The term "imperialism"should be understood to refer clearly influenced China's "response to the West."It might be to the total historical process wherein foreigners intervene to argued,for example,that the puritanical Taiping opposition to restructure the economy,society,polity and culture of Third opium was a major barrier to trade between the rebel areas and World nations in ways which serve the economic and political Shanghai,and that the Taiping threat to the opium trade interests of the metropolitan powers.In apologetic moved the foreign community to aid in the suppression of the scholarship,such restructuring is generally regarded as part of rebellion.In any case,in assessing the impact of imperialism in the process of "modernization."The hypothesis of this essay China,we must be constantly aware of its unique and narcotic is that imperialism produced economic,social and political content. disruptions,distortions and instability of such a nature as to The importance of opium in China's foreign trade was of make successful modernization of any bourgeois-democratic course due to the inability of other foreign products to variety impossible.Revolution became the logical alternative. compete in China's already well-developed indigenous producing and marketing system.It is often noted by those It is convenient to begin a discussion of imperialism in who stress the limited or benign effects of imperialism,that China with the Opium War.Back in 1841,John Quincy Adams China's per-capita foreign trade was the lowest of all 83 expressed an authoritative Harvard view of that Anglo-Chinese countries listed by the League of Nations.14 This is of course conflict: undeniable.China was relatively successful in resisting the Tbe justice of tbe cause between the two parties-wbicb bas impulse of the Western bourgeoisie to "nestle everywhere, tbe rigbteous cause?You bave perbaps been surprised to settle everywhere,establish connections everywhere."is She bear me answer,Britain.Britain bas tbe rigbteous cause. was never reduced to the status of an Egypt,an India or an But to prove it,I bave been obliged to show that the opium Argentina.Furthermore,after 1949,revolutionary China, "aided"by the U.S.economic blockade,was cut off from the question is not tbe cause of the war....Tbe cause of the war is the kowtow!-the arrogant and insupportable West and from the possibility of falling into a state of pretension of China that she will bold commercial permanent economic dependence.This happened precisely at intercourse with tbe rest of mankind,not on terms of the time when the United States acquired the ability and the or tbendeadinoo will to make far greater economic inroads into the economies of the Third World than had even before been possible.In effect,Mao's revolution-itself in part a response to and Subsequent Harvard men have stuck loyally to Adams'view product of imperialism-prevented imperialism from running that China's reluctance to trade with the West was its full course. "insupportable"and that opium was not really the cause of Despite this abbreviation of imperialism's impact, the war.To quote Fairbank himself: China's involvement in the international market economy had By tbe nineteenth century,the Cbinese position on foreign long since become sufficiently intense to induce severe relations,like the contemporary seclusion policy of Japan, distortions in her own economy.In 1842,92%of China's was out of date and no longer supportable.... In exports were silk and tea;in 1868,their percentage was 93.5% demanding diplomatic equality and commercial by 1890 the percentage figure had fallen to 64.5%,though in opportunity,Britain represented all the Western states, absolute terms the trade continued to grow.Throughout the wbicb would sooner or later bave demanded tbe same nineteenth century,tea and silk constituted at least one-half of things if Britain bad not.It was an accident of bistory that China's annual exports.In response to this strong export the dynamic Britisb commercial interest in the China trade demand,many peasants shifted their meagre resources to the was centered not only on tea but also on opium. production of tea and silk,and a substantial proportion of the production of these commodities was exclusively for the In fact,the central role of opium was far from "an export market:at least 40%of the tea in the late nineteenth accident of history."There were demonstrable economic century,17 and 50-70%of the silk as late as the 1920s.18 By causes for the opium trade:not only was the sale of Bengal World War II,foreign markets for Chinese tea and silk had opium an important source of revenue for the British virtually disappeared,and countless thousands of Chinese administration in India,but opium was the only commodity peasants found themselves deprived of their livelihood.19 marketable in China in sufficient quantity to balance the While the conventional Western wisdom sees the moral of this triangular trade between China,Britain and India.This tale of tea and silk to be the inability of an incompetent paramount position of opium among China's imports did not Chinese government and an inefficient Chinese business result from an ignorant xenophobic Chinese resistance to establishment to enforce quality control and compete Western manufactures,but from a well-informed conviction effectively with Japanese silk and Japanese and Ceylonese that China could get along very well without them.Thus,even tea,20 the inescapable facts remain that (1)foreigners had if other Western states "sooner or later"had made the same created,controlled and then closed a market for Chinese demands as Britain,opium would have been a major issue.As goods,and to that extent China had been a victim of a world late as 1870,well after the opening of China by the "armed market in which she was an essentially passive participant;and opium propaganda"2 of the West,opium constituted4%of (2)for China to have competed effectively she would have had China's imports,and it remained the largest single Chinese to allow foreign tea plantations on the South Asian model import until 1890.13 Opium,then,was the West's only feasible (which would have meant an intensification of imperialist entree into the China market and its role was hardly influence in China),or to have established efficient "accidental."Furthermore,the fact that opium-pushing governmental supervision of these industries as was the case in remained the West's most important economic activity Japan.The latter would have required a far stronger Chinese through all but the last decade of the nineteenth century government than-as we shall presently see-was possible 10• • • The term "imperialism" should be understood to refer to the total historical