combined with weak institutions in the labor market;and macroeconomic performance will be worse when the political economies are incoherent(Garrett 1998). A large literature of comparative political economy has argued that labor unions and other labor market institutions have to be considered the integral parts of modern capitalist economies,and they condition many of the political economic outcomes(Hall and Soskice 2001b;Pontusson 2005;Wallerstein 1990,1999;Hall and Franzese 1998).8 We consider the ability of labor unions to intervene in labor markets,as indicated by union centralization.Following Miriam Golden,labor union centralization refers to the degree of internal authority exercised by union confederations over lower level organizational bodies.Confederations mean labor's central peak associations;they comprise individual national unions,and they are multi-sectoral,economy-wide bodies engaged to varying degrees in collective bargaining with government (Golden 1993; Golden et al.2006).When union centralization is high,the central confederation alone officially calls strikes and may have the authority to negotiate wage agreements,which extend to entire industries or even the whole economy (Golden 1993;Golden et al.2006). Under low union centralization,unions at industry or firm levels may be empowered to call strikes separately and sign agreements at their own discretion. Specifically,decentralized unions lean heavily toward extending the interests of their own respective members,even if this may be at the expense of other unions and their members Decentralized unions usually lack institutionalized coordination among themselves,and the nominal central confederations,if they exist at all,do not possess any It is possible that a parallel process works for the organization of capital such as the employers'association but in the opposite direction,yet insofar as interindustry labor mobility is concerned,labor organizations may have an immediate and first-order influence than do capital's organizations.The discussion here considers only the organizations of labor.combined with weak institutions in the labor market; and macroeconomic performance will be worse when the political economies are incoherent (Garrett 1998). A large literature of comparative political economy has argued that labor unions and other labor market institutions have to be considered the integral parts of modern capitalist economies, and they condition many of the political economic outcomes (Hall and Soskice 2001b; Pontusson 2005; Wallerstein 1990, 1999; Hall and Franzese 1998). 8 We consider the ability of labor unions to intervene in labor markets, as indicated by union centralization. Following Miriam Golden, labor union centralization refers to the degree of internal authority exercised by union confederations over lower level organizational bodies. Confederations mean labor’s central peak associations; they comprise individual national unions, and they are multi-sectoral, economy-wide bodies engaged to varying degrees in collective bargaining with government (Golden 1993; Golden et al. 2006). When union centralization is high, the central confederation alone officially calls strikes and may have the authority to negotiate wage agreements, which extend to entire industries or even the whole economy (Golden 1993; Golden et al. 2006). Under low union centralization, unions at industry or firm levels may be empowered to call strikes separately and sign agreements at their own discretion. Specifically, decentralized unions lean heavily toward extending the interests of their own respective members, even if this may be at the expense of other unions and their members. Decentralized unions usually lack institutionalized coordination among themselves, and the nominal central confederations, if they exist at all, do not possess any 8 It is possible that a parallel process works for the organization of capital such as the employers’ association but in the opposite direction, yet insofar as interindustry labor mobility is concerned, labor organizations may have an immediate and first-order influence than do capital’s organizations. The discussion here considers only the organizations of labor