Origins of the EU 57 States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets.Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an "epochal moment"in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests.Innovative actors may assemble new ideational "frames"out of the "tool kit"of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation:adaptation of older framing ideas,or other new ideas,may suggest competing analyses.The result is a "battle of ideas"in which groups debate several viable strategies.This is what developed in France in the late 1940s.Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success.The rise of the super powers,the destruction of national economies,and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned"Euro- peanist"projects-utopian musings before the war-into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well.The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies.They retained a familiar realist analysis,with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state.If the attempt to block Germany's recovery had been frustrated,traditional options remained.Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged;military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought;if necessary,bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves.All would uphold the balance of European power,protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations.This was also more worthy of "great power"France, whose independence was sacrosanct,and whose peers were the United States,the United Kingdom,and the USSR-not the other Europeans. Another group favored "confederal"strategies.They based their analysis on liberal thinking:The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely,given their interdependence. France's natural partner was its liberal counterpart,Britain;together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums,while supervising the illiberal,atavistic Germans.Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe-ruling out narrower Franco-German projects.Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European "third way"between the super powers,and for economic cooperation,without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33.See Milward 1984:and Lundestad 1998. 34.Berk 1994.Similar notions are Ann Swidler's"unsettled periods,"Neil Fligstein's"institution- building moments,"Robert Unger's"context making"eras,and Robert Dahl's"historic commitments." See Swidler 1986:Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996:Unger 1987;Ackerman 1991;and Dahl 1986. 35.See Schon and Rein 1994:Snow et al.1986:and Kingdon 1984. 36.On interwar Europeanism,see Brugmans 1965.States demanded the rapid revival of a West German state and economy as bulwark and ally against the Soviets. Pressure increased with the Marshall Plan in June 1947, offering the French badly needed economic aid on the condition that they coordinate their recovery with Germany and other countries.33 These huge changes opened what Gerald Berk calls an “epochal moment” in French policymaking.34 Rapid change can destabilize how actors understand their interests. Innovative actors may assemble new ideational “frames” out of the “tool kit” of ideas present in their culture.35 Such innovations do not necessarily respond functionally to the new situation; adaptation of older framing ideas, or other new ideas, may suggest competing analyses. The result is a “battle of ideas” in which groups debate several viable strategies. This is what developed in France in the late 1940s. Major change in objective conditions brought new ideas to the fore but did not dictate their success. The rise of the super powers, the destruction of national economies, and domestic delegitimation of the nationalist far Right turned “Euro￾peanist” projects—utopian musings before the war—into active options.36 But older ideas survived these objective shifts as well. The battle over postwar Europe remained to be fought. Some French elites held to traditional strategies. They retained a familiar realist analysis, with legitimacy and security located in the independent nation-state. If the attempt to block Germany’s recovery had been frustrated, traditional options remained. Some direct controls on Germany could still be salvaged; military and economic alliances with other powers could still be sought; if necessary, bilateral deals could even be struck with the Germans themselves. All would uphold the balance of European power, protecting French interests better than uncontrollable international organizations. This was also more worthy of “great power” France, whose independence was sacrosanct, and whose peers were the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR—not the other Europeans. Another group favored “confederal” strategies. They based their analysis on liberal thinking: The nation-state remained the source of legitimacy and security, but like-minded states should cooperate closely, given their interdependence. France’s natural partner was its liberal counterpart, Britain; together they would preside over pragmatic cooperation in broad European forums, while supervising the illiberal, atavistic Germans. Only combined Franco-British leadership would prevent the Germans from dominating Europe—ruling out narrower Franco-German projects. Broad but weak organizations could provide a platform for a European “third way” between the super powers, and for economic cooperation, without requiring direct losses of French sovereignty. 33. See Milward 1984; and Lundestad 1998. 34. Berk 1994. Similar notions are Ann Swidler’s “unsettled periods,” Neil Fligstein’s “institution￾building moments,” Robert Unger’s “context making” eras, and Robert Dahl’s “historic commitments.” See Swidler 1986; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Unger 1987; Ackerman 1991; and Dahl 1986. 35. See Scho¨n and Rein 1994; Snow et al. 1986; and Kingdon 1984. 36. On interwar Europeanism, see Brugmans 1965. Origins of the EU 57