, causing some sort of international cooperation.31 They also made certain issues salient over time: coal and steel during early reconstruction, defense with the outbreak of the Korean War, and trade and atomic energy in the later 1950s. But objective trends never set the shape or extent of cooperation. Ideas, as a distinct cause, selected among three European formats with different institutional and material features. Second, French choices were necessary but not sufficient causes of European outcomes. If all accounts see French choices as pivotal, Benelux leadership (from Beyen and Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak) and German assent (from Chancellor Konrad Adenauer) were also crucial to the EEC. Third, my evidence is largely qualitative. Where possible I offer numbers to substantiate cross-cutting patterns, but my interview, archival, and secondary sources often sustain only estimates. Few precise figures are available. In France, leaders deliberately avoided divisive parliamentary votes that contrasted European alternatives. Most votes were called after policy choices, when leaders engaged coalitional pressures and side-payments to assemble support. Similarly, public opinion polls never contrasted policy options. They show mainly that many voters liked “Europe,” but knew little of European alternatives. Nonetheless, I submit, the evidence strongly supports my analysis. The section first presents how a new French debate emerged in the late 1940s. Then it narrates the French choices leading to the ECSC, EDC, and EEC. Finally, it considers why, if only “community” ideas led France to the EEC, these institu￾tions survived when Charles de Gaulle brought “traditional” ideas to power in 1958. Three Models of French Interests Immediately after World War II, French elites largely agreed on their basic European strategy. Their primary goal was to keep Germany weak while rebuilding French strength. Their means were direct controls on occupied Germany, bolstered by alliances and economic cooperation with other European powers.32 The advent of the Cold War in 1946–47, however, partly blocked this strategy. The United 30. The only academic precedents to this argument are vague histories without specific causal claims: Lipgens 1977; and Brugmans 1965. McNamara’s argument about ideas in the EU concerns ideas about economic policies, not Europe itself. McNamara 1998. 31. Here I allow competitors to pack many other institutionalized ideas (about the state, sovereignty, capitalism, democracy) into “objective conditions.” 32. French disagreements before 1947 mainly concerned who the major European ally was against Germany: the Soviets, the British, or the Benelux and Italy. See Knipping 1990; Gerbet 1991; Young 1990; and Willis 1962. 56 International Organization