FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 514 S.G.Zhang was a serious and responsible player in international politics.Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow's proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China)conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954,Zhou Enlai called upon all 'the big powers'involved in the 205 military conflicts in Asia to 'consult'one another on how to restore peace.Later that month,Soviet Foreign Minister V.M.Molotov followed Zhou's call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea.Echoed by Britain and France,the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 210 Excited at being a participant in the process,Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao's approval,Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference.In early March,Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document 'Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation This document pointed out that 'the United States,France and Britain 215 disagree with each other,especially on the Indochina issue,and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views';the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further 'exploited to our advantage.The instructions then directed that 'our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British,the French,and the neutral [countries]..[so as]to make our 220 positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes.To this end,'we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them.We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result.24 Shortly after 225 the Chinese delegation was formed in April,the CCP's central leadership charged Zhou Enlai,the head of the delegation to exercise 'active diplomacy'at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China.Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements 'so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power 230 consultations25 The Geneva team worked 'day and night making all kinds of preparations'for the PRC's first attendance at an international conference.As spokesman for the Chinese delegation,for example,Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-and- answer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with international 235 standards'before doing it in front of world media.Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva,in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks.During their three meetings with Zhou,both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference.Zhou, however,argued differently:That China,[North]Korea,and Vietnam can jointly 240 participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic]victories.It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.26was a serious and responsible player in international politics. Beijing had explicitly supported Moscow’s proposal of 28 September 1953 that a five-power (including China) conference be convened to resolve international conflicts in Asia.22 On 9 January 1954, Zhou Enlai called upon all ‘the big powers’ involved in the military conflicts in Asia to ‘consult’ one another on how to restore peace. Later that month, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov followed Zhou’s call by proposing in Berlin that a five-power international conference be held to deal specifically with the conflicts in Korea. Echoed by Britain and France, the Molotov proposal brought China into a great-power conference on Korea and Indochina.23 Excited at being a participant in the process, Beijing expected to make an impact. With Mao’s approval, Zhou immediately began a thorough preparation for the conference. In early March, Zhou supervised the drafting of the key document ‘Our Estimation of the Geneva Conference and Preliminary Instructions on Our Preparation’. This document pointed out that ‘the United States, France and Britain disagree with each other, especially on the Indochina issue, and they have great difficulty in reconciling their views’; the internal conflicts of the Western bloc could be further ‘exploited to our advantage’. The instructions then directed that ‘our delegation at Geneva should take all possible initiatives and seize every chance to contact the British, the French, and the neutral [countries]... [so as] to make our positions for a settlement and preference for peace known and understood by them’. The document directed that the Chinese delegation should try hard to generate positive outcomes. To this end, ‘we should concentrate on the issues which contain no big differences of opinion and try to accomplish at least a tentative agreement on them. We shall not allow the conference to the end without any result’.24 Shortly after the Chinese delegation was formed in April, the CCP’s central leadership charged Zhou Enlai, the head of the delegation to exercise ‘active diplomacy’ at Geneva in order to break the US policy of political isolation of and economic embargo against China. Their primary mission was to make every possible effort to reach agreements ‘so as to set a precedent for solving international problems through big-power consultations’.25 The Geneva team worked ‘day and night making all kinds of preparations’ for the PRC’s first attendance at an international conference. As spokesman for the Chinese delegation, for example, Huang Hua practised his press releases and question-and￾answer handling at a mock press conference in accordance with ‘international standards’ before doing it in front of world media. Anxious to achieve a substantive result at Geneva, in early April Zhou made a special trip to Moscow to consult the Soviet leaders on the upcoming talks. During their three meetings with Zhou, both Khrushchev and Molotov expressed low expectations of the Geneva Conference. Zhou, however, argued differently: ‘That China, [North] Korea, and Vietnam can jointly participate in this international conference is in itself an unexpected event and one of our [diplomatic] victories. It will be a bigger success if we can take this opportunity to express our positions and principles on all the issues and offer explanations on certain questions so as to resolve some disputes.’26 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 514 S. G. Zhang 205 210 215 220 225 230 235 240