66 International Organization TABLE 3.New corporate and foreign capital issues in New York, 1919-1929 (in millions of dollars and percent) A B All corporate Foreign B/A issues issues in percent 1919 52,742 $771 28.1% 1920 2,967 603 20.3% 1921 2,391 692 28.9% 1922 2,775 863 31.1% 1923 2,853 498 17.5% 1924 3,831 1,217 31.8% 1925 6,219 1,316 21.2% 1926 8,628 1,288 14.9% 1927 9.936 1,577 15.9% 1928 9,894 1,489 15.0% 1929 11,604 706 6.1% Total,1919-1929 63,840 11,020 17.3% Annual average,1919-1929 5,804 1,002 17.3% Source.United States Department of Commerce,Handbook of American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (Washington,D.C.:GPO,1930),pp.32-37. ing advantages,such as motor vehicles,electric appliances and utilities,and petroleum,as well as in the extraction of resources available more readily abroad.There was little overseas investment by industries producing such relatively standardized goods as steel,clothing,and footwear;they generally had little exporting experience,and few advantages over firms in their lines of business abroad.Thus the major money-center investment and commer- cial banks were highly international,as were the more technologically ad- vanced manufacturing and extractive industries;traditional labor-intensive industries,which were by far the majority,were little involved in foreign investment. American industrial export interests were similar to its foreign invest- ments.The major industrial sectors with overseas investments were also the country's leading industrial exporters,as product-cycle theory would pre- dict.6 Refiners of copper and petroleum,and producers of machinery and equipment,motor vehicles,chemicals,and processed food were all major exporters as well as major foreign investors.The only important exceptions to the general congruence of trade and asset diversification were the steel industry and some agricultural interests,especially in the South.Neither steel producers nor,of course,cotton and tobacco farmers had many over- seas investments.To a large extent,then,the trade and foreign investment line-ups were complementary. 6.The classical explanation of the process is Raymond Vernon,"International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle,'Ouarterly Journal of Economics 80 (May 1966), pp,190-207. 7.On agricultural and industrial trade preferences in the 1920s,see Barry Eichengreen,"The66 International Organization TABLE 3. New corporate and foreign capital issues in New York, 1919-1929 (in millions of dollars and percent) A B All corporate Foreign BIA issues issues in percent 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Total, 1919-1929 Annual average, 1919-1929 Source. United States Department of Commerce, Handbook of American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1930), pp. 32-37. ing advantages, such as motor vehicles, electric appliances and utilities, and petroleum, as well as in the extraction of resources available more readily abroad. There was little overseas investment by industries producing such relatively standardized goods as steel, clothing, and footwear; they generally had little exporting experience, and few advantages over firms in their lines of business abroad. Thus the major money-center investment and commer￾cial banks were highly international, as were the more technologically ad￾vanced manufacturing and extractive industries; traditional labor-intensive industries, which were by far the majority, were little involved in foreign investment. American industrial export interests were similar to its foreign invest￾ments. The major industrial sectors with overseas investments were also the country's leading industrial exporters, as product-cycle theory would pre￾di~t.~ Refiners of copper and petroleum, and producers of machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals, and processed food were all major exporters as well as major foreign investors. The only important exceptions to the general congruence of trade and asset diversification were the steel industry and some agricultural interests, especially in the South. Neither steel producers nor, of course, cotton and tobacco farmers had many over￾seas investments. To a large extent, then, the trade and foreign investment line-ups were c~m~lementary.~ 6. The classical explanation of the process is Raymond Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle," Quarterly - Journal ofEconomics 80 (May 1966), pp. 190-207. 7. On agricultural and industrial trade preferences in the 1920s, see Barry Eichengreen, "The