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Interestingly, two of the three courts= decisions actually stated that granting the requested adoptions would be, in fact, in the best interests of the children. However, a majority of the judges decided that the statutory language and legislative intent required the exercise of jud icial restraint, preventing the courts from granting the adoptions The vigorous dissents in the Wisconsin and Connecticut Supreme Court decisions expressed dismay with the majority opinions= unwillingness to apply the statutory-interpretation provisions in the adoption and children=s codes, which state that the codes are to be >liberally construed to effect the objectives contained in this section =33 or that the codes must be >liberally construed in the best interests of the child=34 Even in the Colorado case which did not contain a dissenting opinion, Judge Ruland concurred specially, stating >. if one assumes again that the adoption is in the best interests of the child then why should the child be deprived of the legal commitments and benefits from a decree which provides a second parent to that child? =>Judge Ruland ended his concurring opinion with a statement in which he hoped >that the issue will be addressed soon either by the general Assembly or in an appropriate court proceed ing [challenging the adoption code as violating constitutionally mandated equal protection rights ]=3 Although three state appellate courts have declined to grant same-gender co-parent adoptions, a much larger number of courts have granted the adoption petitions. In granting same-gender co-parent adoptions, these courts also have applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction, as well as relying on the legislative intent of the adoption codes. The use of the plain-meaning rule has resulted in the courts, in general, finding the codes= language >ambiguous- because the codes do not address, directly the situation in which a same gender couple is seeking to adopt a child together, particularly if one of the petitioners is the Wisconsin legislature to visit ch. 48 in light of all that is occurring with children in our society. The legislators, as representatives of the people of this state, have both the right and the establish the requirements for a legal adoption, for custody and for visitation. This court cannot play that role. We can only interpret the law, not rewrite it. In re Angel Lace M, et al., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 519-20 516N w 2d 678, 687(1994)(Geske, J, concurring 32 >In the present case, everyone involved agrees that the adoption is in Angel=s best interests.= In re Angel Lace M, et al. 184 Wis. 2d 492, 523, 516 N. w2d 678, 688(1994)(Heffernan, CJ dissenting). >We recognize that all the child care experts involved in this case have concluded that the proposed adoption would be in Baby Z=s best interests. In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL33449,21(1999 In re Angel Lace M, et al. 184 Wis.2d 492, 521, 516 Nw2d 678, 687(1994)(Heffernan, C.J. In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL 33449, 29(1999)(Berdon, J, dissenting) In re Adoption of T KJ and K.A. K, Children, 931 P 2d 488, 497(Colo. Ct. App. 1996), NO 95CA0531, 95CA0532, rehearing denied(1996), cert. denied.(1997)(Ruland, J, specially concurring) See supra, notes 26, 27, and 28Interestingly, two of the three courts= decisions actually stated that granting the requested adoptions would be, in fact, in the best interests of the children.32 However, a majority of the judges decided that the statutory language and legislative intent required the exercise of judicial restraint, preventing the courts from granting the adoptions. The vigorous dissents in the Wisconsin and Connecticut Supreme Court decisions expressed dismay with the majority opinions= unwillingness to apply the statutory-interpretation provisions in the adoption and children=s codes, which state that the codes are to be >liberally construed to effect the objectives contained in this section,= 33 or that the codes must be >liberally construed in the best interests of the child.= 34 Even in the Colorado case, which did not contain a dissenting opinion, Judge Ruland concurred specially, stating >. . . if one assumes again that the adoption is in the best interests of the child, then why should the child be deprived of the legal commitments and benefits from a decree which provides a second parent to that child?= 35 Judge Ruland ended his concurring opinion with a statement in which he hoped >that the issue will be addressed soon either by the General Assembly or in an appropriate court proceeding [challenging the adoption code as violating constitutionally mandated equal protection rights.]= 36 Although three state appellate courts have declined to grant same-gender co-parent adoptions, a much larger number of courts have granted the adoption petitions.37 In granting same-gender co-parent adoptions, these courts also have applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction, as well as relying on the legislative intent of the adoption codes. The use of the plain-meaning rule has resulted in the courts, in general, finding the codes= language >ambiguous= because the codes do not address, directly, the situation in which a same￾gender couple is seeking to adopt a child together, particularly if one of the petitioners is the Wisconsin legislature to visit ch. 48 in light of all that is occurring with children in our society. The legislators, as representatives of the people of this state, have both the right and the responsibility to establish the requirements for a legal adoption, for custody and for visitation. This court cannot play that role. We can only interpret the law, not rewrite it.= In re Angel Lace M., et al., 184 Wis.2d 492, 519-20, 516 N.W.2d 678, 687 (1994) (Geske, J., concurring). 32 >In the present case, everyone involved agrees that the adoption is in Angel=s best interests.= In re Angel Lace M., et al., 184 Wis.2d 492, 523, 516 N.W.2d 678, 688 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). >We recognize that all the child care experts involved in this case have concluded that the proposed adoption would be in Baby Z=s best interests.= In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL 33449, 21 (1999). 33 In re Angel Lace M., et al., 184 Wis.2d 492, 521, 516 N.W.2d 678, 687 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting). 34 In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL 33449, 29 (1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting). 35 In re Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., Children, 931 P.2d 488, 497 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), NO. 95CA0531, 95CA0532, rehearing denied (1996), cert. denied, (1997) (Ruland, J., specially concurring). 36 Id. 37 See supra, notes 26, 27 , and 28
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