A.Institutional Design and Its Implications It is well known that power disparities between the KMT and the opposition DPP had induced the latter to combine rational debate with emotional boycott in the legislature before 2000.When the DPP unexpectedly obtained the presidency in 2000(because of the split of the KMT),it could not ensure majority votes in the legislature.Nevertheless,Chen Shui-bian could appoint his executive team members without the approval of the majority Blue legislators,due to the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and legislature.The Blue legislators,therefore,had strong sentiments and the capacity to boycott the DPP administration.Political confrontation in the legislature during 2000-2008 vividly demonstrated such institutional handicaps in Taiwan's party politics.After 2008,the Green legislators followed the suit.The KMT's overwhelming majority in the legislature since 2008,in addition to its control of the presidency,has failed to produce efficient governance as well.8 This deviation is less to do with the minority DPP's confrontational strategies and more to do with the acute inner-party power struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng,who does not fully endorse Ma's policy direction.In other words,the DPP's weak position within the legislature has been neutralized by severe power struggle within the ruling KMT.Thus,the opposition DPP could still successfully block policy proposals of the Ma administration, and resort to street demonstrations whenever it felt necessary. If the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and parliament can be resolved through institutional reform toward the parliamentary system,as KMT new chairman Chu Li-luan (Zhu Lilun)proposed,the sentimental confrontation between minority government and majority opposition legislators can be mitigated significantly.Taiwan's current "president parliamentary" system initiated by the 1997 constitutional revision authorizes the elected president to nominate the chief executive (xingzhengyuan zhang)as well as cabinet members without approval of the legislative branch.In exchange,the two leaders (president and his appointed chief executive)have only limited veto power against decisions (including resolutions,laws,budgets and treaties)made by the legislature,which can reconfirm its decisions by simple majority,rather than crossing the two-thirds threshold as before.This institutional disadvantage may be minimized if the ruling party controls both presidential and parliamentary powers.However,under the so-called "divided government"when different parties control the two branches,the opposition party in the legislature can easily boycott policy proposals of the administration by simple majority.This poor institutional design cannot resolve political gridlock as the president has no right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature,and the legislators do not want to take a risk of being dismissed for a snap reelection by casting a no confidence vote on the chief executive.10 Thus,the opposition legislators could only constrain the administration in policy area,contributing to inefficient governance. From a long-term perspective,Taiwan's electoral system may encourage a balanced s Shelley Rigger,Why Taiwan Matters(New York:Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,Inc,2011),p.89. Wu Yu-shan,"Semi-Presidentialism-Easy to Choose,Difficult to Operate:The Case of Taiwan,"in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup,eds.,Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe:A Comparative Studies(London:Routledge),pp.201-18. 10 Dafydd Fell,Government and Politics in Taiwan (London&New York:Roudledge,2012),pp.52-53. 1010 A. Institutional Design and Its Implications It is well known that power disparities between the KMT and the opposition DPP had induced the latter to combine rational debate with emotional boycott in the legislature before 2000. When the DPP unexpectedly obtained the presidency in 2000 (because of the split of the KMT), it could not ensure majority votes in the legislature. Nevertheless, Chen Shui-bian could appoint his executive team members without the approval of the majority Blue legislators, due to the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and legislature. The Blue legislators, therefore, had strong sentiments and the capacity to boycott the DPP administration. Political confrontation in the legislature during 2000-2008 vividly demonstrated such institutional handicaps in Taiwan’s party politics. After 2008, the Green legislators followed the suit. The KMT’s overwhelming majority in the legislature since 2008, in addition to its control of the presidency, has failed to produce efficient governance as well.8 This deviation is less to do with the minority DPP’s confrontational strategies and more to do with the acute inner-party power struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng, who does not fully endorse Ma’s policy direction. In other words, the DPP’s weak position within the legislature has been neutralized by severe power struggle within the ruling KMT. Thus, the opposition DPP could still successfully block policy proposals of the Ma administration, and resort to street demonstrations whenever it felt necessary. If the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and parliament can be resolved through institutional reform toward the parliamentary system, as KMT new chairman Chu Li-luan (Zhu Lilun) proposed, the sentimental confrontation between minority government and majority opposition legislators can be mitigated significantly. Taiwan’s current “president parliamentary” system initiated by the 1997 constitutional revision authorizes the elected president to nominate the chief executive (xingzhengyuan zhang) as well as cabinet members without approval of the legislative branch.9 In exchange, the two leaders (president and his appointed chief executive) have only limited veto power against decisions (including resolutions, laws, budgets and treaties) made by the legislature, which can reconfirm its decisions by simple majority, rather than crossing the two-thirds threshold as before. This institutional disadvantage may be minimized if the ruling party controls both presidential and parliamentary powers. However, under the so-called “divided government” when different parties control the two branches, the opposition party in the legislature can easily boycott policy proposals of the administration by simple majority. This poor institutional design cannot resolve political gridlock as the president has no right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature，and the legislators do not want to take a risk of being dismissed for a snap reelection by casting a no confidence vote on the chief executive.10 Thus, the opposition legislators could only constrain the administration in policy area, contributing to inefficient governance. From a long-term perspective, Taiwan’s electoral system may encourage a balanced 8 Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), p.89. 9 Wu Yu-shan, “Semi-Presidentialism—Easy to Choose, Difficult to Operate: The Case of Taiwan,” in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup, eds., Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe: A Comparative Studies (London: Routledge), pp.201-18. 10 Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan (London & New York: Roudledge, 2012), pp.52-53