My explanation of the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia is directly concerned with two of its basic characteristics:its cohesiveness and its consistent commitment to industrialisation.I argue that the Northeast Asian states had a particular kind of perception regarding external military threats-viewing them as extremely intensive and long term-and that this was a primary factor in creating cohesive states and ensuring their consistent commitment to industrialisa- tion.In other words,this particular kind of threat perception gave rise to the dev- elopmental state in Northeast Asia.I also contend that changed threat perceptions in the 198os and 199os provided the environment for the decline of the developmental state.The first part of this study discusses the analytical link between threat,threat perception and the developmental state,and alternative arguments concerning the rise of the developmental state.The second and third parts of the study provide evidence of the relationship between the particular kind of threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. With few modifications,this argument could apply to the Japanese case(especially Meiji Japan).However,limited space means that this study concentrates on South Korea and Taiwan.It should also be noted that the aim of this paper is to explain the rise and decline of the developmental state rather than economic growth or indus- trialisation.A country's economic performance is determined by multiple factors,of which its form of state in relation to economic management is but one. Towards a threat perception-centred argument State and state interest This investigation into the relationship between threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia begins with the concept of the state.In particular,the study addresses how it has been treated in the famous state- versus-market debate,which has dominated the academic field of Northeast Asian political economy since the early 198os.By introducing different images of the state from this debate,the state and state interest are problematised on an analytical level. The paper then shows how an external military threat may solve the analytical prob- lem of the state and state interest,and thereby provides a framework for examining the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. The state-versus-market debate is essentially about the role of the state in Northeast Asian development.Those who focus on the positive role of the state-for simpli-Developmental states and threat perceptions in Northeast Asia 7Analysis My explanation of the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia is directly concerned with two of its basic characteristics: its cohesiveness and its consistent commitment to industrialisation. I argue that the Northeast Asian states had a particular kind of perception regarding external military threats—viewing them as extremely intensive and long term—and that this was a primary factor in creating cohesive states and ensuring their consistent commitment to industrialisa￾tion. In other words, this particular kind of threat perception gave rise to the dev￾elopmental state in Northeast Asia. I also contend that changed threat perceptions in the 1980s and 1990s provided the environment for the decline of the developmental state. The first part of this study discusses the analytical link between threat, threat perception and the developmental state, and alternative arguments concerning the rise of the developmental state. The second and third parts of the study provide evidence of the relationship between the particular kind of threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. With few modi fications, this argument could apply to the Japanese case (especially Meiji Japan ). However, limited space means that this study concentrates on South Korea and Taiwan. It should also be noted that the aim of this paper is to explain the rise and decline of the developmental state rather than economic growth or indus￾trialisation. A country’s economic performance is determined by multiple factors, of which its form of state in relation to economic management is but one. Towards a threat perception-centred argument State and state interest This investigation into the relationship between threat perception and the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia begins with the concept of the state. In particular, the study addresses how it has been treated in the famous state￾versus-market debate, which has dominated the academic field of Northeast Asian political economy since the early 1980s. By introducing di fferent images of the state from this debate, the state and state interest are problematised on an analytical level. The paper then shows how an external military threat may solve the analytical prob￾lem of the state and state interest, and thereby provides a framework for examining the rise and decline of the developmental state in Northeast Asia. The state-versus-market debate is essentially about the role of the state in Northeast Asian development. Those who focus on the positive role of the state—for simpli-