POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI University of California Los Angeles ombining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries'external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors.A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land,labor, and capital,depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio.A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and con- tracting trade,and of such specific cases as the German"marriage of iron and rye,"U.S. and Latin American populism,and Asian socialism,suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis.While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied,the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. countries To be sure,some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries,and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries,have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics.Among the many factors that circumstances:one thinks,in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981,Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986,Rosenberg sions,the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943,Sunkel and Paz 1973.One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978),has even suggested a frage,the sequence of "crises"of mod- relation,at least in recent decades, ernization,the electoral system,and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia,Binder et al.1971;Duverger Arguing much more generally,I shall 1959;Kurth 1979a,1979b;Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967;Rokkan 1970,1981). of international trade-including,in Without denying the importance of any particular,the well-known Stolper- of these variables,I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem(Stolper and Samuel- relevance of a factor that has,until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected:externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently,but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL.81 NO.4 DECEMBER 1987POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING EXPOSURE TO TRADE RONALD ROGOWSKI ~ -~ University of California Los Angeles Combining the classical theorem of Stolper and Samuelson with a model of politics derived from Becker leads to the conclusion that exogenous changes in the risks or costs of countries' external trade will stimulate domestic conflict between owners of locally scarce and locally abundant factors. A traditional three-factor model then predicts quite specific coalitions and cleavages among owners of land, labor, and capital, depending only on the given country's level of economic development and its land-labor ratio. A preliminary survey of historical periods of expanding and con￾tracting trade, and of such specific cases as the German "marriage of iron and rye, " U.S. and Latin American populism, and Asian socialism, suggests the accuracy of this hypothesis. While the importance of such other factors as cultural divisions and political inheritance cannot be denied, the role of exogenous changes in the risks and costs of trade deserves further investigation. Why countries To be sure, some studies of individual have the political cleavages they do and countries, and even a few comparative why those cleavages change are among inquiries, have argued the significance of the enduring mysteries of comparative changing international trade in particular politics. Among the many factors that circumstances: one thinks, in particular, have been adduced as partial explanations of Abraham 1981, Gerschenkron 1943, are preexisting cultural and religious divi- Gourevitch 1977 and 1986, Rosenberg sions, the rapidity and timing of indus- 1943, Sunkel and Paz 1973. One author, trialization or of the grant of mass suf- Cameron (1978), has even suggested a frage, the sequence of "crises" of mod- relation, at least in recent decades, ernization, the electoral system, and- between exposure to trade and the rate of most recently-the product cycle (see, growth in state expenditure. inter alia, Binder et al. 1971; Duverger Arguing much more generally, I shall 1959; Kurth 1979a, 1979b; Lipset and try to show that basic results of the theory Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970, 1981). of international trade-including, in Without denying the importance of any particular, the well-known Stolper￾of these variables, I want to suggest the Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuel￾relevance of a factor that has, until now, son 1941)-imply that increases or been widely neglected: externally induced decreases in the costs and difficulty of changes-in countries with different fac- international trade should powerfully tor endowments-in exposure to inter- affect domestic political cleavages and national trade. should do so differently, but predictably, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 81 NO. 4 DECEMBER 1987