Power Transition and China-US Conflicts 45 effectively managed only with a strong Western Alliance that attracts Russia and maintains Japan within its fold.'8 These conclusions have meaning for the East Asia region. The Rise of China The arguments outlined above cast a clear and unambiguous focus on Asia, and in particular on China.The United States and China are locked in a long-term competition for economic primacy.China,today the smaller challenger,is growing at a much faster rate than the more mature economic engine of the United States.This dynamic change is generating the conditions for an overtaking in the future,anticipated to be between 2025 and 2035.From our strategic perspective,this places China into the zone of parity and potential transition with the United States.Our empirical work shows that under conditions of parity,peace is achieved when both parties are satisfied.But if the challenger is dissatisfied,the probability of war increases dramatically. Unlike the contest with the USSR,Figure 3 indicates that over time China could overtake the United States in terms of GDP.If this happens,with its huge population,China's resulting economic parity likely will metamor- phose into military superiority.Figure 3 also indicates that if China grows to its full potential,it would become the leading nation in the international system by 2075.20 Take the case of nuclear weapons as an example. Both nations now have nuclear weapons.Currently,the US arsenal 'assures' the destruction of China under all circumstances,while China has a minimum deterrent.At some point in the future,however,China will achieve a Mutual Assured Destruction level equivalence with the United States.When that happens,the conditions for a potential confrontation will re-emerge.This fact has not escaped the attention of the intelligence community and a number of academics.21 i8 A.F.K.Organski et al.,The Mosaic of International Power:Reflections on General Trends',in Bouda Etemad et al.,eds,Towards and International Economic and Social History:Essays in Honor of Paul Bairoch (Geneva,1995):Ronald Tammen et al.,Power Transitions. 1Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds,Pariry and War. 20 We hedge our conclusion here as a courtesy to the arguments that (a)China may collapse internally such as the USSR:(b)China may decentralize and the provinces will withhold revenues from the central government:(c)China will self destruct economically or face a severe economic downturn that could disrupt its current growth trajectory and(d)China will become a practicing democracy and fall victim to the democratic peace proposition.We find all of these alternatives as being less likely than our previous primary conclusion. 21 National Intelligence Council,Mapping the Global Future:Mearsheimer(2004)unpublished paper;Jacek Kugler and Ronald L.Tammen,'Regional Challenge:China's Rise to Power' in J.Rolfe (ed).The Asia-Pacific;a Region in Transition,Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.1,2006,35-55effectively managed only with a strong Western Alliance that attracts Russia and maintains Japan within its fold.18 These conclusions have meaning for the East Asia region. The Rise of China The arguments outlined above cast a clear and unambiguous focus on Asia, and in particular on China. The United States and China are locked in a long-term competition for economic primacy. China, today the smaller challenger, is growing at a much faster rate than the more mature economic engine of the United States. This dynamic change is generating the conditions for an overtaking in the future, anticipated to be between 2025 and 2035. From our strategic perspective, this places China into the zone of parity and potential transition with the United States. Our empirical work shows that under conditions of parity, peace is achieved when both parties are satisfied. But if the challenger is dissatisfied, the probability of war increases dramatically.19 Unlike the contest with the USSR, Figure 3 indicates that over time China could overtake the United States in terms of GDP. If this happens, with its huge population, China’s resulting economic parity likely will metamor￾phose into military superiority. Figure 3 also indicates that if China grows to its full potential, it would become the leading nation in the international system by 2075.20 Take the case of nuclear weapons as an example. Both nations now have nuclear weapons. Currently, the US arsenal ‘assures’ the destruction of China under all circumstances, while China has a minimum deterrent. At some point in the future, however, China will achieve a Mutual Assured Destruction level equivalence with the United States. When that happens, the conditions for a potential confrontation will re-emerge. This fact has not escaped the attention of the intelligence community and a number of academics.21 18 A.F.K. Organski et al., ‘The Mosaic of International Power: Reflections on General Trends’, in Bouda Etemad et al., eds, Towards and International Economic and Social History: Essays in Honor of Paul Bairoch (Geneva, 1995); Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions. 19 Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke eds, Parity and War. 20 We hedge our conclusion here as a courtesy to the arguments that (a) China may collapse internally such as the USSR; (b) China may decentralize and the provinces will withhold revenues from the central government; (c) China will self destruct economically or face a severe economic downturn that could disrupt its current growth trajectory and (d) China will become a practicing democracy and fall victim to the democratic peace proposition. We find all of these alternatives as being less likely than our previous primary conclusion. 21 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future; Mearsheimer (2004) unpublished paper; Jacek Kugler and Ronald L. Tammen, ‘Regional Challenge: China’s Rise to Power’ in J. Rolfe (ed). The Asia–Pacific; a Region in Transition, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Power Transition and China–US Conflicts 45 Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2006, 35–55