THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 2IT Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways.The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased,when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further,the proceeds were,by arrangements struck during the revolu- tion,deposited in foreign banks before disbursement.The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits.These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1o betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result.The revolutionary movement,whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui,had failed to pre- serve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution.Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the pro- vinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution.Such unified revolutionary de- termination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign inter- vention,for which they were strategically and psychologically quite un- prepared.Hence,despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court,compromise seemed necessary.Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister,Yuan Shih-k'ai,as president.Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments,in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces(Kwangtung,Kiangsi and Anhwei).Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political ra- dicalism.The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model.The constitution located sovereignty in the people.Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament)plus a president,cabinet and judiciary.But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance.On the contrary,the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated.Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active,notably in Szechwan and Shensi,they did not seriously challenge the political pre- eminence of army officers,republican revolutionary politicians,and the leaders of self-government bodies.All three of these dominant groups were socially elite,mainly gentry.Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF THE REVOLUTION 211 Foreign governments took advantage of revolutionary disruption in a variety of ways. The degree of foreign participation in China's customs collection greatly increased, when foreign commissioners became not just assessors and accountants but also actual collectors of the revenue. Further, the proceeds were, by arrangements struck during the revolu￾tion, deposited in foreign banks before disbursement. The measure gave foreign financiers both heightened controls and profits. These and other augmentations of foreign privilege during the Revolution of 1911 betrayed Chinese nationalism and sullied the revolutionary banner. A number of circumstances marking the revolution help to explain the ambiguities of the result. The revolutionary movement, whose broadest organization had been the T'ung-meng hui, had failed to pre￾serve solidarity in the years preceding the revolution. Its national leaders often had little connection with revolutionary developments in the pro￾vinces and were unable to weld into a cohesive whole the forces that burgeoned there during the revolution. Such unified revolutionary de￾termination as they were able to muster was blunted by the fear that continued disruption and warfare might lead to full-scale foreign inter￾vention, for which they were strategically and psychologically quite un￾prepared. Hence, despite a loosely joined accumulation of revolutionary troops that quantitatively far surpassed those at the disposal of the Ch'ing court, compromise seemed necessary. Compromise included accepting the Ch'ing prime minister, Yuan Shih-k'ai, as president. Although 14 provinces established revolutionary governments, in the revolution's aftermath the old revolutionary organization could rely on committed adherents as chief executives in only three provinces (Kwangtung, Kiangsi and Anhwei). Revolutionaries had in fact never been completely in charge of the revolution and were not disposed to press the issue. Another feature of the revolution that contributed to the ambiguity of the result was the social conservatism that accompanied its political ra￾dicalism. The revolution replaced a venerable system of government with the latest Western model. The constitution located sovereignty in the people. Sovereignty was to be exercised by a national assembly (or parliament) plus a president, cabinet and judiciary. But it soon became apparent that the new political system would not displace the prevailing social elites from their positions of dominance. On the contrary, the old ruling class emerged both unscathed and invigorated. Although secret societies with their lower class constituencies were active, notably in Szechwan and Shensi, they did not seriously challenge the political pre￾eminence of army officers, republican revolutionary politicians, and the leaders of self-government bodies. All three of these dominant groups were socially elite, mainly gentry. Another possible threat to the received Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008