I1, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychologial Theory and Women s Development(Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press1982). 12. Mary G Belenky, B. M. Clinchy, N. R. Goldberger, J M. Tarule Women s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice and Mind(New York: Basic Books, 1986). 13, /DOrothy Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987) 1970年代中期Smih开始出版的一个短文集, Nancy Hartsock“ The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically " Hand, Brain, Heart: A Feminist Epistemology for the Natural Sciences, "Signs 9: 1(1983)ka( Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983) Hilary Rose 14. Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology Metaphysics Harding and Hintikka, Discovering reality, Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, N.J. Rowman Allenheld,1983)尤其注意第i; Sandra harding," Why Has the Sex< ender System Beman Visible Only Now” in Harding and Hintikka, Discovering reality, Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminist(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1986), chap,6 立场理论的观点也被其他自由社会运动加以 在下文回到这一点):参见 Samir Amin, eurocentrism( New york Monthly Review Press, 1989) Bettina Aptheker, Tapestries of Life: Women s Work, Women s Consciousness, and the Mesning of Daily Life( Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1989): Patricia Hill Collins, "Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought, "Social Problems 33( 1986): Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa( Washington, D. C: Howard University Press, 1982) Edward Said, Orientalism( New York Pantheon Books, 1978): Edward Said, Foreword to Selected ubaltern Studies, ed. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak(New York University Press, 1988),vili. 16、 Hartsock," The Feminist Standpoint"p.285.为了给较不熟悉的立场认识论设置一个讨论的场景,我在许多地方对女权主义 经验论与女权主义立场的认识论之间的差异进行了阐述。其中阐述得较透彻的是,“ Feminism and Theories of scientific Knowledge, "American Philosophical Association Feminism and Philosophy Newsletter 1987$B1#B; "Epistemological Question 1987); L7"Feminist Justificatory Strategies, "in Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Exploration in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Ml, ress Editor's Conclusion to Fminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues, ed. Sandra Harding( Bloomington: Indiana University Pre Gary、 Marilyn Pearsall( Boston: Unwin Hyman,1989)下文中关于为什么社会性别差异创造科学与认识论资源的分析,基于对 Starting Thought from Womens Lives: Eight Tesources for Maximizing Objectivity, "Journal of Social Philosophy 1990 F5B21NB- 文的缩略和修订。 17、我曾用"扭曲”代替“荒谬”,因为一个人的“反常"也许是另一个人极其宝贵的乐趣。“扭曲的词义在这种重新评估中显得较 少受影响。 18、在 The Science Question in Feminist中,我讨论了四种立场理论(分别由Rose, Hartsock,Fax和Smh提出)的基础之间的差 异。此处,我考虑以另外的基础来证明女权主义研究的正当性。 19、立场理论不需要受本质主义的约束。 The Science Question in Feminist展示了对他们的逻辑的误读;在本书中,我将就本质 主义的阅读方式展开论述。 Flax,“ Political Philosophy”,也可参见Nan Political Theory" American Political Science review1989年第8期3:4)中,为支持种立场认识论,而对对象关系理论的运用。 s Ways of Knowing.前文中我指出 Ruddick Gilligan和 Belenky-—在其他人之中—一没有发展出他们对下面所说的归纳的批评,这种归纳指的是从固定形式化的男性中概括 出立场认识论的例证式人类理性。在这里,我的看法是,他们的论点可以用来进行这种批评。 22. Collins, ""Learing from Ootsider Within, S15. 23. Rossiter. Woman Scientists in America. 24, Smith, Everyday World. J Hartsock's similar in"The Feminist Standpoint." 25、 Smith写的关于“女性的立场”,不是一种女权主义的立场 26, Aptheker, Tapestries of Life, 39 27. Audre Lorde, "A Litany for Survival, "in The Black Unicorn(New York Norton, 1978). 28, Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint", P291-292 29、同上,293,294,296 30. Collins, "Learning from the Outsider"$15 31, Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center(Boston: South End Press 1983, ) 32、我在( Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?文中查到了相似的观点 Friedrich Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, " in The Marx and Engels Reader, ed. Richard Tucker( New York: Norton, 1972),606,624 34、对这种矛盾的启蒙的分析,见 Natalie Sokoloff" Motherwork and Working Mothers;" in Feminist Frameworks,ed. Alison m othenberg( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978) 35、现代科学的一个正确的一般的看法是 Wolfgang van den daele.“ The Social Construction of Science,” in The Social Production of Scientific Knoeledge. Ed. Everett Mendesohn, Peter Weingart, and Richard Whitley( Dordrecht R 36、举例来说,见 Boris hessen, The Economic Roots of Newton 's Principle( New York: Howard fertig,1971); Edgar zilsel"The Sociological Toots of Science,” American Jourmal of Sociology P47(1942),另一种历史的先例是由马克思主义理论者 Fredric jameson,主张的,他主张,虽然是匈牙利的马克思主义者 Geoge lukacs,对立场理论最初发展的负责,而不是今天 Lukacs:的拥 护者或其他时代的马克思主义者,而是现在展示1 ukacs's最权威的遗产的女权主义立场者们见 Jameson,“作为一个未完成的 计划的历史和阶级意识”,在“ History and Class Consciousness as an Unfinished Project," in rethindine marxism1:1(198849- Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness( Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press1971). 37、第7章,和第3部分进一步发展了女权主义立场理论的逻辑性,与它的马克思主义的起源相比更惊人。 38、见 Jaggar, Feminist Politics 39、一些女权主义认识论的批评(包括一些女权主义批评家已主张:一种持女性的经验为女权主义知识的主张,提供依据的女 权主义认识论的存在。有时,这种传说的认识论被当作是女性政治认识论或中心女性”认识论。女性的经验的清淅度在女权主 义认识论中起着重要的作用;正如我在第6章和第2部分中所讨论的,清晰地表明女性经验使学科更少偏爱和歪曲成为可能,但 它不提供学科坚强的基础一它不以此为基础11、Carol Gilligan，In a Different Voice : Psychologial Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press1982). 12、Mary G. Belenky,B. M. Clinchy, N. R. Goldberger, J. M. Tarule. Women’s Ways of Knowing : The Development of Self, Voice and Mind (New York : Basic Books,1986). 13、 参见Dorothy Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic : A Feminist Sociology (Boston : Northeastern University Press , 1987), 1970年代中期Smith开始出版的一个短文集; Nancy Hartsock “ The Feminist Standpoint : Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Histouical Materialism,” in Discovering Reality . ed.Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel,1983); Hilary Rose “Hand , Brain , Heart : A Feminist Epistemology for the Natural Sciences ,” Signs 9:1(1983). 14、 Jane Flax, “Political Philosophy and Patriarchal Unconscious : A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology Metaphysics”, in Harding and Hintikka, Discovering reality; Alison Jaggar , Feminist Politics and Human Nature （Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld,1983）,尤其注意第11章；Sandra Harding , “Why Has the Sex-Gender System Beman Visible Only Now,” in Harding and Hintikka, Discovering reality; Sandra Harding , The Science Question in Feminist (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1986),chap .6. 15、立场理论的观点也被其他自由社会运动加以运用（我将在下文回到这一点）：参见Samir Amin, Eurocentrism (New York : Monthly Review Press , 1989); Bettina Aptheker , Tapestries of Life : Women’s Work , Women’s Consciousness , and the Mesning of Daily Life (Amherst:University of Massachusetts Press 1989) ; Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within : The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33( 1986); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa ( Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press,1982); Edward Said, Orientalism( New York Pantheon Books,1978); Edward Said, Foreword to Selected Subaltern Studies, ed. