OK, but what makes it objective? Why think that there is a fact of the matter? Itis because in some cases you are genuinely entitled to anticipate the experiences of someone else, and in other cases you arent. Or in other words, in some cases youd be right to anticipate, and in some cases not, no matter what convention dictates Cohen argues 1)What I especially care about is my continued existence 2)I donit especially care about the continued existence of my body, but do care about the continued existence of my consciousness, my mental life 3)So my continuation is a psychological matter, and not a bodily matter This argument suggests that JN= MW. But note that if psychological continuity is what really matters then we should be willing to consider a brain transplant: if your brain is injured, put your psychology in a new brain and transplant it into your body. but then the duplication argument reemerges: if you could give one new brain your psychology, presumably you could give it to two! Remember the Single Successor Principle: nothing can preserve personhood that can be duplicated in a number of different successors. Assuming that the brain is a particular collection of cells in an individual's head that can only exist at one place at a time, maybe we should tr Memory Criterion(same brain version ): x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x,s experiences, etc. (the memories are caused"in the right way )either directly or indirectly, and x and y have the same living brain. This prevents duplication(unless you think that the brain could be split and both halves count as"the same brain".). But emember two main advantages of the memory criterion 1)It allows me to know who I am without inspecting my body 2)It captures the idea that what concerns me in survival is the preservation of my psychological traits Both of these advantages are lost when we move to MCsby. Moreover, MCsby doesn't have some of the advantages of the body criterion either, since it requires psychological continuity and doesn' t allow me to consist of both conscious and unconscious stages. Are we better off just dropping psychological continuity Brain criterion: x and y are stages of the same person iff x and y have the same living brain. 3. Return to question of objectivity Cohen argues that the Supreme Court may be fallible about matters of fact, but"Othey are the final authority on the development of certain important concepts used in law. The notion of person is such a concept. (p. 403)Gretchen maintains that it is the facts about who I am or who I will be that matter to us in this discussion, and the Supreme Court can't decide this. But suppose we allow that there are several different concepts at work in our thinking about human beings. E.g., the(biological) concept of a human being, the(forensic)concept of a person, the(psychological) concept of a entities that correspond with more than one of these concepts (e. g, the living human being and the person may bolt exist self, the(spiritual/religious)concept of a soul. These might have different conditions of identity. And possibly there exist-just as the statue and the clay of which it is made are two things and both exist). If so, then it may well be the job of the Supreme Court to decide which of these"person-related"concepts should apply in legal contexts when we hold someone responsible. On this view, it is partly a matter of convention what counts as a person before the law. But Gretchen will respond, presumably: Which of these"entities"is me?! Am I a living human body, a person, or a soul, etc? And isn,'t there a matter of fact which entity I am? What I am-what counts as my coming into or going out of existence-doesn't seem to be a matter that anyone can decide. It is a matter of fact to be discovered. Do you agree?OK, but what makes it objective? Why think that there is a fact of the matter? Itís because in some cases you are genuinely entitled to anticipate the experiences of someone else, and in other cases you arenít. Or in other words, in some cases youíd be right to anticipate, and in some cases not, no matter what convention dictates. Cohen argues: 1) What I especially care about is my continued existence. 2) I donít especially care about the continued existence of my body, but do care about the continued existence of my consciousness, my mental life. 3) So my continuation is a psychological matter, and not a bodily matter. This argument suggests that JN = MW. But note that if psychological continuity is what really matters then we should be willing to consider a brain transplant: if your brain is injured, put your psychology in a new brain and transplant it into your body...but then the duplication argument reemerges: if you could give one new brain your psychology, presumably you could give it to two! Remember the Single Successor Principle: nothing can preserve personhood that can be duplicated in a number of different successors. Assuming that the brain is a particular collection of cells in an individual's head that can only exist at one place at a time, maybe we should try: Memory Criterion (same brain version): x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc. (the memories are caused "in the right way") either directly or indirectly, and x and y have the same living brain.* This prevents duplication (unless you think that the brain could be split and both halves count as "the same brain"...). But remember two main advantages of the memory criterion: 1) It allows me to know who I am without inspecting my body. 2) It captures the idea that what concerns me in survival is the preservation of my psychological traits. Both of these advantages are lost when we move to MCsbv. Moreover, MCsbv doesn't have some of the advantages of the body criterion either, since it requires psychological continuity and doesn't allow me to consist of both conscious and unconscious stages. Are we better off just dropping psychological continuity: Brain criterion: x and y are stages of the same person iff x and y have the same living brain.* 3. Return to question of objectivity Cohen argues that the Supreme Court may be fallible about matters of fact, but "Öthey are the final authority on the development of certain important concepts used in law. The notion of person is such a concept." (p. 403) Gretchen maintains that it is the facts about who I am or who I will be that matter to us in this discussion, and the Supreme Court can't decide this. But suppose we allow that there are several different concepts at work in our thinking about human beings. E.g., the (biological) concept of a human being, the (forensic) concept of a person, the (psychological) concept of a self, the (spiritual/religious) concept of a soul. These might have different conditions of identity. And possibly there exist entities that correspond with more than one of these concepts (e.g., the living human being and the person may both exist­just as the statue and the clay of which it is made are two things and both exist). If so, then it may well be the job of the Supreme Court to decide which of these "person-related" concepts should apply in legal contexts when we hold someone responsible. On this view, it is partly a matter of convention what counts as a person before the law. But Gretchen will respond, presumably: Which of these "entities" is me?! Am I a living human body, a person, or a soul, etc? And isn't there a matter of fact which entity I am? What I am­what counts as my coming into or going out of existence­doesn't seem to be a matter that anyone can decide. It is a matter of fact to be discovered. Do you agree? ______________________