518 International Organization Assumption 2:Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions)represent some subset of domestic society,on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purpo- sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics,the state is not an actor but a repre- sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture,construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors.Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical"transmission belt"by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve efficiently.9 Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities,interests,and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus)who constantly pres- sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy,nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant.No government rests on universal or unbi- ased political representation;every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others.In an extreme hypothetical case,representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual,such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin.Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy,many representative institutions and practices exist,each of which privi- leges particular demands;hence the nature of state institutions,alongside societal interests themselves,is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation,in the liberal view,is not simply a formal attribute of state institu- tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process,formal or infor- mal,that privilege particular societal interests.Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial,bureaucratic,or economic ties to the governing elite from those without.Even where government institutions are formally fair and open,a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property,risk,information,or organi- zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy.Similarly,the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.10 Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals,groups,and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information,risk,and loss.Finally,cost-effective exit options,such as emigration,noncompliance,or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments,may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation.1I 9.Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy;but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi- viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre- sent them effectively,a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10.Doyle1997,251-300. 11.North and Thomas 1973,87.518 International Organization Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state offzcials dejne state preferences and act purpo￾sively in world politics. In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a repre￾sentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy. Individuals turn to the state to achieve goals that private behavior is unable to achieve effi~iently.~ Government policy is therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups (inside and outside the state apparatus) who constantly pres￾sure the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences. This is not to adopt a narrowly pluralist view of domestic politics in which all individuals and groups have equal influence on state policy, nor one in which the structure of state institutions is irrelevant. No government rests on universal or unbi￾ased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others. In an extreme hypothetical case, representation might empower a narrow bureaucratic class or even a single tyrannical individual, such as an ideal-typical Pol Pot or Josef Stalin. Between theoretical extremes of tyranny and democracy, many representative institutions and practices exist, each of which privi￾leges particular demands; hence the nature of state institutions, alongside societal interests themselves, is a key determinant of what states do internationally. Representation, in the liberal view, is not simply a formal attribute of state institu￾tions but includes other stable characteristics of the political process, formal or infor￾mal, that privilege particular societal interests. Clientalistic authoritarian regimes may distinguish those with familial, bureaucratic, or economic ties to the governing elite from those without. Even where government institutions are formally fair and open, a relatively inegalitarian distribution of property, risk, information, or organi￾zational capabilities may create social or economic monopolies able to dominate policy. Similarly, the way in which a state recognizes individual rights may shape opportunities for voice.1° Certain domestic representational processes may tend to select as leaders individuals, groups, and bureaucracies socialized with particular attitudes toward information, risk, and loss. Finally, cost-effective exit options, such as emigration, noncompliance, or the transfer of assets to new jurisdictions or uses, insofar as they constrain governments, may be thought of as substitutes for formal representation. '' 9. Representative political institutions and practices result from prior contracts and can generally be taken for granted in explaining foreign policy; but where the primary interests and allegiances of indi￾viduals and private groups are transferred to subnational or supranational institutions empowered to repre￾sent them effectively, a liberal analysis would naturally shift to these levels. 10. Doyle 1997,251-300. 11. North and Thomas 1973,87