real sanction power against the actions by their members.Centralized unions,by contrast, are distinguished by their effective coordination capacity and their possession of sanction power against stray member unions.They tend to be the hubs where decisions concerning the welfare of workers would be collected,compromised,and implemented as well as where the expectations of ordinary labor owners about their future economic interests will converge.In this scenario,the fact that unions are centralized means that they would strive to advance the interest of labor owners in general rather than some subset of labor owners,and they tend to have high capacity for collective political actions. For ease of developing the argument,we make the following stylized assumption: centralized unions strive to improve the welfare for all labor owners;decentralized unions want to improve the welfare only for some specific groups of labor owners.Such assumption echoes those common in the literature that each union tries to maximize its members'long term utility and that centralized union movement is analytically equivalent to an enlarged union that encompasses the whole labor force (Pontusson 2005; Wallerstein 1990). Well-coordinated unions aided by peak-level enforcement tend to be a critical source of political support to policies that benefit general labor.At the same time,the effectiveness of centralized union is reinforced by labor cohesiveness,because if labor groups have dissimilar economic interests,internal strife will rise and coordination and sanction become more costly.Therefore centralized unions will prefer to have a highly cohesive labor class.Given the positive correlation between labor cohesiveness and laborreal sanction power against the actions by their members. Centralized unions, by contrast, are distinguished by their effective coordination capacity and their possession of sanction power against stray member unions. They tend to be the hubs where decisions concerning the welfare of workers would be collected, compromised, and implemented as well as where the expectations of ordinary labor owners about their future economic interests will converge. In this scenario, the fact that unions are centralized means that they would strive to advance the interest of labor owners in general rather than some subset of labor owners, and they tend to have high capacity for collective political actions. For ease of developing the argument, we make the following stylized assumption: centralized unions strive to improve the welfare for all labor owners; decentralized unions want to improve the welfare only for some specific groups of labor owners. Such assumption echoes those common in the literature that each union tries to maximize its members’ long term utility and that centralized union movement is analytically equivalent to an enlarged union that encompasses the whole labor force (Pontusson 2005; Wallerstein 1990). Well-coordinated unions aided by peak-level enforcement tend to be a critical source of political support to policies that benefit general labor. At the same time, the effectiveness of centralized union is reinforced by labor cohesiveness, because if labor groups have dissimilar economic interests, internal strife will rise and coordination and sanction become more costly. Therefore centralized unions will prefer to have a highly cohesive labor class. Given the positive correlation between labor cohesiveness and labor