mobility as discussed before,we expect that centralized unions always favor high levels of ILM.9 Table 2.1.Predicted levels of ILM along the Left-Right dimension under varying union centralization Left government Right government Decentralized union High Low Centralized union Ambiguous Ambiguous Due to the moderation of union movement,partisan government will strategically pursue their corresponding labor mobility levels,so as to better fulfill their goal of maintaining a supporting constituency.Table 2.1 shows the predicted level of ILM.In the top left cell,when labor unions are decentralized,Left governments are expected to prefer HIGH levels of ILM in order to facilitate the implementation of their preferred labor-benefiting policies.High levels of ILM ensure that the economic interests of labor owners will be determined by general labor market skills and not by their affiliation with specific industries.Through the mechanism of labor mobility,economic implication of policies will spread to all labor owners;hence labor owners will acquire a stake in the implementation of labor-benefiting policies.Since unions are decentralized,coordinated political support for labor-benefiting policies cannot be forthcoming from labor organizations and Left governments will have strong incentives to make up for such a lack of support.Since high degree of labor cohesiveness is conducive to high level of political support from labor owners,we expect Left governments to prefer high ILM levels and,when needed,to engineer increases of ILM levels. In the mean time,unionization and labor mobility levels are largely independent from each other.See section 4 for empirical evidence for this point.mobility as discussed before, we expect that centralized unions always favor high levels of ILM. 9 Table 2.1. Predicted levels of ILM along the Left-Right dimension under varying union centralization Left government Right government Decentralized union High Low Centralized union Ambiguous Ambiguous Due to the moderation of union movement, partisan government will strategically pursue their corresponding labor mobility levels, so as to better fulfill their goal of maintaining a supporting constituency. Table 2.1 shows the predicted level of ILM. In the top left cell, when labor unions are decentralized, Left governments are expected to prefer HIGH levels of ILM in order to facilitate the implementation of their preferred labor- benefiting policies. High levels of ILM ensure that the economic interests of labor owners will be determined by general labor market skills and not by their affiliation with specific industries. Through the mechanism of labor mobility, economic implication of policies will spread to all labor owners; hence labor owners will acquire a stake in the implementation of labor-benefiting policies. Since unions are decentralized, coordinated political support for labor-benefiting policies cannot be forthcoming from labor organizations and Left governments will have strong incentives to make up for such a lack of support. Since high degree of labor cohesiveness is conducive to high level of political support from labor owners, we expect Left governments to prefer high ILM levels and, when needed, to engineer increases of ILM levels. 9 In the mean time, unionization and labor mobility levels are largely independent from each other. See section 4 for empirical evidence for this point