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak(New York Oxfoud University Press, 1988), viii. 16、 Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint,”p．285．为了给较不熟悉的立场认识论设置一个讨论的场景，我在许多地方对女权主义 经验论与女权主义立场的认识论之间的差异进行了阐述。其中阐述得较透彻的是, “Feminism and Theories of Scientific Knowledge,” American Philosophical Association Feminism and Philosophy Newsletter 1987年第1期; “Epistemological Questions,” Editor’s Conclusion to Fminism and Methodology : Social Science Issues , ed. Sandra Harding( Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987); 以及 “Feminist Justificatory Strategies,” in Women, Knowledge, and Reality : Exploration in Feminist Philosophy, ed. Ann Garry、Marilyn Pearsall (Boston : :Unwin Hyman,1989). 下文中关于为什么社会性别差异创造科学与认识论资源的分析，基于对 “Starting Thought from Women’s Lives : Eight Tesources for Maximizing Objectivity ,” Journal of Social Philosophy 1990年第21期)一 文的缩略和修订。 17、 我曾用“扭曲”代替“荒谬”，因为一个人的“反常”也许是另一个人极其宝贵的乐趣。“扭曲”的词义在这种重新评估中显得较 少受影响。 18、 在The Science Question in Feminist中，我讨论了四种立场理论（分别由Rose, Hartsock, Flax,和Smith提出）的基础之间的差 异。此处，我考虑以另外的基础来证明女权主义研究的正当性。 19、 立场理论不需要受本质主义的约束。The Science Question in Feminist展示了对他们的“逻辑”的误读；在本书中，我将就本质 主义的阅读方式展开论述。 20、 Flax, “Political Philosophy” , 也可参见Nancy Hirschmann “Freedom , Recognition , and Obligation : A Feminist Approach to Political Theory,” American Political Science Review 1989年第8期3：4)中，为支持一种立场认识论，而对对象关系理论的运用。 21、 Ruddick Maternal Thinking; Gilligan, In a Different Voice; Belenky et al., W omen’s Ways of Knowing.前文中我指出Ruddick、 Gilligan和Belenky――在其他人之中――没有发展出他们对下面所说的归纳的批评，这种归纳指的是从固定形式化的男性中概括 出立场认识论的例证式人类理性。在这里，我的看法是，他们的论点可以用来进行这种批评。 22、Collins, “Learing from Ootsider Within , S15. 23、Rossiter, Woman Scientists in America. 24、Smith, Everyday World. 见 Hartsock’s similar in “The Feminist Standpoint.” 25、Smith 写的关于“女性的立场”，不是一种女权主义的立场。 26、Aptheker, Tapestries of Life, 39. 27、Audre Lorde, “A Litany for Survival,” in The Black Unicorn (New York Norton, 1978). 28、Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint”，P291-292. 29、同上，293，294，296 30、Collins, “Learning from the Outsider”S15. 31、Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End Press 1983,). 32、 我在(Why Has the Sex/Gender System Become Visible Only Now?)文中查到了相似的观点。 33、 Friedrich Engels, “Socialism : Utopian and Scientific ,”in The Marx and Engels Reader , ed.Richard Tucker(New York：Norton, 1972), 606,624. 34、 对于这种矛盾的启蒙的分析，见Natalie Sokoloff “Motherwork and Working Mothers,” in Feminist Frameworks, ed. Alison M. Jaggar and P. Rothenberg (New York : McGraw-Hill ,1978). 35、 现代科学的一个正确的一般的看法是Wolfgang Van den Daele. “The Social Construction of Science ,” in The Social Production of Scientific Knoweledge. Ed..Everett Mendesohn ,Peter Weingart, and Richard Whitley (Dordrecht :R ) 36、举例来说，见Boris Hessen, The Economic Roots of Newton’s Principle (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971);Edgar Zilsel “The Sociological Toots of Science,”American Jourmal of Sociology P47(1942)。另一种历史的先例是由马克思主义理论者Fredric Jameson,主张的，他主张，虽然是匈牙利的马克思主义者Geoge Lukacs，对立场理论最初发展的负责，而不是今天Lukacs’s的拥 护者或其他时代的马克思主义者，而是现在展示“Lukacs’s最权威的遗产”的 女权主义立场者们。见Jameson，“作为一个未完成的 计划的历史和阶级意识”， 在 “History and Class Consciousness as an Unfinished Project,” in Rethinding Marxism 1:1(1988)49-72 ; Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge , Mass :MIT Press1971)。 37、第7章，和第3部分进一步发展了女权主义立场理论的逻辑性，与它的马克思主义的起源相比更惊人。 38、见Jaggar, Feminist Politics. 39、一些女权主义认识论的批评（包括一些女权主义批评家已主张：一种持女性的经验为女权主义知识的主张，提供依据的女 权主义认识论的存在。有时，这种传说的认识论被当作是女性政治认识论或“中心女性”认识论。女性的经验的清晰度在女权主 义认识论中起着重要的作用；正如我在第6章和第2部分中所讨论的，清晰地表明女性经验使学科更少偏爱和歪曲成为可能，但 它不提供学科坚强的基础---它不以此为基础