War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 181 182 Charles Tilly the bureaucracy created to service the army was likely to become bulky What Do States Do? Furthermore,a government building a standing army while controlling a small As should now be clear,Lane's analysis of protection fails to distinguish population was likely to incur greater costs,and therefore to build a bulkier among several different uses of state-controlled violence.Under the general structure,than a government within a populous country.Brandenburg-Prussia heading of organized violence,the agents of states characteristically carry on was the classic case of high cost for available resources.The Prussian effort four different activities: to build an army matching those of its larger Continental neighbors created an 1.War making:Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the immense structure;it militarized and bureaucratized much of German social territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of life. force In the case of extraction.the smaller the pool of resources and the 2. State making:Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those less commercialized the economy,other things being equal,the more difficult territories was the work of extracting resources to sustain war and other govemnmental 3.Protection:Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients activities;hence,the more extensive was the fiscal apparatus.England 4.Extraction:Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities- illustrated the corollary of that proposition,with a relatively large and com- war making,state making,and protection mercialized pool of resources drawn on by a relatively small fiscal apparatus. The third item corresponds to protection as analyzed by Lane,but the other As Gabriel Ardant has argued,the choice of fiscal strategy probably made an three also involve the application of force.They overlap incompletely and to additional difference.On the whole,taxes on land were expensive to collect as various degrees;for example,war making against the commercial rivals of the compared with taxes on trade,especially large flows of trade past easily local bourgeoisie delivers protection to that bourgeoisie.To the extent that a controlled checkpoints.Its position astride the entrance to the Baltic gave population is divided into enemy classes and the state extends its favors Denmark an extraordinary opportunity to profit from customs revenues. partially to one class or another,state making actually reduces the protection With respect to state making (in the narrow sense of eliminating or given some classes. neutralizing the local rivals of the people who controlled the state),a territory War making,state making,protection,and extraction each take a populated by great landlords or by distinct religious groups generally imposed number of forms.Extraction,for instance,ranges from outright plunder to reg- larger costs on a conqueror than one of fragmented power or homogeneous ular tribute to bureaucratized taxation.Yet all four depend on the state's culture.This time,fragmented and homogeneous Sweden,with its relatively tendency to monopolies the concentrated means of coercion.From the per- small but effective apparatus of control,illustrates the corollary. spectives of those who dominate the state,each of them-if carried on Finally,the cost of protection (in the sense of eliminating or effectively-generally reinforces the others.Thus,a state that successfully neutralizing the enemies of the state makers'clients)mounted with the range eradicates its intemal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources,to over which that protection extended.Portugal's effort to bar the Mediterranean wage war,and to protect its chief supporters.In the earlier European ex- to its merchants'competitors in the spice trade provides a textbook case of an perience,broadly speaking,those supporters were typically landlords,armed unsuccessful protection effort that nonetheless built up a massive structure. retainers of the monarch,and churchmen. Thus,the sheer size of the govemment varied directly with the effort Each of the major uses of violence produced characteristic forms of devoted to extraction,state making,protection,and,especially,war making organization.War making yielded armies,navies,and supporting services. but inversely with the commercialization of the economy and the extent of the State making produced durable instruments of surveillance and control within resource base.What is more,the relative bulk of different features of the the territory.Protection relied on the organization of war making and state government varied with the cost/resource ratios of extraction,state making. making but added to it an apparatus by which the protected called forth the protection,and war making.In Spain we see hypertrophy of Court and courts protection that was their due,notably through courts and representative as the outcome of centuries of effort at subduing internal enemies,whereas in assemblies.Extraction brought fiscal and accounting structures into being. Holland we are amazed to see how small a fiscal apparatus grows up with The organization and deployment of violence themselves account for much of high taxes within a rich,commercialized economy. the characteristic structure of European states. Clearly,war making,extraction,state making,and protection were in- The general rule seems to have operated like this:The more costly terdependent.Speaking very,very generally,the classic European state- the activity.all other things being equal,the greater was the organizational making experience followed this causal pattern: residue.To the extent,for example,that a given government invested in large standing armies-a very costly,if effective,means of war making-War Making and State Making as Organized Crime 181 What Do States Do? As should now be clear, Lane's analysis of protection fails to distinguish among several different uses of state-controlled violence. Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states characteristically carry on four different activities: 1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force 2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories 3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients 4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities – war making, state making, and protection The third item corresponds to protection as analyzed by Lane, but the other three also involve the application of force. They overlap incompletely and to various degrees; for example, war making against the commercial rivals of the local bourgeoisie delivers protection to that bourgeoisie. To the extent that a population is divided into enemy classes and the state extends its favors partially to one class or another, state making actually reduces the protection given some classes. War making, state making, protection, and extraction each take a number of forms. Extraction, for instance, ranges from outright plunder to reg￾ular tribute to bureaucratized taxation. Yet all four depend on the state's tendency to monopolies the concentrated means of coercion. From the per￾spectives of those who dominate the state, each of them – if carried on effectively – generally reinforces the others. Thus, a state that successfully eradicates its internal rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war, and to protect its chief supporters. In the earlier European ex￾perience, broadly speaking, those supporters were typically landlords, armed retainers of the monarch, and churchmen. Each of the major uses of violence produced characteristic forms of organization. War making yielded armies, navies, and supporting services. State making produced durable instruments of surveillance and control within the territory. Protection relied on the organization of war making and state making but added to it an apparatus by which the protected called forth the protection that was their due, notably through courts and representative assemblies. Extraction brought fiscal and accounting structures into being. The organization and deployment of violence themselves account for much of the characteristic structure of European states. The general rule seems to have operated like this: The more costly the activity, all other things being equal, the greater was the organizational residue. To the extent, for example, that a given government invested in large standing armies – a very costly, if effective, means of war making – 182 Charles Tilly the bureaucracy created to service the army was likely to become bulky. Furthermore, a government building a standing army while controlling a small population was likely to incur greater costs, and therefore to build a bulkier structure, than a government within a populous country. Brandenburg-Prussia was the classic case of high cost for available resources. The Prussian effort to build an army matching those of its larger Continental neighbors created an immense structure; it militarized and bureaucratized much of German social life. In the case of extraction, the smaller the pool of resources and the less commercialized the economy, other things being equal, the more difficult was the work of extracting resources to sustain war and other governmental activities; hence, the more extensive was the fiscal apparatus. England illustrated the corollary of that proposition, with a relatively large and com￾mercialized pool of resources drawn on by a relatively small fiscal apparatus. As Gabriel Ardant has argued, the choice of fiscal strategy probably made an additional difference. On the whole, taxes on land were expensive to collect as compared with taxes on trade, especially large flows of trade past easily controlled checkpoints. Its position astride the entrance to the Baltic gave Denmark an extraordinary opportunity to profit from customs revenues. With respect to state making (in the narrow sense of eliminating or neutralizing the local rivals of the people who controlled the state), a territory populated by great landlords or by distinct religious groups generally imposed larger costs on a conqueror than one of fragmented power or homogeneous culture. This time, fragmented and homogeneous Sweden, with its relatively small but effective apparatus of control, illustrates the corollary. Finally, the cost of protection (in the sense of eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of the state makers' clients) mounted with the range over which that protection extended. Portugal's effort to bar the Mediterranean to its merchants' competitors in the spice trade provides a textbook case of an unsuccessful protection effort that nonetheless built up a massive structure. Thus, the sheer size of the government varied directly with the effort devoted to extraction, state making, protection, and, especially, war making but inversely with the commercialization of the economy and the extent of the resource base. What is more, the relative bulk of different features of the government varied with the cost/resource ratios of extraction, state making, protection, and war making. In Spain we see hypertrophy of Court and courts as the outcome of centuries of effort at subduing internal enemies, whereas in Holland we are amazed to see how small a fiscal apparatus grows up with high taxes within a rich, commercialized economy. Clearly, war making, extraction, state making, and protection were in￾terdependent. Speaking very, very generally, the classic European state￾making experience followed this causal pattern: