80:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY with the democratic figures and give up a democratic coalition govern- ment."Stuart promised that "if a genuine coalition government committed to peace,independence,democracy and freedom was to be established in China and if the CCP would change its attitude toward the United States by,among other things,stopping the anti-American campaign"the United States would be willing to"maintain friendly relations with the CCP and would provide the new government with assistance in new China's eco- nomic recovery and reconstruction."13 After receiving Chen Mingshu's report,Mao and the CCP leadership speculated that because "the old U.S.policy of supporting the GMD and opposing the CCP has failed,"Washington"is turning toward adopting a policy of establishing diplomatic relations with us."14As long-time players of the "united front"strategy.Mao and his comrades were determined to stick to their principles,but they could not at the same time ignore an opportunity to weaken the threat from enemies and potential enemies.15 Mao therefore authorized Huang Hua's May-June contacts with Stuart, instructing him "to listen more and talk less."The CCP chairman also made clear that unless the Americans were willing to sever relations with the GMD and to treat China equally,the CCP would not consider having relations with the United States.16 In retrospect,these two conditions were impossible for the Americans to meet.Fulfilling the first condition,cutting off connections with the GMD would require the complete turnover of America's China policy since the end of World War II,and realizing the second,treating the Chinese as "equals,"presented the Americans with a profound challenge in a historical- cultural sense.Indeed,Mao viewed "equality"as a historical problem,point- ing out that Sino-American relations had been dominated by a series of unequal treaties since China's defeat in the Opium War of 1839-1842.He believed that in a moral sense the United States and other Western powers owed the Chinese a heavy debt.As the first step toward establishing an 13.Memorandum."Mr.Chen Mingshu's Report on American Ambassador's Secret Visit to Shanghai,"26 March 1949,CCA.The secret meetings between Stuart and Chen Mingshu and the statements made by Stuart as reported in the memorandum are previously unknown. They cannot be confirmed by currently available American sources.This suggests that Stuart may have gone beyond the authorization of the State Department in an effort to provoke a CCP response that would help bring about a Sino-American accommodation. 14.Instruction,CCP Central Military Commission,"Our Policy toward British and American Citizens and Diplomats,"28 April 1949,in Zhang and Chen,eds.,Chinese Commu- nist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia.doc.2.22. 15.As far as the timing of Stuart's message is concerned,one should keep in mind that the PLA was preparing to cross the Yangzi River and"liberate"Nanjing and Shanghai,China's largest industrial and commercial center.The CCP leadership worried that this movement would result in America's military intervention and was eager to find ways to reduce its possibility.For a more detailed analysis see Chen Jian,China's Road to the Korean War:The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York,1994),52-53. 16.CCP Central Committee to CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee,10 May 1949,in Zhang and Chen,eds..Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia,doc.2.24.80 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y with the democratic figures and give up a democratic coalition govern￾ment.” Stuart promised that “if a genuine coalition government committed to peace, independence, democracy and freedom was to be established in China and if the CCP would change its attitude toward the United States by, among other things, stopping the anti-American campaign” the United States would be willing to “maintain friendly relations with the CCP and would provide the new government with assistance in new China’s eco￾nomic recovery and reconstruction.”13 After receiving Chen Mingshu’s report, Mao and the CCP leadership speculated that because “the old U.S. policy of supporting the GMD and opposing the CCP has failed,” Washington “is turning toward adopting a policy of establishing diplomatic relations with us.”14 As long-time players of the “united front” strategy, Mao and his comrades were determined to stick to their principles, but they could not at the same time ignore an opportunity to weaken the threat from enemies and potential enemies.15 Mao therefore authorized Huang Hua’s May–June contacts with Stuart, instructing him “to listen more and talk less.” The CCP chairman also made clear that unless the Americans were willing to sever relations with the GMD and to treat China equally, the CCP would not consider having relations with the United States.16 In retrospect, these two conditions were impossible for the Americans to meet. Fulfilling the first condition, cutting off connections with the GMD, would require the complete turnover of America’s China policy since the end of World War II, and realizing the second, treating the Chinese as “equals,” presented the Americans with a profound challenge in a historical￾cultural sense. Indeed, Mao viewed “equality” as a historical problem, point￾ing out that Sino-American relations had been dominated by a series of unequal treaties since China’s defeat in the Opium War of 1839–1842. He believed that in a moral sense the United States and other Western powers owed the Chinese a heavy debt. As the first step toward establishing an 13. Memorandum, “Mr. Chen Mingshu’s Report on American Ambassador’s Secret Visit to Shanghai,” 26 March 1949, CCA. The secret meetings between Stuart and Chen Mingshu and the statements made by Stuart as reported in the memorandum are previously unknown. They cannot be confirmed by currently available American sources. This suggests that Stuart may have gone beyond the authorization of the State Department in an effort to provoke aCCP response that would help bring about a Sino-American accommodation. 14. Instruction, CCP Central Military Commission, “Our Policy toward British and American Citizens and Diplomats,” 28 April 1949, in Zhang and Chen, eds., Chinese Commu￾nist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, doc. 2.22. 15. As far as the timing of Stuart’s message is concerned, one should keep in mind that the PLA was preparing to cross the Yangzi River and “liberate” Nanjing and Shanghai, China’s largest industrial and commercial center. The CCP leadership worried that this movement would result in America’s military intervention and was eager to find ways to reduce its possibility. For a more detailed analysis see Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, 1994), 52–53. 16. CCP Central Committee to CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee, 10 May 1949, in Zhang and Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, doc. 2.24