process wherein foreigners intervene to restructure the economy, society, polity and culture of Third World nations in ways which serve the economic and political interests of the metropolitan powers. In apologetic scholarship, such restructuring is generally regarded as part of the process of "modernization." The hypothesis of this essay is that imperialism produced economic, social and political disruptions, distortions and instability of such a nature as to make successful modernization of any bourgeois-democratic variety impossible. Revolution became the logical alternative. It is convenient to begin a discussion of imperialism in China with the Opium War. Back in 1841, John Quincy Adams expressed an authoritative Harvard view of that AnglO-Chinese conflict: The justice ofthe cause between the two parties-which has the righteous cause? You have perhaps been surprised to bear me answer, Britain. Britain has the righteous cause. But to prove it, I have been obliged to show that the opium question is not the cause of the war . ... The cause of the war is the kowtow!-the arrogant and insupportable pretension of China that she will hold commercilll intercourse with the rest of mankind. not on terms of reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of lord and fHlSsal. 10 Subsequent Harvard men have stuck loyally to Adams'view that China's reluctance to trade with the West was "insupportable" and that opium was not really the cause of the war. To quote Fairbank himself: By the nineteenth century, the Chinese position on foreign relations, like the contemporary seclusion policy of Japan. was out of date and no longer supportable.... In demanding diplomatic equality and commercial opportunity, Britain represented all the Western states, which would sooner or later have demanded the same things if Britain had not. It was an accident of history that the dynamic British commercial interest in the China trade was centered not only on tea but also on opium. 11 In fact, the central role of opium was far from "an accident of history." There were demonstrable economic causes for the opium trade: not only was the sale of Bengal opium an important source of revenue for the British administration in India, but opium was the only commodity marketable in China in sufficient quantity to balance the triangular trade between China, Britain and India. This paramount position of opium among China's imports did not result from an ignorant xenophobic Chinese resistance to Western manufactures, but from a well-informed conviction that China could get along very well without them. Thus, even if other Western states "sooner or later" had made the same demands as Britain, opium would have been a major issue. As late as 1870, well after the opening of China by the "armed opium propaganda,,12 of the West, opium constituted 43% of China's imports, and it remained the largest single Chinese import untiT 1890. 13 Opium, then, was the West's only feasible entree into the China market and its role was hardly "accidental." Furthermore, the fact that opium-pushing remained the West's most important economic activity through all but the last decade of the nineteenth century clearly influenced China's "response to the West." It might be argued, for example, that the puritanical Taiping opposition to opium was a major barrier to trade between the rebel areas and Shanghai, and that the Taiping threat to the opium trade moved the foreign community to aid in the suppression of the rebellion. In any case, in assessing the impact of imperialism in China, we must be constantly aware of its unique and narcotic content. The importance of opium in China's foreign trade was of course due to the inability of other foreign products to compete in China's already well-developed indigenous producing and marketing system. It is often noted by those who stress the limited or benign effects of imperialism, that China's per-capita foreign trade was the lowest of all 83 countries listed by the League of Nations. 14 This is of course undeniable. China was relatively successful in resisting the impulse of the Western bourgeoisie to "nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere." 15 She was never reduced to the status of an Egypt, an India or an Argentina. Furthermore, after 1949, revolutionary China, "aided" by the U.S. economic blockade, was cut off from the West and from the possibility of falling into a state of permanent economic dependence. This happened precisely at the time when the United States acquired the ability and the will to make far greater economic inroads into the economies of the Third World than had even before been possible. In effect, Mao's revolution-itself in part a response to and product of imperialism-prevented imperialism from running its full course. Despite this abbreviation of imperialism's impact, China's involvement in the international market economy had long since become sufficiently intense to induce severe distortions in her own economy. In 1842, 92% of China's exports were silk and tea; in 1868, their percentage was 93.S%; by 1890 the percentage figure had fallen to 64.5%, though in absolute terms the trade continued to grow. Throughout the nineteenth century, tea and silk constituted at least one-half of China's annual exports. 16 In response to this strong export demand, many peasants shifted their meagre resources to the production of tea and silk, and a substantial proportion of the production of these commodities was exclusively for the export market: at least 40% of the tea in the late nineteenth century,17 and SO-70% of the silk as late as the 1920s.18 By World War II, foreign markets for Chinese tea and silk had virtually disappeared, and countless thousands of Chinese peasants found themselves deprived of their livelihood. 19 While the conventional Western wisdom sees the moral of this tale of tea and silk to be the inability of an incompetent Chinese government and an inefficient Chinese business establishment to enforce quality control and compete effectively with Japanese silk and Japanese and Ceylonese tea,2() the inescapable facts remain that (1) foreigners had created, controlled and then closed a market for Chinese goods, and to that extent China had been a victim of a world market in which she was an essentially passive participant; and (2) for China to have competed effectively she would have had to allow foreign tea plantations on the South Asian model (which would have meant an intensification of imperialist influence in China), or to have established efficient governmental supervision of these industries as was the case in Japan. The latter would have required a far stronger Chinese government than-as we shall presently see-was possible 10