A Chinese Perspective 79 mittee's Second Plenary Session in March 1949,the CCP leadership reached the consensus that the new Chinese Communist regime should neither hastily seek recognition from,nor pursue diplomatic relations with, the United States and other Western countries."As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries,asserted Mao,"we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after country-wide victory."During 1949-50. CCP leaders repeatedly emphasized that establishing diplomatic relations with the United States or other Western countries was not a priority.10 As is well known,after the Chinese Communists occupied Nanjing,the capital of Nationalist China,in late April 1949,John Leighton Stuart,the American ambassador to China,remained.In May and June,Stuart held a series of meetings with Huang Hua,director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the Communist Nanjing Municipal Military Control Commission. They discussed,among other things,conditions on which relations be- tween the CCP and the United States might be established.11 In the mean- time.CCP leaders asserted on several occasions that if Western capitalist countries cut off their connections with the GMD and treated China and the Chinese people as"equals,"the CCP would be willing to consider establish- ing relations with them.12 Advocates of the"lost chance"thesis use these exchanges and statements to support their position. It is true that for a short period in the spring of 1949,Mao and the CCP leadership showed some interest in having contacts with the United States, which,we now know,was probably triggered by a secret message Stuart sent to the CCP through his personal friend Chen Mingshu,a pro- Communist "democratic figure."A previously unknown memorandum kept at the Chinese Central Archives indicates that on 25 and 26 March, Stuart had two secret meetings with Chen in Shanghai.The American ambassador,according to the memorandum,expressed two major concerns on the part of the United States:"(1)that the CCP might attach itself to the side of the Soviet Union in a confrontation with the United States...,and (2)that the CCP,after unifying China by force,would stop its cooperation directive see Dangde wenxian [Party history documents]no.1(1992):27. 9.Mao Zedong."Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Commit- tee."Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedongl (Beijing.1965).4:1436. 10.See,for example,Mao Zedong's conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee,13 March 1949,CCA:Zhou Enlai,"Report on Problems Con- cerning the Peace Talks,"Zhou Enlai xuanji [Selected works of Zhou Enlai](Beijing.1984). 1:323:and idem."New China's Diplomacy."Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic papers of Zhou Enlai](Beijing.1990),4-5. 11.For a recent Chinese account of the Huang-Stuart meetings see Huang Hua."My contacts with Stuart after Nanjing's Liberation"(trans.Li Xiaobing).Chinese Historians 5,no.1 (Spring1992:47-56. 12.See,for example,Mao Zedong."Statement by the Spokesman of the General Head- quarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army."30 April 1949.and "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference."Mao Zedong xuanji4:1464. 1470.A Chinese Perspective : 79 mittee’s Second Plenary Session in March 1949, the CCP leadership reached the consensus that the new Chinese Communist regime should neither hastily seek recognition from, nor pursue diplomatic relations with, the United States and other Western countries. “As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries,” asserted Mao, “we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after country-wide victory.”9 During 1949–50, CCP leaders repeatedly emphasized that establishing diplomatic relations with the United States or other Western countries was not a priority.10 As is well known, after the Chinese Communists occupied Nanjing, the capital of Nationalist China, in late April 1949, John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China, remained. In May and June, Stuart held a series of meetings with Huang Hua, director of the Foreign Affairs Office under the Communist Nanjing Municipal Military Control Commission. They discussed, among other things, conditions on which relations be￾tween the CCP and the United States might be established.11 In the mean￾time, CCP leaders asserted on several occasions that if Western capitalist countries cut off their connections with the GMD and treated China and the Chinese people as “equals,” the CCP would be willing to consider establish￾ing relations with them.12 Advocates of the “lost chance” thesis use these exchanges and statements to support their position. It is true that for a short period in the spring of 1949, Mao and the CCP leadership showed some interest in having contacts with the United States, which, we now know, was probably triggered by a secret message Stuart sent to the CCP through his personal friend Chen Mingshu, a pro￾Communist “democratic figure.” A previously unknown memorandum kept at the Chinese Central Archives indicates that on 25 and 26 March, Stuart had two secret meetings with Chen in Shanghai. The American ambassador, according to the memorandum, expressed two major concerns on the part of the United States: “(1) that the CCP might attach itself to the side of the Soviet Union in a confrontation with the United States . . . , and (2) that the CCP, after unifying China by force, would stop its cooperation directive see Dangde wenxian [Party history documents] no. 1 (1992): 27. 9. Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Commit￾tee,” Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing, 1965), 4:1436. 10. See, for example, Mao Zedong’s conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, 13 March 1949, CCA; Zhou Enlai, “Report on Problems Con￾cerning the Peace Talks,” Zhou Enlai xuanji [Selected works of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing, 1984), 1:323; and idem, “New China’s Diplomacy,” Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing, 1990), 4–5. 11. For a recent Chinese account of the Huang-Stuart meetings see Huang Hua, “My contacts with Stuart after Nanjing’s Liberation” (trans. Li Xiaobing), Chinese Historians 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 47–56. 12. See, for example, Mao Zedong, “Statement by the Spokesman of the General Head￾quarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” 30 April 1949, and “Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference,”Mao Zedong xuanji 4:1464, 1470