700 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN that incre ondents inte aret the tive c thus inf ose (e g I ambert et al ing their affectiv eactions to n rs and in n gene 2005) reove sed by Frantz e (2005).who found that the preference for fl which typically incre ses arousal.This aro usal,in tum.may en ler d by plying a re this cas apost-n tio appreher or arous response (e.g..implicit preference for flowers over insects) cient to activate different ociative Causes of Explicit Attitude Change As with changes in implicit attitudes rch on motivational states Fer on and Bargh tudes can be due to a number of p ording to the APE (a)a of th efor goal pursui Obiec ts were evaluated mo the set of propositions that are consi se in the Rose Koc The first kind of explici ative in beav the ass ociative structure or temporal ch es in the activation o pos d to a change of ive ev were der ve the ts on their automatic affective rea ions. such chango ative evalual nay, in tum, to corresponding With regard to change in ass ciative structure.a number c esting line of res earch con iewed extensively else where (De Houwer e (2004)for exam r but not sadr on of the relevant evidence from the perspectiv 0 APE that er.in contrast to sadn onflict. rh nte the influe e of EC on evaluative judgments should be mec by ed that wh d a et al with ber of important impic which we discu erplay expli mnlicit attitude ch Segal agrati.and K who four that As with changes in associative temporal changes in iative self-evaluations under ed with at is one could in uggest that ive evaluatio which.in tumn. further inf As w wever. in patte ivatio than from senuine diffe ir ct inf uenc of context stimuli judgments eis a finding b luat;such ddy,Bur Evidence for explicit attitude changes resulting fror higher when the task was int ed as a diagr tic instrument fo ntered members of a social nts abor the assessment of racism.This finding is consistent with the claim the group in general (e.gBless. warz.Bodenhausen,Thieskunkweed) and pleasant insects (e.g., butterfly). According to Govan and Williams, the particular stimuli in the IAT determine how respondents interpret the respective categories, thus influenc￾ing their affective reactions to flowers and insects in general. This interpretation is also consistent with research by Foroni and Mayr (2005), who found that the preference for flowers over insects could be attenuated by a fictional scenario implying a reversal of the typical category evaluations. In their study, participants were asked to imagine a post–nuclear war scenario in which flowers were generally contaminated and insects were the only kind of harmless food available. From the perspective of the APE model, these results suggest that different exemplars (Govan & Williams, 2004) or fictional scenarios (Foroni & Mayr, 2005) may be suffi￾cient to activate different associative patterns, thus leading to different associative evaluations of flowers and insects. A particularly interesting case of changes in pattern activation comes from research on motivational states. Ferguson and Bargh (2004), for example, demonstrated that automatic associative eval￾uations of an attitude object differed as a function of the object’s relevance for goal pursuit. Objects were evaluated more positively when they were relevant than when they were irrelevant for goal pursuit (see also Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003). Similar findings were reported by Sherman, Rose, Koch, Presson, and Chassin (2003), who showed that nicotine deprivation led to more positive associative evaluations of cigarettes in heavy smokers. However, light smokers showed more positive associative evalu￾ations of cigarettes when they had just smoked a cigarette than when they were deprived. Taken together, these results indicate that associative evaluations depend not only on external input stimuli but also on internal motivational states. Moreover, given the transient nature of motivational states, these influences are likely to result from differences in pattern activation rather than from genuine differences in the underlying associative structure. Another interesting line of research concerns the effect of emo￾tional states on automatic associative evaluations. In a study by DeSteno et al. (2004), for example, anger but not sadness enhanced automatic negative evaluations of out-groups. According to De￾Steno et al., these differences were due to the functional relevance of anger, in contrast to sadness, to intergroup conflict. This inter￾pretation is also consistent with findings by Schaller et al. (2003), who showed that ambient darkness enhanced automatic negative evaluations of African Americans for participants with chronic beliefs in a dangerous world but not for participants who did not believe in a dangerous world. Similar differences were reported by Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, and Kennedy (2001), who found that re￾cently recovered depressed patients showed more negative asso￾ciative self-evaluations under sad mood as compared with control conditions. For never-depressed control participants, in contrast, mood had no effect on associative self-evaluations. Taken to￾gether, these results suggest that associative evaluations depend on emotional as well as motivational states. Moreover, as with tran￾sient motivational states, these influences are likely to result from differences in pattern activation rather than from genuine differ￾ences in the underlying associative structure. Directly related to the notion of emotional states is a finding by Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, and Hart (2004). These researchers found that implicit prejudice scores on the IAT were generally higher when the task was introduced as a diagnostic instrument for the assessment of racism. This finding is consistent with the claim that increased arousal enhances dominant responses (Hull, 1943; Zajonc, 1965). That is, one could argue that automatic associations reflect a particular kind of dominant response (e.g., Lambert et al., 2003). Moreover, the diagnosticity instructions used by Frantz et al. (2004) are quite likely to result in evaluation apprehension, which typically increases arousal. This arousal, in turn, may en￾hance dominant responses, in this case the activation level of automatic associations. If this interpretation is correct, any kind of evaluation apprehension or arousal should enhance IAT effects, and this increase should emerge irrespective of whether the task is designed to assess implicit prejudice or any other kind of dominant response (e.g., implicit preference for flowers over insects). Causes of Explicit Attitude Change As with changes in implicit attitudes, changes in explicit atti￾tudes can be due to a number of processes. According to the APE model, changes in evaluative judgments can be due to (a) a change of the associative evaluation of the attitude object, (b) a change in the set of propositions that are considered to be relevant for an evaluative judgment, or (c) a change in the strategy used to achieve consistency within a given set of propositions. Changes in associative evaluation. The first kind of explicit attitude change involves instances in which incremental changes in the associative structure or temporal changes in the activation of associative patterns lead to a change of the associative evaluation of the attitude object. Because people tend to base their evaluative judgments on their automatic affective reactions, such changes in associative evaluations may, in turn, lead to corresponding changes in evaluative judgments. With regard to changes in associative structure, a number of studies on EC have demonstrated that repeated pairings of CSs and USs influence subsequent evaluative judgments of the CSs. This research has been reviewed extensively elsewhere (De Houwer et al., 2001, 2005; Walther et al., 2005), and thus we refrain from an elaborate discussion of the relevant evidence. From the perspective of the APE model, however, it is important to note that processes of EC should not directly influence evaluative judgments. Rather, the influence of EC on evaluative judgments should be mediated by associative evaluations, which, in turn, influence evaluative judgments (see also De Houwer et al., 2001, 2005). This assump￾tion has a number of important implications, which we discuss in more detail in the context of the interplay between explicit and implicit attitude changes. As with changes in associative structure, temporal changes in the activation of preexisting associative patterns can lead to cor￾responding changes in evaluative judgments. That is, one could argue that any context stimulus that leads to a change in pattern activation should influence the associative evaluation of an attitude object, which, in turn, may further influence corresponding eval￾uative judgments. As with the case of EC, however, it is important to note that such changes in evaluative judgments do not reflect a direct influence of context stimuli on evaluative judgments. Rather, such influences should also be mediated by associative evaluations. Evidence for explicit attitude changes resulting from differences in pattern activation comes from studies showing that recently encountered members of a social group influence judgments about the group in general (e.g., Bless, Schwarz, Bodenhausen, & Thiel, 700 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN