24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger October 22. 2001 Personal Identity Ill 1. Review soul criterion and body criterion Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same soul Problems i) There is no way to establish body-soul correlations, and no way to establish personality-soul correlations So soul criterion doesn' t make sense of our practices of recognizing and identifying people ii)We have no special access to souls, so even in our own case we can' t be sure it's the same soul"inside "us whenever we are conscIous iii)The problem of identity is"pushed back": what is it for person-stage x to have the same soul as person-stage y? What makes for sameness of souls? Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body Problems i) If I were my body, then I would have no special access to myself. So the body criterion does not do justice to our practices of self-recognition and self-identification ii) It is possible to be the same person without the same body. Body criterion doesn ' t allow this possibility 1. Review memory criterion Memory Criterion(basic form): x and y are stages of the same person iff y remembers x's experiences, thoughts, feelings, etc(either directly or indirectly ), or vv Advantage: 1) Memory criterion allows me to know who I am without inspecting my body 2) Memory criterion allows me to know who you are by conversational cues 3)Memory criterion does justice to the forensic sense of personhood the basis for a unified self who is responsible for his/her actions Probler i)Circularity Problem Does this revision avoid the circularity problem? Memory Criterion(causal continuity version or "MCcc"):x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc. ( the memories are caused "in the right way")either directly or indirectly.( Call this real-memory linked")24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger October 22, 2001 Personal Identity III 1. Review soul criterion and body criterion Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same soul. Problems: i) There is no way to establish body-soul correlations; and no way to establish personality-soul correlations. So soul criterion doesn't make sense of our practices of recognizing and identifying people. ii) We have no special access to souls, so even in our own case we can't be sure it's the same soul "inside" us whenever we are conscious. iii) The problem of identity is "pushed back": what is it for person-stage x to have the same soul as person-stage y? What makes for sameness of souls? Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body. Problems: i) If I were my body, then I would have no special access to myself. So the body criterion does not do justice to our practices of self-recognition and self-identification. ii) It is possible to be the same person without the same body. Body criterion doesn't allow this possibility. 1. Review memory criterion Memory Criterion (basic form): x and y are stages of the same person iff y remembers x's experiences, thoughts, feelings, etc. (either directly or indirectly), or vv. Advantages: 1) Memory criterion allows me to know who I am without inspecting my body; 2) Memory criterion allows me to know who you are by conversational cues. 3) Memory criterion does justice to the forensic sense of personhood: the basis for a unified self who is responsible for his/her actions. Problems: i) Circularity Problem Does this revision avoid the circularity problem? Memory Criterion (causal continuity version or "MCccv"): x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc. (the memories are caused "in the right way") either directly or indirectly. (Call this "real-memory linked".)