1024 Graham McBeath and Stephen A. Webb have no or little control given the latter we cannot in most situations act morall other words much of life is a matter of luck and traditional moral frameworks exclude this property as they view morality as only a matter of that for which we are entirely responsible. Applied to social work, moral luck builds in a realistic factor of uncertainty which is sometimes enabling of a good act, and sometimes not It thus behoves us to develop an ethics of social work that is compatible with the facts of complexity and risk. It is a false utopia to pretend, as managers and politi cians tend to do, that each case is essentially controllable and predictable. Positivist methodologies have taught us to believe that this is the case, but experience tells us it is not. The particular character of each case calls upon us to do our best, using our judgement and situational intelligence to adapt to changing circumstances. Here lies the skill of the worker giving concrete expression to Aristotle's intellectual virtues of wisdom in relation to prudence Against utilitarian theories which aim to maximize the welfare of persons and society, one telling argument virtue ethics runs is that it would be virtuous to do less than the optimizing action welfare-wise, if the minimizing action entailed trans- gressing virtue. Christine Swanton gives the example of someone refusing to betray a friend for the sake of optimizing the welfare of themselves or someone else (Swanton, 1997). To keep faith with friends is an act that shows that one possesses the virtue of friendship. This is the way one best performs friendship. One does not eep faith simply because of abstract rules of duty. In social work terms, if defensive social work which optimizes the interests of an SSD is a primary consideration and elected members are not to suffer unpopularity near election time, expensive services to a heroin addict should be refused. Giving the addict resources may be the best, most virtuous thing to do where virtue equals looking after clients, but may be contextually sub-optimal for the SSD and the local authority. The social worker should surely endorse virtue against the cruder instincts of obtaining the greatest A second set of arguments in regard of utilitarianism emerges when we consider the relation of complexity to judgement. This goes to the very heart of our discussion which is about the human qualities which can be brought into conjunction with the world of experience. Let us draw a distinction between determinant and reflective judgement; that is between the application of a decision rule such as the greatest ood for the greatest number and, action as a result of prudential consideration of circumstances or as Vico puts it: The wise man... who attains eternal truth by the uneven and insecure paths of practice(Vico, 1709, p. 35). Reflective judgement, which represents the virtuous man, is a sifting process of circumspection. It develops wisdom by engaging us in the process of the cultivation of good judgement. Unlike the utilitarian, the person of virtue and reflection moves from the particular to the universal, that is from an encompassing perception of the circumstances in which we find ourselves to the recognition of a revisable rule as to how we might judge in similar circumstances. The component of reflection provides the critical distance that underpins revisability. Beiner puts it well when he observes that Human beings possess no god-like clairvoyance that guides their judgement; they inhabit a world of experience where insight is always a fragile achievement, forever subject to opa-1024 Graham McBeath and Stephen A. Webb have no or little control. Given the latter, we cannot in most situations act morally. In other words, much of life is a matter of luck and traditional moral frameworks exclude this property as they view morality as only a matter of that for which we are entirely responsible. Applied to social work, moral luck builds in a realistic factor of uncertainty which is sometimes enabling of a good act, and sometimes not. It thus behoves us to develop an ethics of social work that is compatible with the facts of complexity and risk. It is a false utopia to pretend, as managers and politi￾cians tend to do, that each case is essentially controllable and predictable. Positivist methodologies have taught us to believe that this is the case, but experience tells us it is not. The particular character of each case calls upon us to do our best, using our judgement and situational intelligence to adapt to changing circumstances. Here lies the skill of the worker giving concrete expression to Aristotle’s intellectual virtues of wisdomin relation to prudence. Against utilitarian theories which aim to maximize the welfare of persons and society, one telling argument virtue ethics runs is that it would be virtuous to do less than the optimizing action welfare-wise, if the minimizing action entailed trans￾gressing virtue. Christine Swanton gives the example of someone refusing to betray a friend for the sake of optimizing the welfare of themselves or someone else (Swanton, 1997). To keep faith with friends is an act that shows that one possesses the virtue of friendship. This is the way one best performs friendship. One does not keep faith simply because of abstract rules of duty. In social work terms, if defensive social work which optimizes the interests of an SSD is a primary consideration and elected members are not to suffer unpopularity near election time, expensive services to a heroin addict should be refused. Giving the addict resources may be the best, most virtuous thing to do where virtue equals looking after clients, but may be contextually sub-optimal for the SSD and the local authority. The social worker should surely endorse virtue against the cruder instincts of obtaining the greatest utilitarian pay-off. A second set of arguments in regard of utilitarianism emerges when we consider the relation of complexity to judgement. This goes to the very heart of our discussion which is about the human qualities which can be brought into conjunction with the world of experience. Let us draw a distinction between determinant and reflective judgement; that is between the application of a decision rule such as the greatest good for the greatest number and, action as a result of prudential consideration of circumstances or as Vico puts it: ‘The wise man . . . who attains eternal truth by the uneven and insecure paths of practice’ (Vico, 1709, p. 35). Reflective judgement, which represents the virtuous man, is a sifting process of circumspection. It develops wisdomby engaging us in the process of the cultivation of good judgement. Unlike the utilitarian, the person of virtue and reflection moves from the particular to the universal, that is from an encompassing perception of the circumstances in which we find ourselves to the recognition of a revisable rule as to how we might judge in similar circumstances. The component of reflection provides the critical distance that underpins revisability. Beiner puts it well when he observes that ‘Human beings possess no god-like clairvoyance that guides their judgement; they inhabit a world of experience where insight is always a fragile achievement, forever subject to opa-