Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies but responses to these questions tend to have little vari- ditions under which groups can overcome individual ation,calling into question their ability to usefully dis incentives to defect"(Grossman and Baldassarri 2012 criminate between attitudes (Krosnick 1991).Finally, 965).As Baldassarri(2015.367)notes,"designed to in- the widespread use and cross-cultural applicability of duce a social dilemma,[public goods games]capture this scale allows it to be compared to measurements how players balance self-interest and the well-being taken in other contexts,both in existing and future of the group."Habyarimana et al.(2009)argue that studies.5 the public goods game"captures the challenge of pub- A crucial question for predicting the relationship lic goods provision directly"and use results from such between exclusionary attitudes and cooperation games to argue that the failure to cooperate across eth- whether these preferences are symbolic attitudes.In nic groups in social situations analogous to the public the intergroup context,symbolic attitudes are attitudes goods game is the primary reason that diverse societies developed around affective responses to a particular fail to allocate desirable public goods. group that are socialized early in life,are stable over a Habyarimana et al.(2009)attribute this lack of coop- lifespan,and tend to dominate other attitudes(Tarman eration across ethnic groups to a lack of norms of coop- and Sears 2005).The canonical example of symbolic at eration.In other social science work,variation in play titudes is attitudes toward blacks and other racial and in the public goods game is ascribed to differences inin- ethnic groups in the United States(Sears and Henry stitutions(Alexander and Christia 2011).culture (Hen- 2003).Recent empirical work in American politics sug- rich et al.2006),geographic context(Enos 2017),or gests that attitudes toward immigrants are also sym- statistically based stereotypes (Fershtman and Gneezy bolic attitudes(Hopkins,Sides,and Citrin 2016). 2001).The focus in political science and economics Whether social distance should be understood as a on norms and institutions as determinants of cooper- symbolic attitude is important because it speaks to its vc士 ative behavior is understandable given the intellectual likelihood of dominating other attitudes and also of foundation of both disciplines.Yet this focus may ne- changing in the face of shifting demographics.If ex- glect important sources of variation.Cooperation is 4r元 clusionary preferences are symbolic attitudes,they are also likely structured by individual-level differences,in- likely to dominate other attitudes,meaning other atti- cluding psychological traits such as the attitudes asso- tudes will be shaped by the symbolic attitudes-not the ciated with exclusionary preferences.Robust findings other way around.This means that symbolic attitudes from psychology point to this connection:The cogni- are predicted to strongly affect opinion when brought tive biases associated with ingroup favoritism cause to bear on political questions.For example,turning to individuals to seek maximum distinctiveness between the American context.classic literature demonstrates groups,even when it is costly to their own group(Tajfel how whites'attitudes toward blacks dominates other et al.1971;Tajfel and Turner 1979;Turner and Oakes considerations in policy questions from school busing 1986).In other words,when choosing how to allocate (Kinder and Sears 1981)to health care (Tesler 2012). money,anti-outgroup or pro-ingroup biases (Brewer and Miller 1984)cause people to forgo allocations that COOPERATION are beneficial to their own group or mutually benefi- cial to both groups,to select allocations that maximize We connect preference for exclusion with cooperative the difference in monetary payout between groups.A behaviors.Cooperation is necessary to maintain public bias for maximizing differences would predict defec- goods provision,from roads to schools(Habyarimana tion in a public goods game,rather than mutually bene- ficial cooperation.Furthermore,evolutionary psychol- 8 et al.2009),and for the operation of democratic insti- tutions,such as legislatures (Axelrod 2006)-but the ogists have hypothesized that the evolution of the cog- logic of collective action means that cooperation is of- nitive adaptations for social exclusion are a result of ten difficult to achieve (Olson 1971).Given the central selective pressures for efficient within-group cooper- importance of cooperation,social scientists have de- ation and between-group competition (Kurzban and veloped a toolkit for measuring it,including the pris- Leary 2001).5 Also drawing on evolutionary reasoning, oner's dilemma or public goods game.This game re- Sidanius and Pratto(2001)argue that the competition wards participants for mutual cooperation,but rewards between groups to maintain group-based status hier- them more for defecting and allowing the other player archies and to exclude low-status groups from power to carry the cost.This tends to lead to mutual defection causes a range of discriminatory and non-cooperative where neither player cooperates. behavior. 四 The public goods game has been argued to mimic Despite the reasons to believe that exclusion and the dynamics underlying the challenges to societies in cooperation are related,as noted above,the relation- allocating public goods and the tendency for diverse ship between discriminatory attitudes and discrimina- societies in particular to fail at doing so.It "is the con- tory behaviors is heavily contested in the literature, ventional behavioral experiment used to study the con- and other scholarship may point to reasons to believe these attitudes and behaviors should be unrelated.In However,it should be noted that the meaning of levels of closeness in the social distance scale may vary across groups,so that "family rel- Quoting Kurzban and Leary (2001,195):"Indeed,if adaptations ative"may imply a different level of closeness in different cultures.It for within-group cooperation are designed for between-group com does,nevertheless,seem reasonable to assume that the ordinal rank- petition,then the psychology of inclusion and cooperation requires ings of the levels will be consistent across most cultures. a concurrent psychology of social exclusion and discrimination." 