11) Duplication Problem Review duplication argument The challenge is to provide a criterion of Pi that(a) captures the loose links that unite stages of us throughout a life and at the same time(b) doesnit allow for duplication. Should we accept the following principle? Single Successor Principle: nothing can preserve personhood that can be duplicated in a number of different If so, then we should consider the following revision Memory Criterion(no competitor version or"MCncV ) person-stage y is a successor of x iff y really remembers x,s experiences(directly), and no other stage does, x and y are stages of the same person iff they are linked by successor stages iii) Intrinsicness problem Should my continued existence depend on whether there is someone else who happens to have the same memories? Whether I continue to exist should depend only on facts about me and my candidate future self, not on facts about who else happens to exist. MCncy goes against our intuitions about what makes for identity. We normally assume Principle of Intrinsic Identity: whether or not x-y depends on x and y and no one else Should we also make the related assumptions? Whether or not x is the same person as y depends on x and y and no one else OR Principle of Intrinsic Unity: Whether or not x is part of the same person as y is part of depends on x and v and no one eIse The last principle isnit satisfied in the case of MCncy. Does that matter? 2. Reconsideration of the body criterion So what should we do? If the memory criterion is sunk, should we return to the bodily criterion? What about body swapping? Consider the example of: Julia North, Mary Francis Beaudine, and the"Medical Wonder (Nbrain+MFBbody) Question Does JN= MW?(common view) Does MFB=MW?(Gretchenis view) Does neither= MW?(?) Do both=MW?(not possible, if you accept the single successor principle) Should we decide the matter by majority vote? Gretchen says no Supreme court, public opinion, etc are not good enough Individual identity is not like boundaries of countries.(e.g,E. w. Germany? Is Russia today the same country as the one Nicholas and Alexandra ruled? )Whether I survive or not is an objective matter, not a conventional matter, i.e.,not one to be decided by public opinionii) Duplication Problem Review duplication argument: The challenge is to provide a criterion of PI that (a) captures the loose links that unite stages of us throughout a life, and at the same time (b) doesnít allow for duplication. Should we accept the following principle? Single Successor Principle: nothing can preserve personhood that can be duplicated in a number of different successors. If so, then we should consider the following revision: Memory Criterion (no competitor version or "MCncv"): person-stage y is a successor of x iff y really remembers x's experiences (directly), and no other stage does; x and y are stages of the same person iff they are linked by successor stages. iii) Intrinsicness problem Should my continued existence depend on whether there is someone else who happens to have the same memories? Whether I continue to exist should depend only on facts about me and my candidate future self, not on facts about who else happens to exist. MCncv goes against our intuitions about what makes for identity. We normally assume: Principle of Intrinsic Identity: whether or not x=y depends on x and y and no one else. Should we also make the related assumptions? Whether or not x is the same person as y depends on x and y and no one else OR: Principle of Intrinsic Unity: Whether or not x is part of the same person as y is part of depends on x and y and no one else. The last principle isnít satisfied in the case of MCncv. Does that matter? 2. Reconsideration of the body criterion So what should we do? If the memory criterion is sunk, should we return to the bodily criterion? What about body swapping? Consider the example of: Julia North, Mary Francis Beaudine, and the "Medical Wonder" (=JNbrain+MFBbody). Question: Does JN = MW? (common view) Does MFB = MW? (Gretchenís view) Does neither = MW? (?) Do both = MW? (not possible, if you accept the single successor principle) Should we decide the matter by majority vote? Gretchen says no. Supreme court, public opinion, etc. are not good enough. Individual identity is not like boundaries of countries. (e.g., E. & W. Germany? Is Russia today the same country as the one Nicholas and Alexandra ruled?) Whether I survive or not is an objective matter, not a conventional matter, i.e., not one to be decided by public opinion