Quemoy-Matsu,1954-55 99 (Pescadores).The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and,even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II,the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled.On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China,and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory.As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949,they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists.Jinmen,Mazu,and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan,over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait.The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fisher- men.(See map,p.123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance"of the mainland shore,including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen(Amoy);the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou(Foochow).Both groups lie opposite Taiwan.The third main group,the Dachens,is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949.By the start of the 1954 crisis,with American help and encouragement,Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward posi- tions.More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers,many of them first-line regulars,were stationed on Jinmen alone.Apparently,Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime,which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949,Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land?A few days after the Communists started 6.George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.266-74;Stewart Alsop,"The Story Behind Quemoy:How We Drifted Close to War,"Saturday Evening Post,December 13, 1958,pp.26-27,86-88;memorandum of conversation,Yu Ta-wei,Walter Robertson and others, December 6,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59, National Archives. 7.John Foster Dulles,"Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China,"April 4,1955,Office of Chinese Affairs,1948-56,Box 53,Offshore Islands,1955,RG 59,National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed,15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsQuemoy-Matsu, 1954-55 | 99 (Pescadores). The latter had been colonized by the Japanese after their victory over China in the war of 1895 and, even though the jurisdiction of Taiwan and the Penghus had reverted to China following World War II, the United States considered their ultimate disposition still unsettled. On the other hand, the offshore islands-some thirty in number just off the central coast of the mainland-had remained subject to China, and there was no legal question that they were Chinese territory. As the Nationalists retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, they retained control of the offshore islands for use as staging areas to harass the Communists. Jinmen, Mazu, and the others actually possessed questionable value for the defense of Taiwan, over one hundred miles away on the opposite side of the Taiwan Strait. The several thousand inhabitants of the small islands were mainly farmers and fisher￾men. (See map, p. 123.) Eisenhower described many of the offshore islands as practically within "wading distance" of the mainland shore, including two important harbors. The Jinmen group is just two miles from the port of Xiamen (Amoy); the Mazu group is ten miles from the port of Fuzhou (Foochow). Both groups lie opposite Taiwan. The third main group, the Dachens, is located two hundred miles north of Taiwan. The Communists and Nationalists had occasionally skirmished over the islands since 1949. By the start of the 1954 crisis, with American help and encouragement, Jiang had transformed them into formidable forward posi￾tions. More than fifty thousand Nationalist soldiers, many of them first-line regulars, were stationed on Jinmen alone. Apparently, Jiang was preparing the island as stepping stones for his future invasion of the mainland.6 The United States opposed any effort by the Chinese Communists to expand the amount of territory under their control and was fully committed to the Nationalist regime, which refused to budge from any territory it held. Since 1949, Washington had provided $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to the Nationalists.7 Would the United States go to war with China over these insignificant specks of land? A few days after the Communiststarted 6. George and Smoke, Deterrence inAmerican Foreign Policy, pp. 266-74; Stewart Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening Post, December 13, 1958, pp. 26-27, 86-88; memorandum of conversation, Yu Ta-wei, Walter Robertson and others, December 6, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. 7. John Foster Dulles, "Preliminary draft of possible statement of position for communication to the Republic of China," April 4, 1955, Office of Chinese Affairs, 1948-56, Box 53, Offshore Islands, 1955, RG 59, National Archives. This content downloaded from 211.80.51.104 on Wed, 15 May 2013 01:03:56 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions