Virtue ethics and social work 1023 we have to see them if we are to do our duty as set out by the SSD. This breaks the reflexive of the good life, ones own sel able, and the reasons for acting. With similar implications, Slote runs the argument that if duties have a reference point, it is that of the person for whom a duty is performed and not the performer(Slote, 1997). This Slote identifies as a self-other asymmetry that implies that the moral agent(performer) lacks positive moral worth, and that agents are viewed as mere tools for helping others'(Statman, 1997b, p 5) In social work terms this underlines the not unfamiliar idea that social workers are increasingly becoming technical agents of the efficient distribution of welfare goods and construction of client life-plans(see Giddens, 1991; Ferguson, 2001). Doin mething for the sake of the other person may, at face value, seem to be moral, but it weakens the relation between the agent and the act which is what makes the act moralthe virtuous impulse which carries the agent forth into action. Practically speaking, asserting the irrelevance of a sense of personal moral worth of ones own likely to lead to a loss of mo and collectively. How often, if only anecdotally, has one heard comments from social workers about the lack of regard for what they do? This is not a comn about appraisal of their actions, but about their disappointment over the publics failure to appraise their worth as committed carers in difficult circumstances. They would like to be seen as being good. To decouple act from action would strike at the heart of the psychology of work satisfaction apart from any philosophical point In this way then, the self-other asymmetry argument can reveal the functioning of important values in social work. The two arguments above go to the heart of becoming a social worker. It is quite clear that there is a recruitment problem in social work, but why would one become a social worker today? At one time it was common to appeal to political or religious motivations; people committed to doing the right thing in relation to an ideological conception of the good life. Today the motivations are not so clear. Many perhaps enter the profession in pursuit of a public sector job that is relatively secure, but are also dictated by the consequent set of duties that prioritize social work as a task. This brings into play the self-other asymmetry and thus undermines the celebrated Kantian criterion of treating people as ends and not as means. The social worker who does the task because he or she is obliged--is duty boundto do it once mployed, lacks commitment as a self-responsible being pursuing the good life Supplication to duty leaves the worker without moral identity because heor she is acting for the sake of others, that is for the Ssd or the client. If a social worker does not recognize his or her moral identity and calling, then one may wonder whether such a person ought to do social work at all. We may see here that if we ignore the implications of the Stocker and Slote criticisms of Kantian ethics and gnore the need to reflect upon the idea of the virtuous life, the value of social workers as persons and indeed the value of entering social work, at all, is obscured A third point about deontology is what Bernard Williams(1985) has called the problem of moral luck. This points out that our duties are limited by our abilities such that contingency does not enter into duty based accounts of morality. However, the fact is that our lives are filled with the unpredictable, and affairs over which weVirtue Ethics and Social Work 1023 we have to see themif we are to do our duty as set out by the SSD. This breaks the reflexive relation between ones expression of the good life, ones own self as valu￾able, and the reasons for acting. With similar implications, Slote runs the argument that if duties have a reference point, it is that of the person for whoma duty is performed and not the performer (Slote, 1997). This Slote identifies as a self-other asymmetry that implies that the moral agent (performer) lacks positive moral worth, and that ‘agents are viewed as mere tools for helping others’ (Statman, 1997b, p. 5). In social work terms this underlines the not unfamiliar idea that social workers are increasingly becoming technical agents of the efficient distribution of welfare goods and construction of client life-plans (see Giddens, 1991; Ferguson, 2001). Doing something for the sake of the other person may, at face value, seem to be moral, but it weakens the relation between the agent and the act which is what makes the act moral—the virtuous impulse which carries the agent forth into action. Practically speaking, asserting the irrelevance of a sense of personal moral worth of one’s own actions would be dispiriting and be likely to lead to a loss of morale individually and collectively. How often, if only anecdotally, has one heard comments from social workers about the lack of regard for what they do? This is not a comment about appraisal of their actions, but about their disappointment over the publics’ failure to appraise their worth as committed carers in difficult circumstances. They would like to be seen as being good. To decouple act fromaction would strike at the heart of the psychology of work satisfaction apart fromany philosophical point. In this way then, the self-other asymmetry argument can reveal the functioning of important values in social work. The two arguments above go to the heart of becoming a social worker. It is quite clear that there is a recruitment problem in social work, but why would one become a social worker today? At one time it was common to appeal to political or religious motivations; people committed to doing the right thing in relation to an ideological conception of the good life. Today the motivations are not so clear. Many perhaps enter the profession in pursuit of a public sector job that is relatively secure, but are also dictated by the consequent set of duties that prioritize social work as a task. This brings into play the self-other asymmetry and thus undermines the celebrated Kantian criterion of treating people as ends and not as means. The social worker who does the task because he or she is obliged—is duty bound—to do it once employed, lacks commitment as a self-responsible being pursuing the good life. Supplication to duty leaves the worker without moral identity because heor she is acting for the sake of others, that is for the SSD or the client. If a social worker does not recognize his or her moral identity and calling, then one may wonder whether such a person ought to do social work at all. We may see here that if we ignore the implications of the Stocker and Slote criticisms of Kantian ethics and ignore the need to reflect upon the idea of the virtuous life, the value of social workers as persons and indeed the value of entering social work, at all, is obscured. A third point about deontology is what Bernard Williams (1985) has called the problem of moral luck. This points out that our duties are limited by our abilities such that contingency does not enter into duty based accounts of morality. However, the fact is that our lives are filled with the unpredictable, and affairs over which we