745Exclusion and Cooperation in Diverse Societies but responses to these questions tend to have little vari￾ation, calling into question their ability to usefully dis￾criminate between attitudes (Krosnick 1991). Finally, the widespread use and cross-cultural applicability of this scale allows it to be compared to measurements taken in other contexts, both in existing and future studies.5 A crucial question for predicting the relationship between exclusionary attitudes and cooperation is whether these preferences are symbolic attitudes. In the intergroup context, symbolic attitudes are attitudes developed around affective responses to a particular group that are socialized early in life, are stable over a lifespan, and tend to dominate other attitudes (Tarman and Sears 2005).The canonical example of symbolic at￾titudes is attitudes toward blacks and other racial and ethnic groups in the United States (Sears and Henry 2003). Recent empirical work in American politics sug￾gests that attitudes toward immigrants are also sym￾bolic attitudes (Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2016). Whether social distance should be understood as a symbolic attitude is important because it speaks to its likelihood of dominating other attitudes and also of changing in the face of shifting demographics. If ex￾clusionary preferences are symbolic attitudes, they are likely to dominate other attitudes, meaning other atti￾tudes will be shaped by the symbolic attitudes—not the other way around. This means that symbolic attitudes are predicted to strongly affect opinion when brought to bear on political questions. For example, turning to the American context, classic literature demonstrates how whites’ attitudes toward blacks dominates other considerations in policy questions from school busing (Kinder and Sears 1981) to health care (Tesler 2012). COOPERATION We connect preference for exclusion with cooperative behaviors. Cooperation is necessary to maintain public goods provision, from roads to schools (Habyarimana et al. 2009), and for the operation of democratic insti￾tutions, such as legislatures (Axelrod 2006)—but the logic of collective action means that cooperation is of￾ten difficult to achieve (Olson 1971). Given the central importance of cooperation, social scientists have de￾veloped a toolkit for measuring it, including the pris￾oner’s dilemma or public goods game. This game re￾wards participants for mutual cooperation, but rewards them more for defecting and allowing the other player to carry the cost.This tends to lead to mutual defection, where neither player cooperates. The public goods game has been argued to mimic the dynamics underlying the challenges to societies in allocating public goods and the tendency for diverse societies in particular to fail at doing so. It “is the con￾ventional behavioral experiment used to study the con- 5 However, it should be noted that the meaning of levels of closeness in the social distance scale may vary across groups, so that “family rel￾ative” may imply a different level of closeness in different cultures. It does, nevertheless, seem reasonable to assume that the ordinal rank￾ings of the levels will be consistent across most cultures. ditions under which groups can overcome individual incentives to defect” (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012, 965). As Baldassarri (2015, 367) notes, “designed to in￾duce a social dilemma, [public goods games] capture how players balance self-interest and the well-being of the group.” Habyarimana et al. (2009) argue that the public goods game “captures the challenge of pub￾lic goods provision directly” and use results from such games to argue that the failure to cooperate across eth￾nic groups in social situations analogous to the public goods game is the primary reason that diverse societies fail to allocate desirable public goods. Habyarimana et al. (2009) attribute this lack of coop￾eration across ethnic groups to a lack of norms of coop￾eration. In other social science work, variation in play in the public goods game is ascribed to differences in in￾stitutions (Alexander and Christia 2011), culture (Hen￾rich et al. 2006), geographic context (Enos 2017), or statistically based stereotypes (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001). The focus in political science and economics on norms and institutions as determinants of cooper￾ative behavior is understandable given the intellectual foundation of both disciplines. Yet this focus may ne￾glect important sources of variation. Cooperation is also likely structured by individual-level differences,in￾cluding psychological traits such as the attitudes asso￾ciated with exclusionary preferences. Robust findings from psychology point to this connection: The cogni￾tive biases associated with ingroup favoritism cause individuals to seek maximum distinctiveness between groups, even when it is costly to their own group (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner and Oakes 1986). In other words, when choosing how to allocate money, anti-outgroup or pro-ingroup biases (Brewer and Miller 1984) cause people to forgo allocations that are beneficial to their own group or mutually benefi￾cial to both groups, to select allocations that maximize the difference in monetary payout between groups. A bias for maximizing differences would predict defec￾tion in a public goods game, rather than mutually bene￾ficial cooperation. Furthermore, evolutionary psychol￾ogists have hypothesized that the evolution of the cog￾nitive adaptations for social exclusion are a result of selective pressures for efficient within-group cooper￾ation and between-group competition (Kurzban and Leary 2001).6 Also drawing on evolutionary reasoning, Sidanius and Pratto (2001) argue that the competition between groups to maintain group-based status hier￾archies and to exclude low-status groups from power causes a range of discriminatory and non-cooperative behavior. Despite the reasons to believe that exclusion and cooperation are related, as noted above, the relation￾ship between discriminatory attitudes and discrimina￾tory behaviors is heavily contested in the literature, and other scholarship may point to reasons to believe these attitudes and behaviors should be unrelated. In 6 Quoting Kurzban and Leary (2001, 195): “Indeed, if adaptations for within-group cooperation are designed for between-group com￾petition, then the psychology of inclusion and cooperation requires a concurrent psychology of social exclusion and discrimination.” 745 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000266