Regard less of the differences in the outcome of the decisions, however, the courts= analyses sually start from the same place, with an examination of the statutory language of the state=s adoption code. Most of the court decisions initially point out that adoption was unknown in the common law- adoption has been created totally by legislative enactment. Consequently the courts must use rules of statutory construction and interpretation to determine whether same- gender co-parent adoptions are permitted within the adoption code. As mentioned earlier, however, the adoption codes are silent on this issue Generally the courts decid ing this issue start from the foundational rule of statutory construction, the plain-meaning rule. According to this rule, the court must apply the statutory language accord ing to its plain meaning. To ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory language, ours often resort to common dictionary definitions of the words. When the words themselves are ambiguous in their meaning or application, however, the courts also consider the legislative intent of the words for add itional guidance. The use of this statutory-interpretation procedure however, has resulted in contradictory decisions in the cases involving same-gender co-parent dopt In the decisions of the three appellate courts that denied the adoption petitions filed by same-gender co-parents, the courts first relied on the plain meaning of the words of the adoption code to find that the words did not include situations involving same-gender co-parent adoption petitions. The courts used a strict, formalistic construction of the words involved in the codes For example, if the code stated that a single person, a married couple, or a stepparent were allowed to adopt a child, the court would find that a same-gender couple did not fit within this statutory language. The same-gender couple was not adopting as a >single person= because the adoption petition was for a >joint= adoption, and since same-gender couples were not >married they could not adopt as a >married couple. Finally, because the same-gender couple was not married, there could be no >stepparent= or >spouse= within the formalistic use of the plain- meaning rule 29 gene It also appears that in the three states in which the appellate courts denied the same co-parent adoptions, the adoptions were more highly regulated. For example, the Connecticut statute required that, if the child was not being adopted by the legal parent=s >spouse= or >blood relative, then the only way the adoption could occur was by the natural parent=s rights being terminated and a state agency >placing= the child for adoption. 30 In addition, the three appellate courts that denied the adoptions found that the legislative intent did not support these adoptions because the legislative history was silent on the issue, nt adon udges to conclude the legislature probably did not contemplate same-gender co- parent adoptions. Consequently, the courts deferred to the legislature to decide this issue, stating that the legislature was a more appropriate body to determine the question of same- gender co. parent adoptions. 31 See In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL 33449(1999) social mores of the public at large is the role of the democratic process and not of the courts. hp (9 31 >The determination whether this legislative decision is or is not in keeping with the changi Adoption of T KJ and K.A. K, Children, 931 P 2d 488, 496(Colo. Ct. App. 1996), NO. 95CA0531 5CA0532, rehearing denied(1996), cert. denied.(1997). >I write separately only to encourage theRegardless of the differences in the outcome of the decisions, however, the courts= analyses usually start from the same place, with an examination of the statutory language of the state=s adoption code. Most of the court decisions initially point out that adoption was unknown in the common law - adoption has been created totally by legislative enactment. Consequently, the courts must use rules of statutory construction and interpretation to determine whether same￾gender co-parent adoptions are permitted within the adoption code. As mentioned earlier, however, the adoption codes are silent on this issue. Generally the courts deciding this issue start from the foundational rule of statutory construction, the plain-meaning rule. According to this rule, the court must apply the statutory language according to its plain meaning. To ascertain the plain meaning of the statutory language, courts often resort to common dictionary definitions of the words. When the words themselves are ambiguous in their meaning or application, however, the courts also consider the legislative intent of the words for additional guidance. The use of this statutory-interpretation procedure, however, has resulted in contradictory decisions in the cases involving same-gender co-parent adoptions. In the decisions of the three appellate courts that denied the adoption petitions filed by same-gender co-parents, the courts first relied on the plain meaning of the words of the adoption code to find that the words did not include situations involving same-gender co-parent adoption petitions. The courts used a strict, formalistic construction of the words involved in the codes. For example, if the code stated that a single person, a married couple, or a stepparent were allowed to adopt a child, the court would find that a same-gender couple did not fit within this statutory language. The same-gender couple was not adopting as a >single person= because the adoption petition was for a >joint= adoption, and since same-gender couples were not >married,= they could not adopt as a >married couple.= Finally, because the same-gender couple was not married, there could be no >stepparent= or >spouse= within the formalistic use of the plain￾meaning rule.29 It also appears that in the three states in which the appellate courts denied the same￾gender co-parent adoptions, the adoptions were more highly regulated. For example, the Connecticut statute required that, if the child was not being adopted by the legal parent=s >spouse= or >blood relative,= then the only way the adoption could occur was by the natural parent=s rights being terminated and a state agency >placing= the child for adoption.30 In addition, the three appellate courts that denied the adoptions found that the legislative intent did not support these adoptions because the legislative history was silent on the issue, leading the judges to conclude the legislature probably did not contemplate same-gender co￾parent adoptions. Consequently, the courts deferred to the legislature to decide this issue, stating that the legislature was a more appropriate body to determine the question of same-gender co￾parent adoptions.31 29 See In re Adoption of Baby Z, 247 Conn. 474, 1999 WL 33449 (1999). 30 Id. 31 >The determination whether this legislative decision is or is not in keeping with the changing social mores of the public at large is the role of the democratic process and not of the courts.= In re Adoption of T.K.J. and K.A.K., Children, 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), NO. 95CA0531, 95CA0532, rehearing denied (1996), cert. denied, (1997). >I write separately only to encourage the